James Robertson Nowlin

This case involved a dispute between Myriad Development, Inc., a software company, and Alltech, Inc., a disaster inspection services provider, arising from three contracts for developing and licensing an inspection management system called Risk Manager (formerly Apprise) to support Alltech's work with FEMA. Myriad claimed unpaid contract amounts and trade secret misappropriation by Alltech, while Alltech sought to limit or eliminate those claims through post-verdict motions. After reviewing the evidence and applicable law under standards for judgment as a matter of law, the court granted both parties' motions in part and denied them in part, awarding Myriad $21,263 for the APPRISE Agreement, $198,110 for the Subcontract for Labor, and $250,000 in reasonable royalties for trade secret misappropriation, but denying Alltech any recovery and adjusting damages to conform to the evidence and legal requirements such as choice-of-law provisions.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case centered on Deliverance Poker, LLC's claims against Tiltware, LLC and poker player Michael Mizrachi arising from Mizrachi's alleged breach of a promotional sponsorship agreement with Deliverance and Tiltware's role in inducing that breach through its competing offer. The underlying dispute involved contract and tortious interference theories tied to Mizrachi switching his promotional efforts to Full Tilt Poker. The court dismissed the action without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the plaintiff did not meet its burden to establish complete diversity because the citizenship of the members of the LLC parties was not adequately proven, that Mizrachi's presence as a party would destroy diversity, and that he was a required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) whose joinder could not be avoided under the factors of Rule 19(b).

proceduretorts & liability

The case was a class action lawsuit by former waitresses and bartenders against a Cajun restaurant operator alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act's minimum wage and overtime rules, specifically improper overtime pay, uniform fee deductions from wages, and invalid tip credits due to lack of notice and sharing tips with non-tipped employees such as dishwashers and preparation cooks. The court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the overtime and uniform deduction claims, which the defendant conceded, and on the invalidity of including certain non-tipped workers in tip pools, but denied it in part on remaining factual disputes. The core reasoning applied FLSA provisions and persuasive DOL guidance to determine employee eligibility for tip pools based on whether they customarily and regularly receive tips, along with evidence from depositions and affidavits showing the duties of kitchen staff.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involves claims by former restaurant employees against their employer for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), including failure to pay minimum wage due to improper tip pooling with non-tipped employees, unpaid overtime wages, and illegal deductions for uniforms. The plaintiffs sought conditional certification of a collective action to include similarly situated employees. The court granted the motion for conditional certification, applying the lenient first-stage standard under FLSA Section 216(b) because discovery was not complete and the case was not ready for trial. The court found that the plaintiffs had presented substantial evidence showing they were similarly situated to other servers and bartenders regarding the alleged FLSA violations.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved an investor suing Bear Stearns & Co. and employee Lisbeth Barron for alleged misrepresentations about the firm's role in pursuing an IPO for a startup company, claims brought under federal securities laws including Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and Section 20(a) control-person liability to recover losses from a limited partnership investment. The magistrate judge recommended granting the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court adopted the report and recommendation in full after the parties filed no objections, dismissed all claims against Bear Stearns and Barron, and closed the case.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a former Senior Vice President of Finance at Texas Mutual Insurance who alleged gender discrimination under federal and state laws, including the Equal Pay Act, after resigning in 1996; she claimed she was paid less than male counterparts and faced other discriminatory treatment. The defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims. The court granted the motion, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act because her executive role could not be compared to those of other senior vice presidents overseeing different operations, as such high-level positions involve unique factors like experience and market forces that courts should not second-guess. The court also found insufficient evidence to support other claims, such as those involving promises of raises or replacement in her position, noting the absence of specific facts showing genuine issues for trial.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In this case, plaintiffs D. Hull Youngblood and Gwendolyn Youngblood alleged that defendant GC Services violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) when collecting an unpaid AT&T bill, specifically by failing to provide a proper validation notice under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, omitting required debt-collection warnings under § 1692e(11), and using misleading professional names under § 1692e(9) and (10). The court denied plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. It reasoned that the validation and warning notices, though placed on the back of the letters with bold cross-references, were not confusing as a matter of law under any applicable consumer standard, and that the registered professional names used by employees did not violate the statute because they clearly identified the debt-collection source without implying false authority. The court also deferred ruling on class certification.

business & regulatory

In this declaratory judgment action, Plaintiffs sought a ruling that Defendant's $68,000 home equity loan secured by their homestead violated the Texas Constitution's three-percent cap on fees for originating, evaluating, or servicing such extensions of credit under Article XVI, Section 50(a)(6)(E). The dispute focused on whether a $680 loan origination fee and a $1,020 loan discount qualified as fees (rather than interest) that would push the total above the $2,040 limit. The court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, holding that the loan origination fee plainly constituted a fee under the constitutional text because it was charged to originate the credit. Relying on the Texas Supreme Court's directive to give effect to the literal language of the provision and avoid constructions that render it meaningless, the court concluded the loan violated the Constitution.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved national banks and out-of-state banks challenging Texas Business and Commerce Code § 4.112, a statute effective in 2001 that barred banks from charging fees to non-account holders for cashing checks drawn on the bank. The court granted the banks' motion for summary judgment, holding that the Texas law is preempted by the National Bank Act and related federal regulations, and cannot be severed to apply only to Texas-chartered banks. The core reasoning was that federal law, including 12 U.S.C. § 24 and 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(a), expressly permits national banks to charge such fees, with deference given to the OCC's interpretation that this authority extends to non-account holders; the statute directly conflicts with federal authority. The court further reasoned that applying the law only to state banks would violate the Texas Constitution's requirement that state banks enjoy the same rights as national banks. As a result, the court issued a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the statute and declared it unenforceable.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved national banks challenging a new Texas statute, Texas Business and Commerce Code § 4.112, scheduled to take effect September 1, 2001, which would bar banks from charging fees to non-account holders for cashing checks drawn on the bank. The plaintiffs argued that the state law conflicted with and was preempted by the National Bank Act and related federal regulations permitting such fees. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas granted the banks' motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining enforcement of the Texas law pending a final decision on the merits. The court found a substantial likelihood of success on the preemption claim, citing the broad powers granted to national banks under 12 U.S.C. § 24 and 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(a), along with deference to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's interpretations supporting the banks' authority to charge fees. It also determined that the banks would suffer irreparable harm without relief and that an injunction served the public interest while balancing harms to the parties.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case concerned a dispute under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) between the Austin Independent School District and student Robert M., who had been diagnosed with ADD and sought continued placement in a magnet program for gifted students along with special education services. An administrative hearing officer ruled that Robert qualified as Other Health Impaired and Emotionally Disturbed, that the district had failed to provide a free appropriate public education, and that his mother was entitled to reimbursement exceeding $3,000. The district court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment on the administrative record, concluding that Robert's academic difficulties resulted from his own choices such as skipping classes and failing to complete assignments rather than from any qualifying disability or lack of educational benefit, and that lack of motivation does not constitute a disability under the IDEA.

civil rightsfederal power

This case involves a copyright infringement dispute between a Texas photographer operating an adult website and a California company and its CEO who run an online service that indexes and displays photographs from Usenet newsgroups. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants published his copyrighted images without permission, asserting claims under federal copyright law as well as state-law claims for unfair competition and conversion. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, arguing that their internet service's availability in Texas was insufficient for jurisdiction and that the state claims were preempted by the Copyright Act. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, finding personal jurisdiction existed due to the defendants' Texas subscribers and other contacts, dismissing the state-law claims as preempted because they were equivalent to copyright rights, and allowing the copyright claim to proceed after confirming registration formalities were met.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, plaintiff Richard Brook moved to vacate an arbitration award favoring defendant Peak International Ltd. arising from Brook's termination as president and COO under their employment agreement, while Peak sought confirmation of the award. The core dispute concerned whether the arbitrator, Judge Chuck Miller, was properly selected according to the agreement's process involving AAA-provided lists and alternating strikes, after Peak failed to timely submit strikes and rankings, leading to procedural irregularities and Miller's appointment. The magistrate judge's report analyzed whether these selection defects violated the contractual terms, implicated arbitrator jurisdiction, and constituted grounds for vacatur under applicable standards, ultimately addressing objections to the process and related case law on waiver and consent in arbitration. The court recommended vacating the award due to the failure to follow the agreed-upon selection method.

labor & employmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved organizations and lawyers challenging Texas's system of electing state judges through partisan elections that permit large campaign contributions from parties and attorneys who appear before them, without requiring recusal, as violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of State to halt the system until reformed. The court granted the motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), holding that campaign contributions alone do not create the direct, substantial, and pecuniary interest needed to show unconstitutional bias, as due process requires recusal only in extreme cases. The court further reasoned that the issue presented a political question involving state election policy, which federal courts should not resolve absent a clear constitutional violation, leaving reform to the Texas legislature and voters.

electionscivil rightsfederal power

The case involves Barbara Stevenson's application for supplemental security income disability benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, which was denied initially and upheld by an ALJ after a hearing at which she appeared without counsel. The district court reviewed the Commissioner's final decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and determined that the ALJ did not fulfill the special duty to develop a full and fair record for an unrepresented claimant, resulting in inconsistencies in the vocational expert's testimony about jobs the claimant could perform. The court therefore reversed the denial and remanded the matter to the Social Security Administration for a new hearing.

federal powerprocedure

This case challenged Texas's mandatory IOLTA program, under which lawyers must deposit client funds that are nominal in amount or held briefly into interest-bearing accounts, with the interest directed to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation for legal aid to low-income individuals. Plaintiffs, including a public interest group, a lawyer, and a client, claimed the program violated the Fifth Amendment by taking the interest without just compensation and infringed First Amendment rights by compelling support for certain legal services. After the Supreme Court held that the interest constitutes private property, the district court on remand found no constitutional violation: clients could not earn net interest outside IOLTA due to banking rules and costs, so no compensable taking occurred, and the program was content-neutral, advancing an important government interest in access to justice with minimal burden on speech under intermediate scrutiny.

civil rightsfree speechproperty

This case involves a constitutional challenge by the Washington Legal Foundation and others to Texas's mandatory IOLTA program, which requires lawyers to deposit client trust funds into accounts where interest benefits legal aid organizations. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the First and Fifth Amendments via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, following Supreme Court rulings recognizing clients' property interest in IOLTA-generated interest. The Texas Supreme Court Justices moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting immunity from suit. The court granted the motion regarding all claims for monetary damages against the Justices in their official capacities under precedents like Will v. Michigan Department of State Police. It further examined legislative immunity for the Justices' adoption of IOLTA rules and the ripeness of requested injunctive and declaratory relief.

civil rightsproperty

This case involved a 15-year-old student facing mandatory removal from regular high school classes and placement in an alternative education program under Texas Education Code Section 37.006(a) after an off-campus incident where he allegedly threw rocks at a car, which police reported as possible aggravated assault. No criminal charges were filed, and the statute required the placement based solely on the school district's determination without any prior notice or hearing. The court granted the student's motion for summary judgment, declaring the provision unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoining its enforcement for off-campus conduct. The reasoning centered on students' protected property and liberty interests in public education, which require due process protections before such a significant change in placement, even though the alternative program itself provides comparable curriculum.

civil rightsprocedure

The case concerned a challenge by the U.S. Taxpayers Party and supporters of Pat Buchanan to Texas Election Code Section 162.015, the "sore loser" statute, which barred Buchanan from appearing on the November general election ballot as the party's presidential nominee after he had run and lost in the Republican primary. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the statute violated their First Amendment rights to speech and association as well as Article II qualifications for president, along with a preliminary injunction to place Buchanan on the ballot. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction, finding that plaintiffs had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. It applied the Anderson balancing test and concluded that the statute imposed only a slight burden as a reasonable, nondiscriminatory ballot access rule that advanced the state's important interests in orderly elections, preventing voter confusion, and maintaining the integrity of the process, and was distinguishable from impermissible additional qualifications struck down in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton.

electionsfree speech

The case involved a minor student who was sexually assaulted by two fellow students with histories of disruptive behavior while attending a high school in the Austin Independent School District. The plaintiff sued the school district under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that its policy of enrolling students who met state compulsory attendance requirements, including those with prior abusive records, reflected deliberate indifference to students' constitutional right to bodily integrity. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding no liability under any of the three possible theories: deliberate indifference by official policy, a special relationship creating an affirmative duty to protect, or state-created danger. The core reasoning was that the injuries were inflicted by private actors rather than state employees, the district's enrollment practices did not meet the standard for deliberate indifference or culpable conduct, and compulsory attendance laws did not create the required special relationship or opportunity for harm.

civil rights