Fred Joseph Nichol

In Dillman v. Madsen, a 14-year-old boy was severely injured while assisting with corn shelling on the defendant's farm in South Dakota, leading his mother to sue under the state's child labor statute (S.D.C.L. 60-12-3) after dropping a negligence claim. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, finding no violation that proximately caused the injury, but the court granted the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The court reasoned that the statutory term "occupation" encompasses the minor's entire work environment, not just specific safe tasks, and that evidence of the defendant's warnings about dangers was improperly admitted because it improperly introduced fault considerations into a strict statutory liability case where the defendant's conduct was irrelevant. The decision emphasized that such warnings could not excuse a potential violation and had confused the jury on the key issues of dangerous occupation and proximate cause.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case was a class action challenging South Dakota statutes (S.D.C.L. sections 13-34-16.2 and 13-34-16.3) that authorized the loan of textbooks and materials to students at parochial and church-operated schools, with plaintiffs alleging violations of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. After the federal facial challenge was resolved against the plaintiffs on appeal, the district court exercised pendent jurisdiction over the state constitutional claim, certified a question to the South Dakota Supreme Court, and accepted that court's holding that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face under Article VI, Section 3, and Article VIII, Section 16, of the South Dakota Constitution. The court permanently enjoined the defendants from providing textbooks or using public funds for such purposes at parochial schools and awarded the plaintiffs costs and attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. section 1988.

religious libertycivil rights

The case involved an insurance company's motion for attorney fees after prevailing in a coverage dispute with its insured, Bauer Dental Studio, under a policy covering property damage from defective dental crowns. The court awarded Bauer $11,465.45 in fees pursuant to S.D.C.L. section 58-12-3, finding that the insurer's refusal to pay was vexatious and without reasonable cause. The insurer had initially determined coverage existed in 1982 but then delayed settlement negotiations for two years in hopes of shifting blame to a third-party manufacturer, offered only a fraction of the estimated claim amount after suit was filed, and finally denied coverage based on the imprecise wording of the underlying complaint alleging economic loss. The court reasoned that the complaint's references to financial loss did not negate a claim for tangible property damage, as such damage is typically measured by repair or replacement costs, and the insurer's earlier acceptance of coverage made its subsequent actions unreasonable.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case centered on competing claims to ownership of the bed of Lake Andes in South Dakota, brought by the Yankton Sioux Tribe against the State, with the County asserting a governmental interest and the United States intervening to protect a 1939 easement for a wildlife refuge. The court had previously ruled in the Tribe's favor on summary judgment after finding Lake Andes non-navigable, a determination upheld on remand. In this decision, the court denied all motions by the State, County, and United States to amend the judgment or reopen issues, granted the Tribe's motions, and confirmed the Tribe's ownership of the lakebed as established by historical title and prior proceedings. The ruling emphasized that the long-pending litigation should conclude without further relitigation of settled matters.

propertyfederal powercivil rights

The case concerned whether American Family Insurance had a duty under an auto liability policy issued to Laurence Brady to defend or indemnify Brady's part-time employee Christopher Howe after Howe caused a one-car accident that killed one person and injured another. The court held that American Family had no such duty because Howe was not an additional insured under the policy's omnibus clause. The policy extended coverage only to permissive users operating the vehicle within the scope of permission, and the evidence showed Howe had only limited express permission for work-related tasks and no implied permission based on any course of conduct known to and acquiesced in by the Bradys. Applying South Dakota law, the court found no basis to adopt the initial-permission rule and concluded that the accident occurred during Howe's personal use outside any permitted scope.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involves a motion for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 after a class action civil rights suit by Native American inmates at the South Dakota Penitentiary challenging conditions of confinement in the Adjustment Center under the Eighth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The underlying litigation resulted in class certification, some policy changes on maximum segregation time, and findings that certain individual conditions required modification, but no overall Eighth Amendment violation or other constitutional breaches. The court held that the plaintiffs qualified as prevailing parties and calculated a reasonable fee by first determining a lodestar of $28,199.60 based on hours worked and hourly rates, then reducing it by 40 percent to account for the limited results obtained under Hensley v. Eckerhart and by another 10 percent for inadequate documentation. This produced a final award of $15,227.78 in fees plus $1,008.90 in costs.

civil rightsprocedure

This case concerns the navigability of Lake Andes at key historical dates relevant to the Yankton Sioux Tribe's reservation boundaries and land cessions. The court determined that Lake Andes was navigable in law and in fact during 1858, 1889, and 1892 after reviewing the evidence presented in the cross-motions for summary judgment. The decision applies the legal standard that a body of water is navigable if it can support watercraft in its natural condition or with reasonable improvements. Additionally, the court denied the motion to join the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, finding no prejudice to the United States regardless of the outcome.

propertyfederal power

This case involves an appeal by the resistors William E. Doyle and Roger W. Lunstra from a bankruptcy court order granting interim compensation of $21,091.70 to attorney J. Bruce Blake for services rendered in the bankruptcy proceeding of Doyle-Lunstra Sales Corp. The district court granted leave to hear the interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. section 1334(b) and evaluated the fee award pursuant to 11 U.S.C. sections 330 and 331, applying factors such as time expended, nature of services, and comparable costs, along with guidelines from Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express. The court determined that the applicant's time records were inadequate because they lacked detail on the substance of correspondence and calls, used arbitrary rather than actual time figures, and failed to distinguish productive legal work, resulting in a disallowance of $14,032 in fees (after crediting a $9,747.30 retainer) and an order for repayment to the bankruptcy estate. Costs of the appeal were also taxed against the applicant due to his failure to file a requested brief.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This products liability diversity action was brought by Jane Brech against J.C. Penney after she suffered severe burns when the cotton flannel nightgown she wore while cooking on a gas stove caught fire. Brech asserted two strict liability claims, alleging the gown was unreasonably dangerous due to its lack of flame resistance and that Penney failed to warn of this danger. The court found that the gown and similar garments met and exceeded federal flammability standards under 16 C.F.R. section 1610, classifying them as normal flammability with no unusual burning characteristics per expert testing. Expert testimony also indicated the fire likely originated from another source, such as the home's space heater or oven, rather than solely from the gown sleeve. The court concluded the plaintiff failed to establish the product was unreasonably dangerous or that a warning was required.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved two drivers arrested in South Dakota for driving while intoxicated who requested to consult an attorney before deciding whether to submit to a chemical sobriety test under the state's implied consent law; their requests were treated as refusals, leading to one-year license revocations upheld by state courts. They brought a federal action under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 seeking declaratory relief, claiming violations of Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court held that no such constitutional right to counsel exists prior to the test, reasoning that the implied consent procedure is civil and administrative rather than a critical stage of criminal proceedings, that Miranda warnings do not apply, and that numerous state and federal precedents support treating a request for counsel as a refusal.

criminal lawcivil rights

The Yankton Sioux Tribe sued non-Indian individuals, later joined by South Dakota and Charles Mix County, claiming ownership of the bed of Lake Andes under the 1858 Treaty and seeking relief for alleged trespass and crop conversion when defendants harvested vegetation from the dry lakebed. The district court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on the legal question of title. The court granted the Tribe's motion and denied the State's, holding that the Tribe retained ownership because the 1858 Treaty reserved the unceded aboriginal lands—including the lakebed—without expressly extinguishing the Tribe's title, distinguishing the case from precedents like Montana v. United States where different treaty language allowed title to pass to the state upon admission to the Union.

propertyfederal power

In Winkler v. Solem, petitioner Mark Winkler sought a federal writ of habeas corpus challenging his South Dakota state conviction for aggravated assault, alleging that the state's failure to endorse certain witness names on the information as required by statute and his trial counsel's ineffective assistance in not seeking a continuance deprived him of constitutional rights. The U.S. District Court denied the petition after reviewing the state court record, determining that defense counsel had interviewed three of the four additional witnesses before trial and received a recess to interview the fourth, and that no material prejudice resulted from the lack of endorsement or counsel's performance. The court further found that the ineffective assistance claim had been adequately presented on direct appeal to the South Dakota Supreme Court but did not meet the threshold for relief in federal habeas proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

In Stumes v. Solem, petitioner Norman Stumes filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his state conviction for first-degree manslaughter, claiming violations of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, he alleged denial of counsel during police questioning after his arrest in Wisconsin, improper admission of hair evidence without foundation, and erroneous submission of the manslaughter charge to the jury. The court denied the petition, finding that Stumes had been advised of his Miranda rights, had spoken with his attorney by phone, and had validly waived his Fifth Amendment right to counsel before making statements during transport, with no Sixth Amendment right attaching at that stage. The court also rejected the evidentiary and sufficiency claims, holding that the evidence met due process standards and that a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under Jackson v. Virginia.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a farmer suing the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from actions by local and state Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service committees regarding his participation in the Feed Grain Program from 1965 through 1971. The plaintiff alleged inconsistent denials of program benefits, conflicting reasons for those decisions, and repeated compliance demands that caused him severe mental distress. After a bench trial, the court found the government's conduct unreasonable over multiple years and awarded the plaintiff $35,000 in damages. The reasoning centered on evidence that ASCS employees gave shifting explanations for denials, ignored higher-level reversals, relied on inconsistent reports, and should have recognized the likely impact on the plaintiff's mental health, supported by medical testimony showing lasting anxiety and depression.

torts & liabilityfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned Canton Lutheran Church's claims against architect Sovik, Mathre, Sathrum & Quanbeck and contractor W.A. Kepp & Sons for alleged defects, including corrosion and cracking in concrete caused by unauthorized use of calcium chloride, in an educational building addition completed in 1963 and discovered in 1977. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that SDCL 15-2-9, the statute limiting actions for deficiencies in building construction, barred the suit because more than six years had passed since substantial completion. The plaintiff opposed on constitutional grounds and argued tolling due to fraudulent concealment or absence from the jurisdiction. The court analyzed the statute as a repose provision that runs from completion rather than injury or discovery, reviewed its history and similar laws in other states, and noted apparent conflicts with U.S. Supreme Court, Eighth Circuit, and South Dakota precedents holding that limitations periods cannot extinguish rights before they accrue.

procedurepropertytorts & liability

This case was a Federal Tort Claims Act suit by Donald Erickson and his wife against the United States seeking damages for personal injuries and loss of consortium after Mr. Erickson, a patient at a Veterans Hospital, underwent knee surgery and later suffered a heart attack and cardiogenic shock. The court found that hospital employees were negligent in failing to monitor or treat his deteriorating condition over several days, contrary to the applicable standard of care as established by expert testimony, which led to the amputation of both legs below the knee. After a bench trial the court concluded that this negligence caused permanent disability, pain and suffering, and loss of earning capacity, and it awarded Erickson $500,000 in damages allocated among past and future earnings and pain and suffering. The wife's consortium claim was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

This case involved plaintiff Rod Goeman's claims against defendants Gordon D. Keating and William Keating for violations of the federal Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act's odometer disclosure rules in the 1978 sale of a 1969 Camaro. The court found that William Keating, who handled the transaction, knew the odometer had been broken and repaired multiple times yet failed to provide required written notices about the prior repairs or the inaccurate mileage reading, and did so with intent to defraud; Gordon Keating was not liable because he had no involvement or control over the sale. The court awarded Goeman the statutory $1,500 damages plus attorney fees and costs against William Keating only, based on the difference between the purchase price and resale value plus incidental expenses. The decision rested on evidence of the unchanged odometer readings over time, Keating's admissions, and his failure to disclose known inaccuracies as required by sections 1987 and 1988 of the Act.

business & regulatory

The case involved Elizabeth Ann Henkin, a severely mentally retarded and epileptic adult woman whose state funding for residential care at a private Texas facility was terminated after she turned 21, leading her and her guardian to sue South Dakota state agencies for violations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. Henkin sought a mandatory injunction for resumed funding or an equivalent in-state program under Title XIX, plus compensatory damages for past tuition costs. The court reviewed evidence on the lack of suitable alternative South Dakota facilities that met her needs and were Medicaid-certified, as well as the state's eligibility determinations. It concluded that a private right of action exists under the federal developmental disabilities statute and can be adjudicated in federal court, rejecting arguments that such claims must proceed only in state court.

civil rightshealthcarefederal power

This diversity case involved a claim by the Scherschlights, as assignees of Hanson, against Empire Fire & Marine Insurance for breach of the duty to defend under a farm liability policy after an accident in which Hanson's towed pickup truck collided with JoAnn Scherschlight's vehicle on a public highway in South Dakota. The underlying suit alleged negligence both in operating the vehicle and in negligently constructing a trailer hitch on the farm. Empire denied coverage and refused to defend based on a policy exclusion for the ownership, maintenance, or use of automobiles while away from the insured premises. Applying Nebraska law, the court held that the pleadings alleged facts squarely within the exclusion, so no duty to defend arose, and granted summary judgment to Empire. The decision turned on the clear policy language and the determination that no covered hazard originated on the farm premises.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a trademark infringement claim by Health Industries, Inc., which owns and operates health clubs nationwide under the registered service mark "European," against a South Dakota health club operator using the name "European Health Spa" and its president. The court found that the plaintiff had established infringement of its exclusive rights under federal trademark law, as the defendant knowingly adopted a confusingly similar name in the same industry despite awareness of the plaintiff's prior use and registration, which had become incontestable. The court rejected the defendant's defenses and ordered a permanent injunction against further use, an award of profits to the plaintiff, payment of costs by the defendants, and destruction of infringing promotional materials, while declining to award attorney's fees. The decision was based on the likelihood of consumer confusion arising from the identical mark in overlapping services and the defendant's bad-faith adoption of the name.

business & regulatory