This case concerns a bankruptcy trustee's attempt to recover as a preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 547 funds that debtor ESA transferred to obtain a letter of credit securing performance bonds from Hanover Insurance for government contracts. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment to Hanover, and the District Court affirmed. The court held that the earmarking defense applied because the funds came from a specific lender (Prospect) and were designated solely for the letter of credit without diminishing the estate. It further held that Hanover established a complete new-value defense under § 547(c)(1) because it issued the bonds contemporaneously in exchange for the collateral, enabling ESA to obtain and perform revenue-generating contracts. The decision rested on undisputed facts showing the transfers occurred on the same dates as the bond issuance and contract awards.
This case involved a former employee suing his employers for wrongful termination under the FLSA and North Carolina public policy, claiming retaliation for filing prior lawsuits regarding overtime pay and outsourcing of his position. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The core reasoning was that claims based on events before the second prior lawsuit were barred by res judicata, the non-renewal of the outsourcing contract was a legitimate business decision unrelated to protected activity, and the plaintiff failed to present admissible evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact on causation or pretext.
Cleveland Construction sued Fireman's Fund Insurance over an all-risks builder's risk policy for a county courthouse project, alleging breach of contract for unpaid claims related to damaged or stolen materials, repair work, and related costs, plus added claims for bad faith refusal to pay and unfair/deceptive trade practices after the insurer allegedly failed to investigate. The court had previously dismissed a negligence claim. On the insurer's summary judgment motion, the court granted judgment to the defendant on the bad faith claim but denied it on the breach of contract and unfair/deceptive trade practices claims. The ruling on bad faith rested on the absence of evidence showing aggravated conduct by the insurer, while the unfair practices claim survived due to a factual dispute over whether the insurer violated statutory duties by not timely investigating the claims.
This case involves claims under ERISA regarding the Bank of America cash balance pension plan (BAC Plan) and transfers of assets from the company's 401(k) plans into it. Plaintiffs challenged the plan's method for calculating lump-sum benefits upon early retirement (Count I), as well as the transfers themselves. The court granted the motion to dismiss Counts I and III but denied it as to Count IV. For the surviving claim, the court found that the complaint plausibly alleged a prohibited transaction because plan fiduciaries allowed 401(k) assets to be commingled and used to offset the bank's funding obligations, causing participants to lose separate account protections under ERISA sections 406(a)(1)(D) and 406(b).
This ERISA case involved plaintiff Lynn Vincent, who was involuntarily transferred from Lucent to IBM in 2001, received a lump-sum pension distribution, and was rehired by Lucent in 2002 but automatically enrolled in the Account Balance Plan rather than the closed Service Based Pension Program. Vincent sought injunctive relief to reenter the SBP and statutory damages for the company's alleged failure to produce certain plan documents during her administrative appeals. The court granted summary judgment to Vincent on the pension eligibility issue, ordering that she be allowed to reenter the SBP upon repaying her lump-sum distribution with interest and receive service credits from September 2001 onward, while denying her claim for statutory damages. The decision rested on the court's interpretation of the plan's reentry exceptions and the administrative record, finding Vincent eligible under the plan terms despite the administrator's contrary determination. The request for attorney fees was held in abeyance.
The case involved professional race car driver Jeremy Mayfield and his company suing NASCAR and related parties after his suspension for allegedly violating NASCAR's Substance Abuse Policy following a random drug test conducted by Aegis. Plaintiffs asserted claims including defamation, unfair and deceptive trade practices, breach of contract, negligence, and violation of the North Carolina Persons with Disabilities Protection Act, primarily alleging flaws in the testing process and improper publication of results. The court granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed all claims. It reasoned that the signed NASCAR agreements and Policy contained broad releases waiving liability for claims arising from the Policy's implementation, including negligence and publication of results, and that plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to support any of their claims.