This case arose from a 1991 airplane crash in Michigan that killed three people, including Albert Brereton; the plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging negligence by air traffic controllers, with liability already apportioned and the remaining issue being damages under the Michigan Wrongful Death Act. The court considered motions in limine to exclude expert testimony on hedonic damages, which seek to compensate for the loss of enjoyment of life. The magistrate judge recommended, and the district court accepted, that such hedonic damages are not recoverable because the MWDA must be narrowly construed and explicitly limits recoverable damages to items like pain and suffering while conscious, loss of financial support, and loss of society and companionship, without including the value of a prematurely ended life. The court further held that the plaintiffs' expert's proposed testimony using a willingness-to-pay model was inadmissible under Daubert because it lacked reliability and would not assist the factfinder. The reasoning emphasized statutory limits on damages in derogation of the common law and the absence of any basis in Michigan precedent for the claimed category of recovery.
In Dubuc v. Green Oak Township, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action claiming that township officials impeded his efforts to develop property in retaliation for his public criticism and prior lawsuits against them, violating his First Amendment rights to free speech and court access as well as his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on liability, granted the defendants' motion in part by dismissing one defendant, and permitted substitution of a deceased party's estate. It reasoned that state court rulings upholding the township's actions under local ordinances did not bar the federal claims via res judicata, because those rulings did not address whether the officials acted with retaliatory motive, and even lawful actions can give rise to liability if taken for an improper constitutional reason.
This case involves a dispute in bankruptcy proceedings where the Chapter 7 Trustee sought to surcharge Heidelberg Harris, a secured creditor with a security interest in a printing press, for expenses including rent, heating, and locksmith services incurred while storing the press. The Bankruptcy Court granted the surcharge totaling $13,606.63, apportioning costs based on the value of collateral among secured creditors. On appeal, the District Court reversed, holding that under 11 U.S.C. § 506(c), such expenses were ordinary administrative costs not providing a special benefit to the secured creditor and thus could not be surcharged personally against Heidelberg rather than against the collateral or estate.
This case concerns whether funds received by a contractor under the Michigan Builders Trust Fund Act are encumbered such that a responsible person cannot be held liable for willful failure to pay federal employment taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 6672. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Act permits use of trust funds to pay employment taxes on wages from the relevant construction projects. The core reasoning was that the statute protects not only laborers, subcontractors, and materialmen but also "others entitled to payment," which includes the IRS for such taxes, and allows proceeds to cover all construction expenses including lawfully imposed taxes on labor wages; this addressed an issue left undecided in the prior Huizinga decision due to differences in the factual record and arguments presented.
This case involves conflicting claims to life insurance proceeds under an ERISA-governed employee welfare plan after the death of participant Floyd M. Fowler, with claims filed by his ex-wife Judy Ann Fowler as the designated beneficiary and by their minor children Florisa and Julie Fowler pursuant to a divorce judgment. The court denied Judy Ann Fowler's motion for summary judgment and granted judgment in favor of the minor children. The core reasoning was that the divorce judgment qualified as a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) under ERISA because it clearly specified the beneficiaries, the amount of benefits, and the timing of payment, thereby exempting it from ERISA preemption under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) and requiring distribution according to the judgment rather than the plan documents.
This case involved ERISA-regulated pension funds and an individual employee seeking to recover unpaid wages and fringe benefit contributions owed by a defaulted subcontractor on a public school construction project, by suing the surety company that posted a payment bond under the Michigan Public Works Act. The court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied defendant's, ruling that the plaintiffs had standing to sue on the bond and could recover the fringe benefits as compensation for labor. The core reasoning was that the Michigan statute must be liberally construed like the federal Miller Act, that the statute does not limit recovery to wages alone but covers contributions required under collective bargaining agreements, and that ERISA does not preempt the state law because the Public Works Act is a generally applicable statute with only incidental effects on ERISA plans.
