In this case, Dan Murphy and Wendy Linnington, as assignees of Rusty Nail Acquisition, Inc., sued Acceptance Indemnity Insurance Company alleging breach of the duty to defend and indemnify in an underlying personal injury action. The underlying complaint described Murphy being forcefully escorted out of the Rusty Nail bar and thrown or pushed down stairs by employees, which the plaintiffs framed as negligence claims. The insurance policy covered bodily injury but excluded coverage for expected or intended injuries, claims arising out of assault and battery, and related negligent hiring or supervision allegations. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and granted the defendant's cross-motion, holding that the factual allegations described intentional acts excluded from coverage, so there was no duty to defend or indemnify. The decision focused on the policy language and the underlying complaint's facts rather than the legal theories pleaded.
This case is a patent infringement dispute in which Chet’s Shoes sought a declaratory judgment that its rubber overshoes with studded soles do not infringe two patents held by Kastner for resilient soles containing retractable metal studs, while Kastner counterclaimed for infringement. After claim construction and discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to Chet’s Shoes on non-infringement, holding that the accused products failed to meet key claim limitations including the requirement that studs retract within the sole material until flush with the bottom surface and that stud anchors be embedded in more resilient sole portions, and that no infringement existed under the doctrine of equivalents.
Plaintiff William Ray Costello sued the City of Burlington and its police officers, claiming that officers violated his First Amendment rights by approaching him while he preached loudly on Church Street and issuing a warning under the city's noise ordinance. The case had previously been decided in the defendants' favor, but the Second Circuit remanded for additional evidence on the usual and customary noise levels in that location. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed the case. The court reasoned that Costello's voice carried far beyond ordinary conversation and dominated the area, making the ordinance's application narrowly tailored to the city's interest in controlling unreasonable noise, and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because his actions did not violate clearly established law under precedents like Ward v. Rock Against Racism and Deegan v. City of Ithaca.
free speechreligious libertycriminal lawcivil rights
Dr. Camilla Kelly sued Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company and Unum Group after her disability benefit payments under an "own occupation" policy were discontinued in 2007, alleging she remained totally disabled by mental health conditions and seeking unpaid benefits plus damages on breach of contract and bad faith claims. The insurer moved for summary judgment, citing independent medical examinations and vocational analysis indicating clinical improvement that allowed a return to medical practice, while Kelly cross-moved for partial summary judgment on the contract claim. The court denied both summary judgment motions, concluding that genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether Kelly continued to meet the policy's definition of total disability. It also dismissed sua sponte the implied-covenant claim and denied as moot the insurer's motions to stay discovery and to strike factual statements.
business & regulatoryhealthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure
This case involved plaintiff Elizabeth Russell's challenge to the denial of Medicare Part A coverage for skilled nursing home health services she received from June to December 2004, after the Secretary determined she was not confined to her home as required under the Medicare Act. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, granting Russell's motion to reverse the Secretary's decision, denying the Secretary's motion to affirm, and remanding the case for further administrative proceedings, including possible re-weighing of the evidence. The core reasoning focused on deficiencies in the ALJ's assessment of whether Russell qualified as homebound, including conflicting evidence regarding her ability to perform instrumental activities of daily living like shopping, her medical conditions such as a non-healing wound and fatigue, and inconsistencies in how the homebound standard was applied to the facts. The court found the administrative decision did not adequately address the record in light of the statutory criteria for coverage.
The case Fortunati v. Campagne arose from the June 24, 2006 shooting death of Joseph Fortunati by Vermont State Police troopers after he threatened his family with a handgun while known to be mentally ill and armed. Plaintiffs, Fortunati's family members, sued the officers and supervisors in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging excessive force, along with related state claims. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. It held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because their use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, including the suspect's prior threats, possession of a weapon, erratic behavior, and history of resisting police, and any mistake by the officers was reasonable.