William M. Nickerson

This case is an insurance coverage dispute in which IFCO Systems North America sought a judicial declaration that its general liability policy with American Home Assurance Company covered claims brought by Rite Aid for over $1.5 million in goods allegedly stolen by IFCO employees. The court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the policy did not provide coverage or a duty to defend. Georgia law, which governs the policy, defines an "occurrence" as an "accident," which requires an unintentional act, and the underlying Rite Aid complaint centered on intentional acts such as conversion and theft even when pled alongside negligence or breach of contract claims. The court reasoned that whether coverage exists is determined by the allegations in the underlying complaint and that intentional employee theft cannot constitute an accident under the policy language.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved Ann Kramer, an employee of the Board of Education of Baltimore County since 1998, alleging she was denied promotions to Construction Specialist positions given to less qualified male candidates and paid less than men performing similar work, in violation of Title VII, the federal Equal Pay Act, and the Maryland Equal Pay Act. The defendant moved to dismiss, contending the Title VII claim was untimely filed more than 90 days after the first right-to-sue notice and that the state equal pay law did not apply to public school employers. The court denied the motion, finding the suit timely because it was filed within 90 days of the second notice from the EEOC and concluding that the Maryland Equal Pay Act applies to the defendant as its terms reach public school employees.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

This case involves a longshoreman who slipped and fell on an icy ship deck while working as a deck foreman during coal loading operations in February 2007, alleging negligence by the vessel owner. The plaintiff claimed that the ship's Chief Officer had been warned about the ice and had promised to clear paths and apply salt and sand, but failed to do so. The defendant shipowner moved for summary judgment, arguing that under Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, shipowners owe no duty to protect longshoremen from open and obvious dangers like ice after an ice storm. The court denied the defendant's motion, finding potential issues of fact regarding whether the Chief Officer's assurances created a duty or justified reliance by the plaintiff, and held the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment open for additional briefing from the defendant.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves a wrongful death claim by the widow and son of Jimmy Wayne Streeter, who died in 2006 when a portion of a calciner start-up stack from a W.R. Grace plant fell and struck his maintenance truck. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants negligently designed, manufactured, and erected the stack as part of constructing a new FCC plant completed in 1995. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by Maryland's ten-year statute of repose for architects, engineers, and contractors. The court granted the motion, finding that the improvement to real property was completed more than ten years before the accident, thus barring the action under the statute regardless of when the injury occurred.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case is a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act brought by environmental groups against a poultry farm and Perdue Farms Inc. as an integrator, alleging illegal discharges of pollutants like fecal coliform, E. coli, nitrogen, and phosphorus from the farm's CAFO into a ditch leading to a river, in violation of NPDES permit requirements or a zero-discharge standard. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and (6), arguing insufficient notice for the citizen suit, lack of ongoing violation, no liability for the integrator, and failure to state a claim connecting the farm to the pollutants. The court denied the motions in part, holding that the complaint sufficiently alleged an ongoing violation and a reasonable inference of discharge from the CAFO's production area, while granting them in part on other grounds such as certain notice or standing issues.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned a verbal contract dispute between Dart Machinery, a Michigan company supplying high-performance racing engines, and RaceRedi Motorsports, a Maryland NHRA racing team, along with third-party Finishes, Inc., over engine provision and payment for the 2008 season; the parties disagreed on terms including duration and Finishes' role, leading to competing breach claims after prior suits were filed and transferred between Michigan and Maryland courts. Dart asserted counterclaims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, misappropriation of trade secrets, and injunctive relief, while RaceRedi and Finishes moved to dismiss portions of those claims. Applying Maryland law as the governing choice-of-law rule, the court granted the motions in part and denied them in part, dismissing the conversion and trade secrets claims for insufficient pleading or overlap with contract claims but allowing the breach and unjust enrichment claims to proceed, including against Finishes on alter ego or direct liability theories.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved Syed Mukarram, a lawful permanent resident from India, who sought de novo judicial review of the denial of his naturalization application by USCIS and an immigration officer. The agencies had rejected the application on grounds that Mukarram gave false testimony during the statutory period. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, confining its review to the administrative record under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that Mukarram failed to establish the good moral character required for naturalization because immigration law mandates a finding of bad moral character for anyone who provides false testimony to obtain an immigration benefit, even if the statements are immaterial.

immigration

The case involved a married couple, one a U.S. citizen and the other initially an inadmissible legal permanent resident, who applied for an I-130 petition, adjustment of status, and an I-601 waiver of inadmissibility based on extreme hardship. After initial denials by USCIS officials citing insufficient evidence of hardship and a sham marriage, followed by multiple reconsiderations, the waiver was eventually granted in 2007 and the husband obtained permanent residency. The plaintiffs then sued the United States and various immigration officials under the FTCA and Bivens, alleging misconduct including hostile interviews, improper denials, and misapplication of legal standards. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all fourteen counts, holding that federal law barred judicial review of discretionary immigration relief decisions under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), the FTCA did not permit constitutional tort claims, and Bivens actions were unavailable against the officials.

immigrationfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

In Petry v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the named plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that Wells Fargo and Long & Foster entities created a sham mortgage lender called Prosperity Mortgage to generate referrals and pay undisclosed finder's fees or kickbacks to real estate brokers, violating Maryland's Finder’s Fee Act, Consumer Protection Act, and common law claims including unjust enrichment and restitution, along with theories of conspiracy, aiding and abetting, partnership liability, and agency. Defendants moved to dismiss or for summary judgment on all counts. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part without a hearing. The ruling addressed federal preemption under the DIDMCA for finder's fees charged by creditors, factual disputes over whether Prosperity functioned as a broker or lender, and the legal sufficiency of derivative liability claims against the various affiliated defendants.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case is a class action brought by homebuyers against Wells Fargo, Long & Foster, and affiliated entities, alleging that the defendants created a sham mortgage company called Prosperity to generate referrals and pay illegal kickbacks, violating RESPA, RICO, and state laws on fraud, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and consumer protection. The plaintiffs claimed Prosperity performed little or no actual work yet charged borrowers substantial fees that were funneled back as referral payments. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts and for a stay of discovery. The court granted summary judgment in part and denied it in part after applying a multi-factor test to assess whether the affiliated business arrangement was bona fide and provided substantial services, and it denied the stay motion as moot.

business & regulatorycriminal law

This case concerns allegations by plaintiff Darzel Robinson that defendants Fountainhead Title Group Corp., Assurance Title, Long & Foster Real Estate, and Mid-States Title Insurance Agency violated sections 8(a) and 8(b) of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) by creating sham affiliated business arrangements and imposing improper title fees during her May 2003 home purchase, with the suit also including related state-law claims such as unjust enrichment and conspiracy. The action originated in 2003 as a class action by another plaintiff and was amended multiple times to add Robinson and the new defendants, after most related litigation had settled. Defendants moved to dismiss the third amended complaint, primarily arguing that the RESPA claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations under 12 U.S.C. § 2614 and by the voluntary payment doctrine. The court granted the motions in part and denied them in part, holding that the limitations period was not tolled as to the new defendants for certain claims, that standing requirements were not met for all allegations, and that the voluntary payment doctrine did not bar claims based on a mistake of fact regarding the defendants' relationships.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Regina Hill sued BEMI, Brush Wellman, and other defendants alleging that her workplace exposure to beryllium-containing dental alloys from 1992 to 2004 caused her chronic beryllium disease, asserting claims for negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and fraudulent concealment with civil conspiracy. The court granted BEMI's Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss all claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction and granted the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Count IV with leave to amend, while also dismissing the punitive damages claims. The core reasoning was that BEMI, as a holding company with no offices, employees, property, or business activities in Maryland, lacked the minimum contacts required for either general or specific jurisdiction under due process standards. For Count IV, the complaint failed to adequately allege the plaintiff's detrimental reliance on any omissions, which is essential to a fraudulent concealment claim under Maryland law, and thus could not support the related conspiracy allegations.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a Caucasian attorney briefly employed by the Baltimore Police Department who alleged he faced racial discrimination, harassment through office moves and heavy workloads, and retaliatory termination after criticizing the department's EEO unit and consulting an attorney, bringing claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, state torts, and constitutional provisions against BPD, the City, and individual officials. The court ruled on defendants' motion to dismiss, granting it in part and denying it in part while denying a motion to seal the record entirely. Core reasoning centered on Rule 12(b)(6) standards requiring acceptance of well-pled facts, with some claims (such as certain First Amendment association rights and conspiracy allegations) failing due to qualified immunity, intra-corporate doctrine considerations, or insufficient pleading, while others survived as potentially viable.

civil rightslabor & employmentfree speechprocedure

This case involves former loan officers at Savings First Mortgage, LLC, who sued the company and its owner under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and Maryland's Wage Payment and Collection Law for unpaid overtime, minimum wage shortfalls, post-termination commissions, and year-end bonuses. The plaintiffs alleged they often worked over 40 hours per week without overtime pay, received no wages in pay periods with no loan closings, and were denied commissions and bonuses due to termination or timing rules in their compensation agreements. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and denied the defendants' cross-motion, finding no genuine issues of material fact on key claims after reviewing the compensation policies and applicable wage laws. The core reasoning centered on the company's commission-only structure and forfeiture provisions violating FLSA requirements for minimum wage and overtime, as well as state law obligations for earned wages.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved an employment dispute where plaintiff James Emery alleged that defendant Bay Capital Corp. breached a promise in an offer email to provide six months of severance pay upon termination for any reason other than fraud, along with travel expense reimbursement, after his position as Director of Net Branching was eliminated. Plaintiff brought claims under Tennessee and Maryland breach of contract law as well as the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Act. Defendant moved for partial dismissal, arguing that the severance-related claims were preempted by ERISA. The court denied the motion, holding that the one-time severance promise did not create an ERISA employee benefit plan because it lacked any requirement for an ongoing administrative scheme, applying the test from Fort Halifax v. Coyne.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case was an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision avoiding as a fraudulent transfer under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code the recording of a deed to Bahamian real property. The debtor had gifted the property to her children in 1981, but the deed was not recorded until June 2000, shortly before an involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed against her. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment to the trustee, holding that the transfer occurred upon recording in 2000 under Section 548(d)(1). The court concluded that Section 548 applied because the relevant conduct took place in Maryland and all interested parties were U.S. residents, so neither the presumption against extraterritoriality nor principles of international comity prevented avoidance of the transfer.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case arose when the publisher of a local newspaper sued a county sheriff, off-duty deputies, a state’s attorney candidate, and county officials after they collectively purchased all copies of an election-day edition to prevent its distribution. The Fourth Circuit had previously ruled that the defendants acted under color of state law and violated the publisher’s First Amendment rights, remanding for resolution of qualified immunity, municipal liability, state-law claims under the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and one defendant’s degree of participation. On remand, the district court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on liability and denied most defense motions, holding that qualified immunity was unavailable because the conduct was not within the scope of official duties, that the Fourth Circuit’s findings established violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the remaining issues of state-law liability and individual participation could proceed accordingly.

free speechelectionscivil rights

This case arose from a fraud scheme in which fake invoices led Kaiser Foundation Health Plan to issue approximately $1 million in checks that were deposited into accounts at Allfirst Bank, SunTrust Bank, and First Union National Bank; after recovering judgments against the payees, Kaiser received an insurance payout from National Union Fire Insurance, which then sued the banks to recover the losses. The court granted summary judgment to the three defendant banks and denied the plaintiff's cross-motions. The core reasoning was that UCC §§ 3-404, 3-405, and 3-406 (governing imposter, fictitious-payee, and negligence claims) do not create liability for depository banks absent forged signatures, forged endorsements, or alterations on the checks themselves, none of which were present here.

business & regulatory

This case involved the U.S. government suing RGI, CSM, and John and Priscilla Rachel for allegedly using a chain of controlled companies to inflate costs billed to the IRS under a laptop computer repair contract, passing through markups from about $25 to nearly $129 per hinge repair. The court denied the defendants' motions for sanctions, to compel, summary judgment, and partial dismissal, and granted the government's motion for summary judgment in part as to liability on the False Claims Act counts while denying other counts as moot. The core reasoning was that the defendants had actual knowledge or acted in reckless disregard of the contract's requirement to bill at actual cost plus a fixed markup, as they controlled all entities involved and prepared the invoices showing the inflated amounts.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

In Beckwith v. Hart, a federal prisoner sued a prison employee and others under the Federal Tort Claims Act and Bivens, alleging defamation through libel and slander, an assault by closing a door on his foot, failure to provide medical care, and retaliation for prior litigation that violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights. The court dismissed the defamation claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the FTCA expressly exempts libel and slander claims. On the remaining claims, the court granted summary judgment, finding no disputed facts showing malicious or harmful force, no sufficient injury for an Eighth Amendment violation, no details supporting a retaliation claim, and timely medical attention provided. The plaintiff had not responded to the dispositive motion despite extensions.

civil rightstorts & liabilitycriminal law