George Franklin Morris

This case was an action by the government under Section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to enjoin a New Hampshire machine repair and construction company from violating the Act's overtime pay requirements for employees engaged in work connected to interstate commerce. The defendant admitted the Act's constitutionality and jurisdiction but contended its application was limited to only certain employees performing specific tasks at particular times, while denying any violations. The court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the injunction, holding that the statute broadly covers such employees without specific exceptions applying here, that the defendant's pleadings and conduct indicated it was not in full voluntary compliance when the suit was filed, and that injunctive relief was necessary to deter future violations even if some had ceased.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved a contract dispute between the Frederick Snare Corporation, a New York contractor, and the Maine-New Hampshire Interstate Bridge Authority over payment for extra work on the foundations of a bridge across the Piscataqua River. The contractor claimed additional compensation for excavating to greater depths than indicated in the bidding plans and for other unforeseen site conditions, asserting that the plans misrepresented subsurface conditions and that the engineers' decisions were biased. The court found that the contract permitted recovery for extra costs when subsurface conditions differed materially from those shown on the plans, that the engineers could not serve as impartial arbiters due to their interest in minimizing project costs for funding agencies, and that payment should be based on the contractor's actual documented expenses. It entered a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $136,119.16 plus interest and costs.

business & regulatory

The case involved a bankrupt who filed a voluntary petition in 1939, failed to provide indemnity for expenses or prosecute the case, resulting in dismissal for want of prosecution before any creditor notices or claims were filed; he then filed a second petition in 1940 listing the same debts. Objecting creditors challenged an unqualified discharge, and the court considered whether the first proceeding's dismissal made the debts res judicata and nondischargeable in the second. The court reversed the Referee's ruling granting an unconditional discharge, holding that precedents such as Pollet v. Cosel establish that failure to prosecute the initial petition bars discharge of scheduled claims in a later proceeding, and remanded for a qualified discharge excluding those claims.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a copyright infringement claim brought by Doll & Smith against funeral home operator Lewis Wilkinson for continuing to publish advertising cuts from their copyrighted booklet 'Publicity Guide for Funeral Directors, Funeral Series B' after their three-year service contract expired in 1936. The court ruled in favor of the defendant, finding no liability for infringement. The core reasoning was that the plaintiffs failed to provide adequate statutory notice of the copyright under 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 9 and 18, as the materials sent to the defendant consisted of loose leaves without a cover indicating copyright, and the 'DS' symbol with a circled 'c' on the cuts was too small and microscopic to be visible without magnification, leaving an innocent user without proper notice as required by precedent.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved New Hampshire wholesale beverage dealers suing state officials to enjoin enforcement of liquor regulations under chapters 99 of the Laws of 1933 (as amended) and related statutes, which required out-of-state manufacturers to obtain certificates of approval, submit monthly sales reports, and pay fees in order for wholesalers to purchase their products; the plaintiffs claimed these provisions violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. The court denied the requested injunction, vacated the temporary restraining order, and dismissed the bill. It reasoned that the Twenty-First Amendment and Webb-Kenyon Act authorize states to regulate the traffic in intoxicating liquors free from Commerce Clause limitations so long as the rules are reasonable and bear a substantial relation to public health, morals, or safety, and concluded that the reporting and fee requirements met that standard without operating extraterritorially or amounting to an invalid tax.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case involves a debtor corporation seeking court confirmation of a reorganization plan under section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act after prior receivership proceedings. The plan proposed transferring assets from the trustee to the debtor, settling bonded and unsecured debts at reduced rates with creditor assent, exchanging preferred and common stock at ratios of 4:1 and 10:1 respectively to reduce outstanding shares, and authorizing future mortgaging of corporate property to raise working capital while altering voting and dividend rights. Although majorities of both classes of stockholders had accepted the plan, the court declined to confirm it. The decision rested on findings that the plan was not fair and equitable, particularly due to vague provisions allowing the board to encumber assets without defined limits and insufficient arrangements for cash payment of administrative costs as required by the statute.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a claim of unfair competition where the plaintiff, a Missouri corporation operating since 1914 under the names 'Western Auto Supply Company' and 'Western Auto Stores' as a nationwide seller of auto supplies with extensive advertising and stores in the Boston area, sued a New Hampshire corporation incorporated in 1934 that used identical names for a similar store in Manchester, NH. The court found as fact that the defendant deliberately chose the names to imitate the plaintiff and benefit from its established goodwill. It decided that the plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief against the defendant's use of the names, even though the plaintiff was not authorized to do business in New Hampshire and had not opened stores there. The core reasoning was that a domestic corporation cannot use a trade name identical to a foreign corporation's when chosen with knowledge of the latter's business and reputation, as this constitutes fraud that can be restrained to protect goodwill in the shared trading area reached by advertising and customer travel.

business & regulatoryproperty

In Bartlett v. Doherty, plaintiffs sought to recover the purchase prices of securities bought from defendant H.L. Doherty & Co. through its salesman Leonard O. Parent, who was not licensed in New Hampshire for 1929 under the state's Blue Sky law, even though the securities were qualified for sale and the defendant was a licensed dealer. The court ruled for the plaintiffs in three consolidated actions, awarding recovery of amounts paid (less dividends received) plus interest from the date of the writs. The core reasoning was that the unlicensed agent's involvement violated New Hampshire Public Laws c. 284, making the in-state sales subject to the statute and allowing rescission, and that the law applies despite confirmations from the defendant's New York office because otherwise state Blue Sky laws would have no effect.

business & regulatory

This case concerns a contempt petition filed by Pine Tree Products Company against Teele Soap Manufacturing Company and its officers Elliot W. Denault and Talbot C. Chase for allegedly violating a permanent injunction issued on April 2, 1934, in an underlying equity suit. The original dispute involved contracts for manufacturing Billy B. Yan’s Pine Tree Soap, which the court canceled after finding fraud and which resulted in injunctions barring Teele from producing or selling the soap under Pine Tree’s trademark or using a secret formula, along with requirements to return property and refrain from unfair competition. The court adjudged Teele and Denault in contempt for continuing manufacturing and sales activities in defiance of the orders and for failing to return items like die appurtenances, while finding Chase not in contempt because he had resigned his officer role before the violations and had no involvement. Damages were to be assessed by a master, with the core reasoning that injunctions must be obeyed as issued and that a corporation acts through its officers who bear responsibility for willful violations.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether an endowment life insurance policy issued to bankrupt Edwin C. Bray, which had a cash surrender value, became part of the bankruptcy estate or qualified for exemption under New Hampshire law after Bray filed for bankruptcy in 1934. The court held that the policy passed to the trustee as an asset of the estate. It reasoned that the applicable state statute exempts such policies only when the insured has fully parted with beneficial interest by making proceeds payable to a named beneficiary other than himself, but here the policy's terms allowed Bray to change the beneficiary at will, borrow against it, or redirect it to his own estate, so the exemption did not apply under the Bankruptcy Act's provisions preserving state exemptions and vesting nonexempt property in the trustee.

property

This case involves a claim by plaintiff Maurice Bowen to recover a judgment for injuries from a 1931 car accident under an automobile indemnity insurance policy issued to Eva Cote, owner of the Reo sedan. Bowen had obtained a judgment against Ulrao Soucy, who was driving the car at the time of the accident, but Soucy could not pay; Bowen then sued Cote, Soucy, and the Phoenix Indemnity Company. The policy and New Hampshire statute extended coverage to any person operating the vehicle with the owner's express or implied consent. The court found that Cote had permitted Soucy to use the car only on the condition that a licensed driver operate it, which was not the case on the trip in question, and that the insurer had properly reserved its rights before defending the underlying suit. Applying New Hampshire precedent on permissive use, the court entered a decree for the defendants.

torts & liability

In this bankruptcy case, Javan M. Bussell filed a voluntary petition for adjudication as a bankrupt and later applied for a discharge from his debts, which creditors opposed through objections to his schedules and statements. The primary objections concerned the alleged intentional omission of an automobile from his asset list (later amended) and the undervaluation of household furniture at $100 when it was worth substantially more, along with a false financial statement provided to the North Berwick National Bank. The court found no intent to conceal the automobile or other issues such as inadequate books or improper transfers, but determined that the furniture omission was intentional and that the bank statement was materially false. Under section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act, the court sustained the objections regarding the furniture and financial statement, resulting in denial of the discharge.

procedurefederal power

In Jones v. McGill, a federal prisoner sued the county and its jail keeper in state court for injuries sustained while working at the jail, alleging negligence. The defendants removed the case to federal district court under a provision allowing removal for suits against officers of U.S. courts acting under color of their office. The plaintiff moved to remand the case back to state court. The court held that the jail keeper qualifies as such an officer when holding federal prisoners, because state jails housing federal inmates and their keepers are deemed U.S. officials for these purposes under relevant statutes and precedents. Therefore, the motion to remand was denied, allowing the case to proceed in federal court.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

This case involved a challenge by New Hampshire public utility companies and their out-of-state holding company affiliates to an order by the state's Public Service Commission requiring them to appear and provide detailed financial information, including stock issuances, contracts, and ownership details, as part of an investigation into their operations. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction in federal court under section 266 of the Judicial Code, arguing the order exceeded the commission's jurisdiction and would violate due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court granted the injunction, directing the parties to submit a form for it, while noting that local utilities should comply with requests for information they possess. The core reasoning was that material factual disputes existed regarding whether the out-of-state entities were doing business in New Hampshire and thus subject to the commission's authority, requiring a full hearing on the merits before enforcement, and that wrongful assumption of jurisdiction could lead to unconstitutional deprivations.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a bankruptcy proceeding for the Barton Company, where lessor Harry G. Clough sought to prove a claim for damages arising from the bankrupt lessee's failure to restore leased premises as required by a 1911 written lease. The referee disallowed the claim as non-provable, but the court reversed that decision on review. The court held that the claim was provable under section 63a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act because it was founded on an express contractual obligation to restore the premises upon termination of the lease, which became fixed and actionable at the time of the bankruptcy filing. The obligation was not contingent or limited to post-petition rent, distinguishing it from cases barring claims for future rent or lease termination damages. The matter was remanded for liquidation of the replacement costs and allowance of the claim.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involved a bill in equity by the United States seeking a preference for $2,221.40 in postal funds deposited in the People's Trust Company, a New Hampshire bank that had been placed under state supervision and liquidation. State bank commissioners had petitioned the superior court in January 1925 after determining the bank's business was unsafe, leading to an injunction against deposits, possession of assets, and eventual liquidation under New Hampshire law, though the petitions did not allege insolvency. The court held that the United States was entitled to priority under Revised Statutes section 3466, reasoning that the federal priority statute applies to equity receiverships or equivalent liquidation proceedings where insolvency exists in fact, and that state law or procedures cannot impair or supersede the federal claim. The bank had acquiesced in the state process by accepting service without contest, resulting in dispossession of its property and ongoing liquidation by the commissioners.

federal powerbusiness & regulatory