Monona Shores, Inc. v. United States Steel Corporation
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-12-27 · cited 7×
This case involves plaintiffs, including Monona Shores, Inc. and related entities controlled by Russel Lesperance, who entered contracts in 1965 with defendants including United States Steel Corporation and its affiliates for financing the development of an apartment complex in Madison, Wisconsin. Plaintiffs alleged that the financing was conditioned on purchasing prefabricated steel dwellings from United States Steel, creating an illegal tying arrangement in violation of federal antitrust laws under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, and defendants raised counterclaims along with defenses including the statute of limitations. The court granted dismissal of the antitrust claims, holding that the statute of limitations had expired because plaintiffs' cause of action accrued by September 9, 1967, at which point they possessed sufficient evidence of alleged damages to present a triable issue to a jury. The decision rested on the determination that any antitrust injury from the financing arrangements and subsequent loss of the property was or should have been discoverable well before the filing of the suit, barring prosecution of the claims.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Ferris v. Special School District No. 1
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-11-29 · cited 4×
The case involved a probationary public school teacher in Minnesota whose contract was not renewed after the school board provided written notice and specific reasons for the decision, which she claimed were false, fabricated, and stigmatizing. She brought a federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the denial of a hearing violated her due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court analyzed the claim under the framework of Board of Regents v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann, identifying four situations from those precedents where a nontenured teacher might be entitled to a hearing, and considering a potential fifth exception for maliciously fabricated adverse reports. Under the relevant state statute, the court observed that probationary employment could be terminated without cause or hearing at the board's discretion unless one of the enumerated due process triggers applied.
civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure
Lykken v. Vavreck
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-11-16 · cited 13×
This case was a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by David Lykken, his family, and guests against Minneapolis police officers, claiming illegal arrest, unlawful search and seizure, and other constitutional violations arising from a May 1970 raid on an open-house fundraiser at the Lykken home for the group People Against Missiles. Guests made donations for beer supplied by Lykken, prompting charges of operating a disorderly house and selling liquor without a license under city ordinances; all charges were later dismissed. The court found defendants Tidgwell, Haertel, and Searles liable because they planned and directed the raid with knowledge of the event's actual noncommercial and peaceful character yet proceeded anyway, while dismissing claims against other officers who lacked such knowledge or involvement. The core reasoning focused on the officers' disregard for the plaintiffs' rights under the circumstances actually known to them at the time.
civil rightsfree speechcriminal law
OM Droney Beverage Co. v. Miller Brewing Company
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-10-19 · cited 9×
The case involved Droney Beverage Co., a long-time distributor of Miller Brewing Company products, alleging that Miller breached their agreement by abruptly terminating the distributorship via telegram with no advance notice. Droney sought a preliminary injunction to maintain the business relationship and allow time to sell the distributorship as a going concern. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. It reasoned that the remedy at law in the form of damages was adequate, as the defendant was financially responsible and any losses from insufficient notice could be measured and compensated in a damages action; specific performance of an ongoing distributorship contract was not feasible, and there was no showing of irreparable harm or probable success on the merits sufficient to warrant equitable relief.
business & regulatoryprocedure
OSKEY GASOLINE AND OIL COMPANY INC. v. OKC Refining Inc.
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-09-18 · cited 16×
This case involved a dispute between a wholesale oil distributor (plaintiff) and a refinery (defendant) over whether their supply agreement for gasoline formed a valid contract under UCC Section 2-207 after the plaintiff added language specifying gross-gallon measurement, and what the measurement term required. The court decided that the parties had entered into a binding contract requiring delivery measured in gross gallons and issued a mandatory injunction ordering the defendant to perform, subject to the force majeure clause. The core reasoning was that the inserted terms were additional and clarifying rather than contradictory to the offer, so UCC 2-207 permitted contract formation; the parties' prior dealings, negotiations, and partial performance confirmed their intent for gross-gallon measurement; and the defendant's later supply shortage did not excuse performance under the contract terms.
business & regulatory
INMATE 24394 v. Schoen
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-09-10 · cited 10×
This case was a class action brought by inmates at Minnesota's state prison and reformatory challenging the institutions' disciplinary procedures. The parties reached a stipulation agreeing to revised procedures, leading the court to enter an order requiring implementation of new rules by specific deadlines. These procedures mandate written notice to accused inmates detailing charges and rights, a hearing before an impartial disciplinary board excluding involved staff or witnesses, opportunities to present evidence and witnesses, and limits on segregation or transfers without due process. Damage claims against the named officials were dismissed with prejudice, and the order explicitly does not find prior procedures unconstitutional. The court based its decree on the parties' agreement and its jurisdiction over the matter.
civil rightsprocedure
SS Kresge Company v. Kamei-Autokomfort
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-09-06 · cited 10×
This case involves a declaratory judgment action by S.S. Kresge Company, a Michigan corporation licensed in Minnesota, against Kamei-Autokomfort, a West German corporation holding a U.S. patent on automobile steering-wheel covers, seeking to establish the patent's invalidity or non-infringement by Kresge's products. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Kamei. The core reasoning was that Kamei had no direct contacts with Minnesota and did not satisfy the requirements of the state's long-arm statutes (Minn. Stat. §§ 303.13 and 543.19) because there was no contract with a Minnesota resident or tort committed in the state, while the licensing agreement with its California-based licensee was insufficient; additionally, the defendant lacked the minimum contacts required by due process under the factors from Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co.
procedure
Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-09-06 · cited 9×
Plaintiffs sued the accounting firm Peat, Marwick after relying on its certified financial reports for Telecheck International, Inc. (TCI) to sell their corporation via stock transfer; they had already obtained a judgment against TCI, which later entered bankruptcy, and sought recovery under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 plus common-law fraud. Defendant moved to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds. The court held that because the federal securities statute lacks a limitations period, the forum state's most analogous period must apply, and that Minnesota's six-year common-law fraud statute governs the 10b-5 claim. It rejected arguments for adopting a uniform federal one-to-three-year period drawn from other securities provisions or for applying shorter state blue-sky or statutory-fraud periods, citing controlling Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent that requires borrowing the state fraud limitations period.
business & regulatoryprocedure
In Re Le Mieux
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-08-24 · cited 4×
The case In Re Le Mieux involved a dispute over the validity of a bank's security interest in a truck used by a bankrupt milk hauler. The Referee in Bankruptcy ruled that the financing statement was improperly filed with the local register of deeds rather than the Secretary of State, either because the truck constituted inventory or the debtor was an organization under the Minnesota Uniform Commercial Code, rendering the lien invalid against the trustee. The district court reversed this decision, holding that the truck was not inventory as it was not furnished under contracts of service to customers and the debtor was not an organization but an individual operating independently. Consequently, the local filing perfected the security interest, making the bank's lien valid on the proceeds from the truck's sale.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Rintala v. Shoemaker
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-08-22 · cited 22×
The case involved a Minnesota plaintiff, acting as trustee in a wrongful death action, attempting to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction over a Michigan defendant for a car accident that occurred in Florida by serving a garnishment summons on the defendant's liability insurer, which was licensed to do business in Minnesota. The defendant and insurer moved to dismiss, arguing that personal jurisdiction was unavailable and that the insurer's obligations to defend and indemnify did not constitute an attachable res. The court analyzed Minnesota garnishment statutes, which it found to be liberally construed and to permit attachment of intangibles such as debts where the garnishee could be sued, concluding that the insurer's contractual duties qualified as a proper res located in the state. It further determined that the procedure satisfied due process for a nonresident defendant, distinguishing cases requiring pre-seizure hearings and noting the limited nature of the garnished interest.
proceduretorts & liability
Nyberg v. City of Virginia
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-08-10 · cited 11×
This case involved residents, taxpayers, and physicians challenging a resolution adopted by the Virginia Municipal Hospital Commission that banned the performance of abortions at the publicly owned and funded hospital except when necessary to save the mother's life. The plaintiffs sought to have the resolution declared invalid and to compel the hospital to provide facilities and allow staff physicians to perform abortions at their discretion. The court held that the resolution violated constitutional rights as established in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, because the hospital is a public institution subject to federal constitutional constraints and cannot impose such restrictions on abortion access. The court declared the resolution null and void, required the hospital to take steps within 30 days to provide abortion services and facilities for requesting physicians and patients, and noted that individual staff members could not be forced to participate against their personal convictions.
abortioncivil rights
Botzet v. Spencer
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-07-30 · cited 3×
The case involved a medical malpractice claim by a Minnesota plaintiff against a Canadian doctor for negligent surgery and post-operative care performed in 1969 without informed consent, resulting in nerve damage. The plaintiff filed the suit in federal district court in Minnesota in February 1973, more than two years after the last treatment in July 1970. The court dismissed the case, holding that Minnesota's two-year statute of limitations for malpractice actions applied and had expired, as the cause of action accrued upon cessation of treatment, and no exceptions like tolling for non-residents or the prior Canadian suit applied. The court rejected arguments that the statute was unconstitutional or that the Canadian proceedings tolled the limitations period.
healthcareproceduretorts & liability
Leppala v. Sawbill Canoe Outfitters, Inc.
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-07-18 · cited 1×
In this diversity case, an employee injured when a wooden pole broke while he was installing equipment on the defendant's premises sued the defendant for negligence, claiming a failure to provide a safe workplace. The defendant moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a) to join the plaintiff's employer as a third-party defendant for contribution or indemnity. The court denied the motion, applying Minnesota's Workmen's Compensation Act, which bars an employer from liability to a third party for reimbursement or indemnity absent a prior written agreement. The court rejected the constitutional challenge to this statutory provision and followed state law under Erie.
labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure
United States v. Schullo
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-06-22 · cited 6×
In United States v. Schullo, defendants were convicted by a jury of violating the federal anti-gambling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1955, based on their involvement in a Minnesota bookmaking operation that violated state law. The court denied the defendants' post-trial motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the validity of wiretap evidence, holding that the government had proven the required elements including gross revenue exceeding $2,000 on certain days and the involvement of five or more persons. The court interpreted "gross revenue" under the statute to mean the total amount of bets placed, including credit transactions, rather than net profits after payouts, drawing on legislative history and precedent such as United States v. Ceraso. It also upheld the wiretap authorization despite a signature irregularity, following Eighth Circuit precedent that ministerial acts do not invalidate approval by the Attorney General. Other claims regarding jury instructions, evidence admission, and the statute's constitutionality were rejected as meritless.
criminal lawprocedurefederal power
Minnesota Ex Rel. Likins v. Weinberger
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-06-07 · cited 8×
The State of Minnesota sued federal officials from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Treasury seeking a $41.875 million judgment for unreimbursed expenditures on approved social service programs under the Social Security Act, alleging a contractual obligation to provide matching funds. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction under the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. § 1346) because the claim exceeded the $10,000 limit and under the Administrative Procedure Act because an adequate remedy existed in the Court of Claims. However, the court concluded it possessed mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, reasoning that the relevant statutes (42 U.S.C. §§ 603 and 1383) impose a non-discretionary duty on the Secretary of the Treasury to pay the states 75% of qualifying expenditures once a plan is approved and expenditures are documented. The court distinguished this mandatory statutory command from discretionary actions and noted that mandamus applies when officials exceed their authority by refusing to comply with such a clear directive.
federal powerprocedurehealthcare
Klinkhammer v. Richardson
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-05-30 · cited 3×
In Klinkhammer v. Richardson, Minnesota Marine Ready Reserve members sued to challenge a Marine Corps hair regulation, interpreted to bar short-hair wigs at monthly drills, claiming it exceeded statutory and constitutional authority given that reservists serve only about 3% of their time on duty and seek to maintain contemporary long hairstyles as civilians. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement, costs, and class-action status, while the government contested jurisdiction under provisions such as 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) and § 1361. After consolidating the preliminary-injunction hearing with the merits and hearing testimony, the court determined jurisdiction existed, found the wig prohibition invalid as applied to reservists at drills, and granted relief limited to those settings, while denying costs and declining to address active-duty or summer-camp applications.
civil rightsfederal power
Buggs v. City of Minneapolis
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-05-25 · cited 3×
This case involved two nonprobationary employees of the Minneapolis Civil Rights Department who were suspended for 90 days without prior notice or a hearing after being charged with gross misconduct, insubordination, and a hostile attitude toward coworkers. The employees sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a violation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that it had jurisdiction and that exhaustion of state remedies was not required. It granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding that the charges implicated their reputation and good name, thereby triggering the need for notice and an opportunity to be heard under Supreme Court precedents like Board of Regents v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann. The suspensions were carried out under city rules and charter provisions that explicitly permitted disciplinary suspensions of up to 90 days without a hearing.
civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure
Moulton v. Aaron
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-04-21 · cited 2×
This case involves a federal prisoner seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent enforcement of a detainer lodged by Texas authorities on state criminal charges, which restricted his custody level and program eligibility at a federal facility. The petitioner alleged that Texas prosecutors had known his location for over 20 months but failed to respond to repeated inquiries or pursue prosecution, despite his cooperation. The court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, treating the matter as akin to habeas corpus, and granted relief by directing prison authorities not to enforce the detainer's restrictive effects. The reasoning relied on Supreme Court precedents including Klopfer v. North Carolina and Smith v. Hooey, which require states to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring out-of-state prisoners to trial under the Sixth Amendment speedy trial guarantee, and noted the absence of such effort here.
criminal lawcivil rightsfederal power
United States v. Lillehei
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-04-20
In United States v. Lillehei, Dr. C. Walton Lillehei, a medical professor, was indicted on five counts of willfully filing false and fraudulent federal income tax returns for 1964 through 1968. The government presented evidence at a five-week jury trial that the defendant omitted over $262,000 in patient fees, honoraria, interest, and reimbursed expenses while claiming false deductions and charitable contributions, using an unauthorized cash-basis accounting method that deferred reporting of income until full patient payment. The jury convicted on all counts, and the district court denied the defendant's post-trial motion for acquittal or a new trial, holding that the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, the trial was fair, and any errors were harmless.
criminal lawtaxes
American Oil Company v. Egan
District Court, D. Minnesota · 1973-04-06 · cited 10×
The case arose from the termination of a distributorship agreement between American Oil Company and Egan, leading to state court litigation over telephone intercepts, injunctions, and a subsequent counterclaim by Egan alleging violations of federal antitrust laws under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. American Oil petitioned to remand the case to Minnesota state court after it had been removed to federal court based on the counterclaim. The court decided to grant the remand, ruling that removal was improper from the outset because federal jurisdiction must appear on the face of the plaintiff's complaint rather than a counterclaim, and that the plaintiff's fifteen-month delay in objecting did not constitute a waiver absent any prejudice to the defendant. The core reasoning rested on established precedent interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the principle that plaintiffs may choose to litigate on state grounds, and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction defects in removal procedure.
procedure