The case concerned whether Starrett City Associates' policy of capping the percentage of black and Hispanic tenants at its Brooklyn housing complex violated the Fair Housing Act. The government brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 3604, alleging that the policy amounted to racial discrimination in rental decisions, advertising, and availability statements. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States and issued a permanent injunction barring the defendants from using race or national origin in tenant selection. The court held that the defendants had openly admitted to treating black and Hispanic applicants differently from white applicants on the basis of race, which directly contravened the statute regardless of any integrative purpose.
This case challenged the constitutionality of the New York City Board of Estimate under the one-person, one-vote principle, as each of the five borough presidents received an equal vote despite large population differences among the boroughs. Plaintiffs, residents of Brooklyn, argued that the allocation violated equal protection due to a 132.9% population deviation between Staten Island and Brooklyn. Following remand, the court applied the Abate v. Mundt framework and determined that this deviation exceeded permissible limits and created a prima facie case of discrimination, shifting the burden to defendants to justify the structure with valid policies and interests. The court concluded that defendants failed to meet this burden with sufficiently precise and supported justifications, rendering the voting allocation unconstitutional.
This case involves plaintiffs' claims that two New York psychiatric centers failed to provide constitutionally adequate treatment to mentally ill patients, focusing on the right-to-treatment claim remanded by the Court of Appeals. The district court held hearings to assess whether the lack of JCAH accreditation at Mid-Hudson and Bronx Psychiatric Center established a violation under Youngberg v. Romeo standards. The court decided that absence of accreditation does not automatically prove inadequate care or shift the burden to defendants, and plaintiffs must affirmatively demonstrate constitutional defects to obtain injunctive relief. The core reasoning is that JCAH accreditation serves only as prima facie evidence of adequacy, while the Court of Appeals opinion requires plaintiffs to document specific deficiencies rather than relying solely on accreditation status.
This case involves consolidated § 1983 civil rights actions brought by a plaintiff convicted of second-degree murder after multiple trials, alleging that the Kings County District Attorney, an assistant DA, and an investigator conspired to suborn perjured testimony from a witness to secure his conviction. The court dismissed the complaints after the plaintiff exhausted state remedies. It held that prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity under Imbler v. Pachtman for actions like the alleged use of perjured testimony, which are intimately associated with the judicial phase of criminal proceedings. Even apart from immunity, the complaints failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution because they disclosed independent probable cause for the prosecution based on other witness testimony and circumstantial evidence, and New York law bars such claims following an affirmed conviction.
This case concerned the calculation of prejudgment interest on a $68,000 jury verdict for economic and noneconomic losses in a federal civil rights action, along with the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The court held that prejudgment interest would apply to the full award, including the emotional distress portion, at the adjusted prime rate under 26 U.S.C. § 6621, and it granted fees after reducing the requested hours by 25% plus specific deductions for time on unsuccessful claims, res judicata issues unrelated to the federal case, travel, and duplicative work. The core reasoning was that federal question cases leave interest rates to the district court's discretion absent a statutory directive, prior procedural opportunities to raise objections had passed, and fee awards under § 1988 require compensation only for time reasonably spent on matters where the plaintiff prevailed.
This case involves seven shareholders of the bankrupt Teltronics Services, Inc. suing Ericsson and affiliated defendants, alleging a conspiracy to bankrupt the company after failed takeover efforts through manipulation of loan agreements, security interests in equipment leases, and related financing terms. The court dismissed the claims, finding that the allegations and facts were identical to those in a prior related action (Teltronics Services, Inc. v. Anaconda-Ericsson) that had already been rejected on the merits. The reasoning emphasized that any asserted fraud or RICO violations lacked legal foundation, that Teltronics' bankruptcy settlement barred derivative claims, and that plaintiffs' attempts to relitigate the same issues were unsupported by new evidence or applicable law.