Herbert Frazier Murray

The case concerned Baltimore City Ordinance 307, which banned cigarette billboard advertising in designated zones; plaintiff Penn Advertising, a billboard owner in those zones, sued the City seeking to enjoin the ordinance on grounds that it violated the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech, was preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, and was preempted by Maryland state law. The court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issues of material fact and resolving the claims as pure questions of law. It upheld the ordinance under the Central Hudson test for commercial speech restrictions, held that the ordinance did not trigger federal preemption because it imposed no additional labeling or advertising requirements, and concluded that state law on cigarette sales to minors did not occupy the field of billboard advertising regulation.

free speechbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved plaintiff Leon Neufeld, who installed a ten-foot satellite dish in his front yard in violation of Baltimore City's zoning rules requiring a thirty-foot setback and a special permit, resulting in eleven criminal convictions and fines. After the city enacted Ordinance 266 imposing stricter size limits on satellite dishes, Neufeld sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming constitutional violations and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The court had previously held that the ordinance's size restrictions were preempted by FCC regulations under 47 C.F.R. § 25.104 to the extent they unreasonably limited satellite reception, but that the independent setback violation precluded any § 1983 liability or attorney fees. On the pending motions for summary judgment and reconsideration, the court denied relief on the as-applied claims and attorney fees, granted limited declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the preempted provisions, and scheduled further briefing on whether the setback ordinance applied to the original installation under state property law.

civil rightspropertyfederal power

The case involved a jury verdict awarding $2.5 million to Westfarm Associates against defendants International Fabricare Institute and Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission for tort damages. After judgment was entered, WSSC moved to reduce its liability to $200,000 under the cap provided by the Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act. The court denied the motion, holding that WSSC had waived the defense by failing to plead the statutory cap as an affirmative defense in its answer or raise it at any point before or during the trial. The court reasoned that such a limitation on liability constitutes an avoidance that must be timely asserted under federal procedural rules to avoid prejudicing the opposing parties, who might have otherwise addressed issues like the number of occurrences or pre-effective date damages.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned groundwater contamination with the hazardous solvent tetrachloroethylene (PCE) beneath land owned by plaintiff Westfarm Associates. Westfarm sued defendant International Fabricare Institute (IFI), a dry-cleaning trade group that used and disposed of PCE on its adjacent property, and both parties brought claims against the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC), which owned and operated the leaking sewer system into which IFI had poured PCE wastes. The court resolved four pending motions for summary judgment under CERCLA, RCRA, and state law, finding that PCE from IFI had migrated through the cracked sewer lateral into WSSC's Tech Road Sewer and that WSSC had not established a defense under CERCLA § 107(b)(3).

environmentpropertytorts & liability

The case involved a Baltimore homeowner who installed a ten-foot satellite dish in his front yard, leading to multiple criminal convictions under city zoning ordinances that limited satellite dishes to under six feet in residential areas, required permits and setbacks, and treated them more restrictively than other antennas. After removing the dish, the plaintiff sued the city and officials, claiming the ordinances were preempted by FCC regulations and violated constitutional rights, while seeking damages under federal civil rights statutes. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff, declaring that the size restrictions on eight-to-twelve-foot satellite dishes in R-1 districts were preempted by 47 C.F.R. § 25.104 because they unreasonably limited satellite signal reception, and enjoining enforcement of those provisions. The decision rested on the FCC regulation's preemptive effect over conflicting local zoning rules that singled out satellite dishes, while finding no preemption of the generally applicable setback requirements.

federal powerproperty

The case involved a religious order that hired a builder for a convent construction project secured by performance and payment bonds from an insurance company. When the builder defaulted and the surety refused to complete the work or pay subcontractors, the order sued for breach of contract, bad faith, and conversion. The court dismissed the bad faith and conversion claims, holding that under Maryland law such tort claims do not arise from breaches of surety contracts. It also stayed the proceedings pending arbitration as provided in the construction contract.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In Lucas v. Cheney, the plaintiff, a former Defense Mapping Agency employee, sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging race and sex discrimination as well as retaliation after receiving a verbal reprimand for leave procedures, a supervisor's threat, and a written reprimand for unauthorized absence that was later rescinded. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims failed to allege any adverse employment actions and were moot since the plaintiff no longer worked there. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case, holding that the incidents did not qualify as ultimate employment decisions under Title VII precedents such as Page v. Bolger and Raley v. Board of St. Mary’s County Commissioners, which require actions like hiring, firing, or promotion decisions rather than intermediate steps or rescinded reprimands. The court further noted that the reprimands did not become part of the plaintiff's final employment record and were unrelated to her later termination for fraud.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved parents suing county and state social services officials under §1983 for alleged due process violations arising from an investigation into suspected child abuse of their infant son, where the case was ruled unsubstantiated but records in the Automated Master File were allegedly improperly maintained or coded. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in part based on Eleventh Amendment immunity for the county department and official capacity claims for damages, but denied it in part allowing equitable relief and individual capacity claims. It also granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment after converting the motion due to submitted evidence, finding that the maintenance of the records implicated a protected liberty interest without adequate process.

civil rightsfamily lawprocedure

This case involved two longshoremen employed by an independent stevedoring company who were injured when they slipped on oil or transmission fluid while unloading vehicles from a ship at the Port of Baltimore. They sued the vessel owner under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), alleging negligence for failing to clean up or warn about the slippery conditions. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Applying the standards from Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, it held that the shipowner’s duty is limited to exercising ordinary care so that an expert stevedore can safely perform operations and warning of hazards not obvious to a competent stevedore; the plaintiffs presented no evidence that the oil patches were not obvious hazards or that the shipowner acted unreasonably by relying on the stevedore to manage them.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

The plaintiff, a permanent resident alien and Australian citizen, contacted GEICO to obtain homeowners insurance for his new home but was refused coverage solely because he was not a U.S. citizen, though he was later offered a policy after filing a state complaint. He sued GEICO under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 seeking compensatory and punitive damages plus declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged discrimination in contract formation. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the complaint sufficiently alleged a live case or controversy based on claimed damages, that § 1981 provides a cause of action for private alienage discrimination in contractual matters, that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not preclude the claim, and that abstention was unwarranted.

civil rights

The case involves the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as receiver for a failed savings and loan association, seeking to recover under a directors and officers liability insurance policy for losses allegedly caused by the institution's officers and directors. The court initially granted summary judgment to the FDIC on issues of timely notice under the policy and the interpretation of an ambiguous endorsement, construing it against the insurer under Maryland law. On reconsideration, prompted by intervening state precedent and arguments about corporate capacity, the court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment with respect to the FDIC's claims but denied it as to the remaining plaintiffs. The reasoning focused on the application of Maryland contract law to the policy language, the lack of admissible extrinsic evidence of intent, and the rule that forfeited corporations lack capacity to sue.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, Joseph Venneri was convicted in 1982 of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 for a scheme involving a bribe to a Marriott project manager and was ordered to pay $3,512 in restitution to Marriott as a condition of probation. After the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in McNally v. United States held that the mail fraud statute did not cover schemes to defraud of intangible rights like honest services, Venneri's conviction was vacated via a writ of error coram nobis. The court addressed whether it had authority to order Marriott to repay the restitution, despite Marriott not being a party to the criminal proceeding. It concluded that jurisdiction existed under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, because no statutory mechanism addressed repayment after vacatur of a conviction, the underlying offense no longer existed, and Marriott was closely connected to the original restitution order. Principles of justice required the refund of money paid under an unconstitutional conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

Dr. Sharon Johnson sued NIH officials under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging sexual harassment by her supervisor and failure to accommodate her narcolepsy and related medical conditions that affected her work schedule and commute. After a bench trial, the court ruled in her favor on the handicap discrimination claim, finding she was an otherwise qualified individual with handicaps who had been denied reasonable accommodations such as flexible arrival times. The court ordered her reinstatement to a comparable GS-14 position, back pay of $57,638.39 after offsets for mitigation and benefits received, front pay until reinstatement, and attorneys' fees. The decision rested on evidence that her prior performance was satisfactory, that flexitime posed no undue hardship, and that the lack of accommodation led to her inability to continue in the role.

civil rightslabor & employment

In this case, defendant Aiken faced charges for possessing an unregistered sawed-off shotgun under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court addressed whether these offenses qualify as 'crimes of violence' under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A), which would permit a detention hearing to assess flight risk and community safety. Relying on the statutory definition in 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(B) that mirrors 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), the court examined only the intrinsic nature of the offenses rather than the defendant's specific conduct, following Fourth Circuit precedent in United States v. Thompson. It concluded that both offenses constitute crimes of violence because unregistered firearms like sawed-off shotguns are inherently dangerous and felon possession involves a substantial risk of physical force, drawing support from Ninth Circuit authority in United States v. Dunn. The court therefore denied the motion to revoke the detention order.

criminal lawguns

The case involved Quality Automotive Company, as assignee of Parts Pro Distributing, suing Signet Bank for breaching an obligation of good faith under a loan and security agreement by terminating the line of credit. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court denied the motion, holding that Maryland's UCC Section 1-203 creates an independent cause of action for breach of good faith in contract performance and enforcement, following precedents from the First and Sixth Circuits. The court also found an implied private right of action under a state banking statute prohibiting unfair practices, applying the Cort v. Ash test.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a class of tenured faculty members at the former Community College of Baltimore who sued state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after the Maryland General Assembly transferred the college to state control as the New Community College of Baltimore. The plaintiffs alleged that the transfer legislation and resulting termination of their prior employment violated the Contracts Clause and Due Process Clause by abrogating their tenure rights without adequate process. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the statute creating the new institution did not impair contractual obligations in violation of the Contracts Clause and that the revised evaluation, hearing, and appeals procedures satisfied due process requirements. The decision rested on the statute's provisions disclaiming liability for prior contracts, offering temporary employment, and establishing new terms set by the incoming board, along with the financial and operational justifications for the state takeover.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In Johnson v. Sullivan, plaintiff Dr. Sharon Johnson, a federal employee at the National Institutes of Health, brought claims of sex discrimination and sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 along with handicap discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, alleging her employer failed to accommodate her medical conditions such as idiopathic CNS hypersomnolence and cardiac arrhythmias, leading to her constructive discharge. The court first granted the plaintiff's motion to strike numerous unauthenticated exhibits attached to the defendant's summary judgment papers under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) but denied her motion to strike the defendant's timeliness arguments raised in reply, citing judicial economy. Treating the defendant's motion as one for summary judgment due to materials outside the pleadings, the court denied both parties' summary judgment motions, holding that disputed issues of material fact existed on key elements including whether the employer's actions were deliberate and working conditions intolerable enough to constitute constructive discharge.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

This case concerns a dispute over coverage under a directors' and officers' liability insurance policy issued to an insolvent savings and loan association, Fidelity Federal. Plaintiffs, including FSLIC as receiver and subrogee along with Fidelity's subsidiaries, sought to recover for losses from alleged wrongful acts by the association's officers and directors, while the insurer, American Casualty, moved for summary judgment arguing inadequate notice and exclusion under Endorsement No. 2. The court granted plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant's, holding that the conservator's February 1984 letter provided sufficient notice of potential claims under the policy's terms and that the ambiguous endorsement must be construed against the insurer as its drafter. The decision rests on standard principles of Maryland contract interpretation applied to the policy language and undisputed facts regarding the timing and content of the notice.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a challenge by Pfizer to the FDA's interpretation of the term 'drug' under sections 355(b)(1) and (c)(2) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in connection with the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. Pfizer sought to require the FDA to accept and publish patent information for unapproved tablet formulations of the active ingredient nifedipine, arguing that 'drug' encompasses both the active ingredient and the drug product. The FDA interpreted 'drug' to refer only to the specific drug product approved under a new drug application. The court granted summary judgment to the FDA, holding that its interpretation was reasonable and consistent with the statutory language, congressional intent, prior judicial decisions, and agency regulations.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

St. Agnes Hospital, a Catholic institution, sued the chairman of the ACGME after the organization withdrew accreditation from its obstetrics and gynecology residency program due to insufficient training in areas like family planning and certain surgeries, which the hospital avoided on religious grounds. The hospital claimed violations of its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, federal civil rights statutes, due process, and state law, seeking to restore accreditation. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the defendant, finding insufficient evidence of religious discrimination or conspiracy and determining that the accreditation process met due process standards as applied neutrally.

religious libertycivil rightshealthcareprocedure