This case involved a seaman's claim for injuries sustained aboard the vessel President Coolidge. The plaintiff argued he qualified as a seaman under federal statute and was entitled to recover for an accident that occurred while preparing the ship for a fishing voyage. The court held that recovery was unavailable because the injury happened after the plaintiff left his assigned work in the engine room to respond to a personal telephone call from his wife, an action not connected to his employment duties or the ship's service. The decision rested on precedents requiring that an injury occur during the discharge of employment obligations, and the court dismissed the libel after finding the plaintiff's voluntary departure for a personal matter broke the necessary connection to the vessel.
In this case, the plaintiff brought a private action for treble damages under section 7 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, alleging injury to his business from a conspiracy by the defendants to restrain or monopolize interstate commerce in billboard advertising. The court addressed a motion to strike portions of the complaint and to make it more definite and certain, granting the motion in part by striking multiple paragraphs and requiring the plaintiff to plead specific facts. The court reasoned that recovery requires a showing of actual damages to the plaintiff's business or property that are logically inferable from concrete facts, not conjecture, and that the complaint must detail the interstate commerce activities involved, name the alleged conspirators, and demonstrate how any local conduct was tied to a scheme affecting interstate trade. It further held that billboard advertising is intrastate in nature, so additional allegations were needed to establish the required connection to interstate commerce. All other aspects of the motion were denied.
In this admiralty case, charterers sued a vessel owner for damages after a ship was condemned for unseaworthiness, alleging breach of oral warranties about cargo capacity and seaworthiness made both before and after signing a written charter party, plus a separate tort claim for cargo loss from a fire allegedly started by the ship's engineer. The court sustained exceptions to claims based on pre-charter statements, ruling that parties are bound by the written agreement and such inducements fall outside admiralty jurisdiction. It overruled exceptions to post-execution representations, finding they could support a cause of action as warranties tied to tank installations. The tort claim was dismissed because the engineer was the charterer's servant under the master's control, not the owner's agent, so the owner bore no liability for the engineer's conduct.
The case involved a licensed barber operating a late-night shop in Seattle who challenged a city ordinance, enacted under state authority, that restricted barber shop hours to 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. (or 7 p.m. on certain days), claiming it violated the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment by depriving him of valuable goodwill built over 25 years without compensation. The defendant city moved to dismiss the complaint for failing to state a claim warranting relief. The court denied the motion, presuming the ordinance's validity but concluding that the plaintiff's established goodwill was a protected property interest, and that the hour restrictions arbitrarily took away approximately one-third of that interest, which the city lacked power to do under the 14th Amendment. The court therefore ordered a preliminary injunction against enforcement as to the plaintiff.
The case involved a corporation charged with violating federal prohibition laws after its agent sold a yeast compound known to be used in manufacturing alcoholic liquors. The court held the defendant company guilty, ruling that a principal cannot avoid liability for an agent's criminal acts within the scope of employment by merely issuing internal rules restricting conduct. The reasoning emphasized that the national prohibition law forms part of any agency contract, requiring the principal to ensure sales do not aid unlawful purposes, and that knowledge of the agent's actions or facts putting a reasonable person on inquiry suffices to establish corporate responsibility when the sales further the illegal enterprise.
The case involved a railroad employee who sued his employer after being discharged, claiming that the action breached an employment agreement between the railway company and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, the union of which the plaintiff was a member. The court granted the defendant's motion to strike the portions of the complaint that relied on that agreement as the basis for the plaintiff's claims. The core reasoning was that the agreement was a contract solely between the railway company and the union as separate entities, and it did not create any direct contractual rights or remedies for individual union members. The court noted that no right of action accrued to the plaintiff unless based on a separate contract or tort, and it referenced a Privy Council decision reaching the same conclusion in a similar context.
