James Tyne Moody

The case concerned The American Insurance Company's action for declaratory judgment that its commercial general liability policy issued to Crown Packaging International did not cover Crown's claim for indemnification of approximately $454,000 in chargebacks taken by Crown's customer Ecolab for defective plastic containers that caused date-code and graphics problems with Ecolab's soap products after filling. The court resolved cross-motions for summary judgment on coverage issues, including whether the events qualified as property damage from an occurrence under the policy. The court concluded that damage to and loss of use of Ecolab's soap constituted covered property damage because it involved tangible property other than the containers themselves, distinguishing precedents that found no occurrence when only the insured's product was affected.

business & regulatory

In this case, pro se plaintiff Joseph Trzeciak sued State Farm Fire & Casualty Company for refusing to cover property damage he allegedly sustained during his 2004 arrest by Hammond police, when the property was insured under a State Farm policy. The court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the claims against it, while allowing the plaintiff to amend his complaint against another party. The core reasoning was that the insurance policy required any lawsuit to be filed within one year of the loss (extended by agreement to December 29, 2005), but the complaint was not filed until August 2010; the court found no basis to toll the contractual limitations period due to the plaintiff's incarceration or his attorneys' actions under Indiana law, and the plaintiff's submissions failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Rivas v. Martin, the plaintiff sued the LaGrange County Sheriff and jail officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that her detention in the county jail after she posted bond on a state felony charge violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because it exceeded the 48-hour limit specified in an ICE immigration detainer. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and on qualified immunity grounds, arguing that no constitutional violation arose from the regulation and that any right was not clearly established. The court denied the motion, holding that the complaint adequately alleged the defendants lacked authority to detain Rivas beyond the detainer's expiration and that her right to be free from unauthorized detention was clearly established under existing precedent. The core reasoning was that the detainer imposed an express temporal limit on custody, the plaintiff had satisfied all state release conditions, and the defendants provided no alternative legal basis for continued holding after the 48-hour period expired.

immigrationcriminal lawcivil rights

In this case, high-end repossessor Nick Popovich and his company sued freelance journalist Mark Weingarten for claims including breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets arising from interviews about repossession work and a subsequent magazine article. Weingarten filed counterclaims for defamation and interference with prospective business advantage, alleging that Popovich made false statements to others in the entertainment industry about the disclosure of confidential information. Popovich moved to dismiss the counterclaims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court denied the motion, holding that Weingarten's allegations were sufficient to meet the plausibility standard under Rule 8 and that Indiana's choice-of-law rules supported applying California law to the tort claims without rendering them deficient.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Graber v. Mad Brewer, Inc., plaintiff Corry L. Graber sued her former employer for gender discrimination after her termination as general manager, alleging she was replaced by a male assistant manager, as reflected in her EEOC charge. Defendant Mad Brewer moved for summary judgment, arguing that undisputed facts showed no genuine issue for trial on the discrimination claim. The court granted the motion, ruling that the plaintiff had not properly disputed many of the defendant's material facts under Local Rule 56.1 despite partial compliance via affidavit citations, leading those facts to be deemed admitted, and that the remaining evidence failed to create triable issues.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In Sims v. Humane Society of St. Joseph County Indiana, African-American plaintiffs alleged that the Humane Society and a veterinary clinic discriminated against them on the basis of race when denying their application to adopt a dog, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 as well as Title II, Title VI, negligence, and contract theories. The district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). It dismissed the Title II, Title VI, and most other claims for failure to state a plausible cause of action or lack of standing, while allowing the §§ 1981 and 1982 claims against the Humane Society and Parrett defendants to proceed. The court reasoned that the complaint's factual allegations of differential treatment and pretextual denial met the plausibility standard for those civil rights statutes but not for the dismissed counts.

civil rights

The case involved defendant Wynell Gray, who was charged with conspiring to defraud the Indiana Medicaid Program by submitting false billings for nonexistent transportation services through two companies and with executing a scheme to defraud Medicaid through one of those companies. A jury convicted Gray on the conspiracy and scheme counts related to the first company. Gray moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence of agreement and intent was insufficient because it rested on uncorroborated testimony from her codefendant, and she also moved for a new trial based on allegedly improper prosecutorial comments about missing witnesses. The court denied both motions, holding that a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the codefendant's in-court testimony together with other evidence, that credibility determinations are for the jury, and that the prosecutor's responsive comments did not shift the burden of proof or render the trial unfair.

criminal lawhealthcareprocedure

The case involved the State of Indiana and the City of East Chicago suing former mayor Robert Pastrick, his aide James Fife, councilman Frank Kollintzas, and others for operating the city government as a racketeering enterprise from 1996 to 2004, in violation of federal RICO law and state laws against theft and official misconduct, through practices such as diverting public funds into political slush funds and requiring employee contributions tied to political support. After the defendants failed to appear for trial and accepted default, the court entered default judgment on liability. At a subsequent evidentiary hearing on damages, the court found the well-pleaded allegations true and credited the plaintiffs' evidence, awarding $2,689,917.18 in compensatory damages plus prejudgment interest, $108,619.50 in costs, and injunctive relief barring the defendants from future involvement in city affairs or gaming funds. The core reasoning was that default established liability, shifting the focus to proving the amount and form of relief based on the credible testimony and exhibits presented.

criminal law

The case involved Jim Pittman, an African American employee at the Housing Authority of the City of South Bend (SBHA), who sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act alleging racial discrimination and retaliation after he was not promoted to a Maintenance Technician III position. The court granted the SBHA's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the claims. The court reasoned that Pittman lacked the qualifications and experience required for the role, other candidates such as Boone were more qualified based on certifications, management experience, and demonstrated skills, and Pittman failed to present evidence that the decision was pretextual or motivated by race or retaliation, especially given that multiple decision-makers and supervisors were also African American.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involves plaintiff Bethany Kuntzman suing her former employer Wal-Mart Stores East for claims under Title VII including hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and retaliation. The court first denied the defendant's motion to strike sections of the plaintiff's sur-reply, ruling that most sections addressed evidence admissibility within the scope of prior leave and caused no prejudice. On summary judgment, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, finding insufficient evidence to support constructive discharge or certain retaliation claims but allowing others related to post-employment criminal charges to proceed due to their nexus to employment and potential impact on future prospects.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a parent, H.S., suing the Huntington County Community School Corporation on behalf of her third-grade child J.S., claiming that the school's allowance of a religious time-release program—conducted in a trailer parked on school property during school hours by the Associated Churches of Huntington County—violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing and granted in part the motion for a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the use of school grounds for the religious instruction. The core reasoning was that the arrangement created a strong likelihood of perceived school endorsement of religion, due to the trailer's visible placement on school property, the school's logistical facilitation, the 97% student participation rate, and the lack of comparable access for non-religious groups, while students not participating remained in classrooms.

religious libertycivil rights

In this case, plaintiff Rochelle Batchelor, a former sales representative for Merck & Co., sued her employer alleging violations of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. She claimed that Merck discriminated against her based on her expressed intent to become pregnant and retaliated against her after she complained to supervisors and filed an EEOC charge. The court granted Merck's motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue of material fact on either claim. The decision rested on evidence that Batchelor was an at-will employee whose performance consistently fell below objectives in evaluations and sales metrics, leading to a 30-day warning, a performance improvement plan, and eventual termination for poor performance. There was also no evidence that her treatment changed after she engaged in protected activity.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerned parents suing a school corporation and employees after their 15-year-old daughter was given a TeenScreen psychological assessment at school using a passive consent process, in which parents received notice but had to opt out for their child not to participate; the plaintiffs alleged violations of federal and state constitutional and statutory rights due to lack of active written parental consent. The defendants moved for summary judgment on claims against the school entity and individuals in both official and personal capacities. The court reviewed the factual background of the screening's implementation after a student suicide, the passive consent procedure adopted after low active consent rates, the student's signing of an assent form, and arguments regarding state consent statutes, ruling on whether consent validity depended on state law and addressing related statutory interpretations without resolving all factual disputes in the excerpted analysis.

civil rightsfamily law

Clyde Piggie, a pro se prisoner, sued Ms. Riggle claiming she retaliated against him for filing grievances and lawsuits by requesting his transfer from a medium-security facility to a maximum-security facility in violation of his First Amendment rights. Riggle moved for summary judgment on grounds that she only initiated the process for legitimate reasons and was not the decision-maker, that she had immunity, and that Piggie failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not properly appealing the transfer. The court denied the motion, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Riggle caused the transfer, whether the stated reasons were pretextual, and whether Piggie had exhausted available remedies through appeals to the classification department and commissioner.

civil rightsfree speechcriminal law

The case involved a personal injury claim by the plaintiff against Great Lakes Terminal & Transport Corporation after an accident with one of its tanker trucks. The plaintiff sought damages for lost wages and lost corporate profits from Gaerte Engines, Inc., a company he owned 70% of and worked for as president. The court granted the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on these claims. It reasoned that the plaintiff had continued receiving his salary, so there were no lost wages, and that under Indiana law, he could not recover the corporation's lost profits as he was not the sole shareholder and the losses were partly due to market trends rather than solely his injury.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Lita Filippo, a volunteer anti-drug activist, suing defendant Lee Publications, Inc., the publisher of The Times newspaper, for defamation over multiple articles, editorials, and a cartoon published in 2003 that reported on her drunk driving arrest and criticized her role on the Partnership for a Drug-Free Lake County board. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. It reasoned that several publications constituted protected opinions under the First Amendment and that the plaintiff, as a limited public figure involved in a matter of public concern, failed to present evidence that the defendant published any false statements with actual malice. The court also found no actionable implication that the plaintiff had been convicted rather than merely arrested.

free speechtorts & liability

The case involves David Jean-Baptiste, a black Haitian man, suing his former employer K-Z, Inc. for discriminatory discharge and harassment based on race and national origin under Title VII after being fired 21 days into his employment in the lamination department. Jean-Baptiste alleged multiple incidents of racial and national origin slurs and physical harassment by coworkers, along with supervisors' failure to address his complaints, while K-Z maintained the termination was due to unsatisfactory progress during the orientation period. K-Z moved for summary judgment on both claims and to strike portions of the plaintiff's filings. The court denied both motions, determining that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the existence of a hostile work environment, the employer's knowledge and response, and whether the stated reason for termination was a pretext for discrimination.

civil rightslabor & employment

In United States v. Davis, a federal prisoner filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging his 168-month sentence for distributing cocaine base after pleading guilty pursuant to a written agreement, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for not appealing or contesting a sentencing enhancement for firearm possession and later arguing that judicial findings on the firearm and drug quantity violated Blakely v. Washington. The court denied and dismissed the motion with prejudice under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. The core reasoning was that the plea agreement included an enforceable waiver of appeal and collateral attack rights that covered the sentence-determination issues raised, the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and counsel had no duty to anticipate subsequent changes in the law such as those in Blakely.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves Efrain Santos's post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging his federal convictions for operating an illegal lottery (Bolita) in Indiana and related money laundering offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Santos was convicted after a 1997 trial on conspiracy, illegal gambling business, and promotion money laundering counts based on his use of betting proceeds to pay collectors and winners, with sentences running concurrently up to 210 months; his direct appeal was denied. The court grants the § 2255 motion in part, holding that a subsequent circuit decision interpreting the term 'proceeds' in the money laundering statute to mean net profits rather than gross receipts applies retroactively to Santos's case because it clarifies the statute's original meaning, potentially invalidating the laundering convictions that rested on payments from gross receipts.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a claim by seamen plaintiffs against defendant Riverboat Services, Inc. for overtime wages under general maritime law, after which the defendant failed to timely respond to the complaint, leading to entry of default and a default judgment for over $1.1 million. The defendant moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to vacate the default judgment, arguing excusable neglect and meritorious defenses including the two-dismissal rule from Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1), while plaintiffs filed a related motion for judicial notice of proceedings in a prior Northern District of Illinois case. The court granted the motion for judicial notice of the related docket and pleadings, noting their direct relation to the issues, and analyzed the vacatur motion under the standard that Rule 60(b) relief is more liberally granted for defaults to favor resolution on the merits, identifying potential prejudice issues and valid defenses that questioned the judgment's propriety.

procedurelabor & employment