John Trice Nixon

The case involved plaintiff Robert Donaldson, who obtained a $138,000 mortgage loan in 2007 secured by a deed of trust on Nashville property, made payments until February 2009, and then sued BAC Home Loans Servicing (successor to Countrywide) after it began servicing the loan. Donaldson asserted claims for breach of contract, money had and received (unjust enrichment), and fraud, alleging issues with the original loan documents, the defendant's right to collect, and lack of proper disclosures. The court granted BAC's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case, holding that there were no genuine disputes of material fact because Donaldson provided no evidence that BAC or its predecessors breached any contract, were unjustly enriched, or made fraudulent representations. The court adopted the magistrate judge's report with modifications and found the evidence one-sided in favor of the defendant on all claims.

business & regulatoryproperty

In McMillion v. Metropolitan Government, plaintiff Beverly Burns McMillion, a former MAC employee, sued after her 2009 termination in a reduction in force, alleging First Amendment retaliation for a 2008 internal grievance over an accounting error that caused her to be placed on unpaid leave status and lose accrual of additional leave time, as well as age discrimination under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The court granted summary judgment to defendants on the First Amendment claim, finding that the grievance addressed only internal personnel and leave policy matters rather than a public concern. Because the speech did not qualify for First Amendment protection under Connick v. Myers and related Sixth Circuit precedent, the court did not reach causation or other elements of the retaliation claim. The court then dismissed the state-law age discrimination claim without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) after declining supplemental jurisdiction once the sole federal claim was resolved.

free speechlabor & employment

This case involved father-and-son employees Cruz and Dustin Ayala suing their former employer Summit Constructors under Title VII and the Tennessee Human Rights Act for alleged hostile work environment harassment based on national origin and race, as well as retaliation after they raised concerns. After a bench trial, the court found that the plaintiffs did not prove their hostile work environment claims or Dustin's retaliation claim due to insufficient credible evidence of pervasive slurs or adverse actions tied to protected activity. However, the court ruled for Cruz on his retaliation claim, determining that Summit unlawfully refused to rehire him after he filed an EEOC charge, and awarded him $27,113.20 in damages without punitive damages because the decision was not shown to involve malice or reckless indifference. The core reasoning centered on credibility assessments of witness testimony regarding the frequency and occurrence of discriminatory conduct versus company policies and responses.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involved a claim under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) brought by the executor of the estate of Jason Ashley Burd against Lebanon HMA, Inc. d/b/a University Medical Center. The plaintiff alleged that the hospital failed to provide an appropriate medical screening and stabilization during two emergency room visits on March 22, 2008, after Burd's suicide attempt, possibly due to his lack of insurance, and that he was discharged before committing suicide the next day. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff provided no evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether hospital staff had actual knowledge of an emergency medical condition or acted with an improper motive, distinguishing the claims from EMTALA violations and aligning them instead with potential medical malpractice.

healthcareprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Teddy Hutchison sued the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that police officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during a 2008 traffic stop by surrounding his vehicle with guns drawn, ordering him out without allowing use of his crutches due to his prosthetic leg, and causing him to fall and injure his back, all without finding contraband or issuing citations. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the claim against the Metropolitan Government. The core reasoning was that the amended complaint failed to state a plausible claim for municipal liability under Monell because it recited only legal conclusions about an official policy, custom, or practice of improper stops and inadequate training regarding disabilities, without pleading any supporting facts, as required by the plausibility standard from Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.

civil rightsprocedure

This case is a Title VII action brought by the EEOC and intervenor plaintiff Carlota Freemen against Whirlpool Corporation alleging sexual and racial hostile work environment harassment by a coworker that caused Freemen PTSD, emotional distress, and economic harm. The defendant moved to strike evidence supporting lost pay damages and the report and testimony of the plaintiffs' economics expert Dr. Mark Cohen. The court denied both motions, holding that the complaints sufficiently alleged facts supporting a constructive discharge claim under liberal notice pleading standards to permit front and back pay, and that Dr. Cohen's testimony and calculations on lost pay, benefits, and future medical costs were sufficiently reliable based on the record and his expertise.

labor & employmentcivil rights

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store sued its insurer, Cincinnati Insurance Company, after the insurer refused to defend or indemnify the company in an EEOC lawsuit alleging sexual harassment and discrimination in employment practices, which Cracker Barrel ultimately settled for $2 million. The suit sought recovery under an Employment Practices Liability Insurance policy and asserted claims for common-law bad faith and statutory bad faith under Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-105. The court granted the insurer's motion to dismiss both claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It reasoned that Tennessee recognizes no common-law tort for insurer bad faith and that the statutory claim was deficient because the complaint did not allege a formal demand that expressly threatened bad-faith litigation.

business & regulatorylabor & employment

In Denning v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, plaintiffs filed a Section 1983 civil action claiming that Officer Don Davidson and the city violated the decedent David Denning's Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when the officer fatally shot him while responding to a 911 call about Denning allegedly pointing a gun at a pizza delivery person. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed all remaining claims. The ruling rested on the determination that the officer's use of deadly force was constitutionally permissible because he had probable cause to believe Denning posed a serious threat of physical harm, there was no evidence of an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom, and the Second Amendment claim failed on multiple grounds including lack of supporting evidence.

civil rightsguns

The case involved the Governor of Tennessee challenging the Secretary of Defense's decision to realign the 118th Airlift Wing of the Tennessee Air National Guard under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act without the Governor's consent, claiming violations of statutory rights under 32 U.S.C. § 104(c) and constitutional provisions including Article I, Section 8 and the Second Amendment. The court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over the statutory claims because Congress intended to preclude judicial review in the BRAC process, and that the constitutional claims presented non-justiciable political questions related to military organization and control. The court did not reach the merits of the Governor's motion for summary judgment, as the case was dismissed in full.

federal powerprocedure

The case involved Plaintiff King Records, Inc. suing Defendants Kenneth Bennett and KRB Music Companies for copyright infringement under the Copyright Act regarding a musical composition titled “Don’t Fall Asleep at the Wheel” and multiple sound recordings of popular songs, as well as related state-law claims. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiff on the copyright claims and awarded $170,000 in damages. The court reasoned that the Plaintiff established ownership of the copyrights through registration and assignment documents, that the Defendants had infringed by unauthorized duplication and distribution of the works via retail sales, and that statutory damages were appropriate based on the number of infringed works without evidence supporting higher awards or piercing the corporate veil. The court dismissed or declined to address certain ancillary claims and motions in the process.

business & regulatory

The case centered on JB Oxford's claims that First Tennessee Bank's and Thompson & Company's advertisements, which featured currency-themed characters, infringed JB Oxford's copyrighted television and print ads depicting a lazy character named 'Bill' in a dollar bill costume, and violated the Lanham Act by constituting reverse passing off or unfair competition. Defendants moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the First Amended Complaint. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, determining after comparing specific expressive elements that the ads were not substantially similar in protectable aspects under copyright law and that the Lanham Act claims failed because the ads did not misrepresent the origin or characteristics of services.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns a motion to revise Paragraph C(7) of a consent decree governing TennCare (Tennessee's Medicaid program) appeals, specifically the standard for overruling a treating physician's clinical judgment on medical necessity. The court had previously ruled that the decree permits the state to consider all relevant information beyond just medical records, but that the weight given to a physician's opinion increases when supported by evidence, without allowing conclusory statements to bind the state or requiring physicians to justify deviations from standard treatment when opinions are reasonably supported. Plaintiffs and defendants submitted competing proposals for revising the decree language, neither of which the court found fully consistent with its prior orders. The court therefore ordered the parties to adopt its own specified revision to the first sentence of Paragraph C(7)(b) and directed modifications to certain state proposed medical necessity rules to align with that standard, drawing on Social Security disability evaluation principles for guidance.

healthcareprocedure

This case involves a motion by the Tennessee Hospital Association to alter or amend prior court orders in a longstanding dispute over Tennessee's TennCare Medicaid program and related consent decrees. The movants sought clarification that the court's earlier rulings on providers' obligations to give notice for benefit limits and copayments did not decide whether providers qualify as state actors under the Constitution or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court granted the motion in part, amending language that had stated a provider's refusal to render services "constitutes action by the State," while confirming that notice requirements remain in effect based solely on contractual relationships and the consent decree. It explicitly clarified that none of its orders had addressed or resolved the constitutional state-action question, and it denied the alternative request for a partial new trial.

healthcareprocedure

In Grier v. Goetz, the court considered plaintiffs' application for attorney's fees and expenses as a prevailing party for monitoring the state's implementation of a 2003 consent decree governing TennCare (Tennessee's Medicaid program) and for opposing the state's motion to modify that decree. The court found plaintiffs entitled to fees for their monitoring work, which the state had acknowledged as helpful, and for their partial success in the modification litigation, where the court granted only five of the state's thirty-four requests without limitation and imposed limits or denied the rest. The core reasoning examined whether plaintiffs qualified as a prevailing party under fee-shifting standards, focusing on the tangible benefits achieved through enforcement assistance and defense of the decree rather than outright victory on every point.

healthcarecivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a federal employee of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers who alleged that her employer retaliated against her under Title VII by failing to upgrade her GS-12 position to GS-13 and by not selecting her for the Chief of Contracting position, due to her prior EEO activity. After granting partial summary judgment on other claims, the court held a bench trial on the remaining retaliation claims and entered judgment for the defendant. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the decisions were retaliatory, finding instead that the actions were based on legitimate organizational restructuring, position classification procedures, and recruitment policies that did not disadvantage her. The opinion details the factual background of her role, evaluations, and the selection process without finding any causal link to protected activity.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case is a long-running class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging Tennessee's TennCare Medicaid managed care program for failing to provide adequate notice and hearing procedures to recipients facing denial of benefits, in violation of the Medicaid Act and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The dispute centers on multiple consent decrees dating back to 1986 and 1992, with the latest being the 2003 Consent Decree, which the state sought to modify and clarify in 2005 regarding appeals processes, prescription drug coverage, and benefit limits. The court applied the two-step Rufo framework for modifying consent decrees and issued orders granting in part and denying in part the state's requests, primarily to align procedures with federal regulations while accounting for the managed care context and administrative needs. The core reasoning focused on ensuring final administrative action meets federal timelines, expanding or clarifying expedited appeals definitions, and maintaining due process protections without unduly burdening the state or contractors.

healthcarecivil rightsprocedurefederal power

This case concerns the State of Tennessee's motion to modify a 2003 Revised Consent Decree governing the TennCare Medicaid program, specifically regarding drug coverage, prior authorization requirements, prescription limits, appeals processes, and related beneficiary protections. The court found significant changed circumstances justifying some modifications under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, but ruled that changes must be suitably tailored to those circumstances and consistent with constitutional and regulatory requirements such as 42 C.F.R. § 431.244(f). It granted in part requests allowing prior authorization with a 72-hour emergency supply exception, a soft five-prescription limit after CMS approval, certain appeals adjustments, and evaluation under state medical necessity definitions, while denying requests for blanket implementation of future unapproved CMS reforms, categorical claim denials, termination of the decree, and some notice or expedited appeal alterations. The court emphasized that the parties should develop practical implementation solutions and that future modifications inconsistent with the decree still require court approval.

healthcarecivil rightsprocedure

In Suciu v. Barnhart, the plaintiff sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Administration's denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. After the plaintiff failed to appear at a scheduled ALJ hearing and did not respond to a notice to show cause, the ALJ dismissed the hearing request; subsequent requests to reopen were also denied by the agency. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing failure to exhaust administrative remedies and no final decision after a hearing. The court denied the motions to dismiss, holding that the ALJ violated 20 C.F.R. § 404.957 in dismissing the hearing without following required procedures, which implicated due process concerns sufficient to support jurisdiction and remand. The case was remanded to the Commissioner for a hearing before an ALJ.

federal powerprocedurehealthcare

This case involves a claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by Susan Green against Prudential Insurance Company for denial of long-term disability benefits under an employer-sponsored plan. Green, who left her banking position due to chronic fibromyalgia and depression, argued that Prudential improperly denied her benefits. The court determined that Prudential's denial was arbitrary and capricious, particularly in its assessment of her medical condition and application of the plan's mental disorder limitation. It therefore reversed the decision and remanded the matter to Prudential to update the medical records and issue a new determination on whether Green qualifies for total disability benefits.

labor & employmenthealthcare

This case involves federal capital charges against defendant Donnell Young as part of a larger prosecution of an alleged drug trafficking and violent criminal enterprise known as the Shakir Enterprise. Young moved for bifurcated juries, seeking one non-death-qualified jury to decide guilt or innocence and, if convicted of a capital offense, a separate death-qualified jury for the sentencing phase. The court granted the motion after a hearing. The core reasoning was that Supreme Court precedent requires bifurcated guilt and penalty proceedings in death penalty cases and permits but does not mandate the same jury for both phases, allowing separate juries here to fairly balance the defendant's interest in an impartial guilt-phase jury with the government's interest in a death-qualified sentencing jury.

criminal lawprocedure