John Watkins Oliver

This case involved four petitions for writs of coram nobis filed by individuals convicted under the Prohibition Act in the 1920s and 1930s, challenging those convictions on the ground that they were obtained without counsel or a knowing waiver of the right to counsel, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Zerbst. The court held that the petitioners had the right to raise these claims via coram nobis and that the convictions were invalid under the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Johnson v. Zerbst and later cases like Argersinger v. Hamlin, which require counsel for any offense resulting in imprisonment absent a proper waiver. The court found that the petitioners met their burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to show the absence of counsel and waiver, leading it to vacate the guilty pleas, convictions, judgments, and sentences in each case. The reasoning emphasized that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel acts as a jurisdictional bar to valid convictions when violated and that old convictions obtained in violation of these standards may be corrected through this extraordinary remedy.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by a Missouri prisoner challenging his conviction, where prior certification of questions about state post-conviction remedies to the Missouri Supreme Court was declined. The federal district court directs further proceedings requiring the petitioner to file a Missouri Rule 91 state habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeals, Western District, and if necessary the Missouri Supreme Court, to determine whether an available state corrective process exists under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). The core reasoning rests on principles of comity and federalism, along with the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in White v. State indicating that state habeas remains available as a post-conviction remedy despite Rule 29.15, to ensure any federal claims receive a full and fair hearing in state court before federal jurisdiction is exercised.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

This case involves plaintiffs' motion to hold defendants in contempt for alleged failures to comply with consent decrees previously entered in a dispute over state administration of child welfare programs in Missouri. The court has not yet ruled on the contempt request or the related motion for extension of time, instead directing further proceedings to develop a more detailed record. The opinion explains that consent decrees are enforceable through the court's contempt powers under 18 U.S.C. § 401, but emphasizes that enforcement must follow the least intrusive means and that the decree itself requires plaintiffs to first notify defendants of specific areas of noncompliance and attempt informal resolution. The court notes that the current motion provides only conclusory allegations rather than the particularized showing needed to proceed, and it references Supreme Court precedent requiring careful, step-by-step consideration before imposing sanctions.

civil rightsfamily lawprocedure

This case concerns a state prisoner's second federal habeas corpus petition under Section 2254 challenging the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole's rescission of an unexecuted parole grant without notice or an opportunity to be heard, which the petitioner claims violated due process. The petition had previously been dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies, but new exhibits from state court filings, including a habeas petition to the Missouri Supreme Court that was summarily denied and a related Missouri Court of Appeals decision finding a liberty interest deprived without due process, raised the question of whether exhaustion had now occurred. The court concluded that the record must be expanded under Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to obtain additional materials necessary to determine whether the petitioner has exhausted available state postconviction remedies before further proceedings on the federal claim.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involves a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction. The district court identified unresolved questions of Missouri law about whether Rule 29.15 precludes state courts from exercising their constitutional habeas jurisdiction under Rules 91 and related provisions, and whether the petitioner had available state postconviction remedies that must be exhausted before federal review. To resolve these issues before proceeding, the court certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Missouri concerning the interpretation of Rule 29.15, the prohibition on suspending habeas corpus in the Missouri Constitution, and the availability of appellate habeas relief.

criminal lawprocedure

The case is a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by a state prisoner challenging his conviction based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea. After previously denying dismissal and ordering a supplemental response with state court transcripts and exhibits, the court reviewed those materials and concluded that appointment of counsel for the petitioner was required under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) because the interests of justice so demanded. The court directed appointed counsel to confer with the petitioner and prepare a report recommending what further proceedings, if any, should follow under the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, stressing the need for complete factual records before determining whether an evidentiary hearing or other disposition is warranted.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 1986 guilty plea conviction for second-degree assault in Missouri state court on four grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The respondent moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the petitioner had defaulted by failing to file a timely Missouri Rule 24.035 postconviction motion, which the state claimed precluded federal review. The court denied the motion to dismiss without further proceedings, holding that under the Eighth Circuit's decision in Barks v. Armontrout the new state rule did not bar federal habeas review and that principles of comity and federalism required further consideration of whether an alternative state remedy such as habeas corpus remained available. The opinion also examined whether Missouri's constitutional provisions on the writ of habeas corpus preserved an exhaustion requirement under federal law before the district court could reach the merits.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

The case concerned five claims by former employees against their employer for age discrimination under the ADEA, violations of ERISA, and three related state common-law claims arising from demotions and terminations. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that all counts were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. It determined that the plaintiffs had not timely filed their charges, as the limitations periods began when they knew the facts underlying their claims, and neither equitable estoppel nor equitable tolling applied based on the stipulated facts and deposition evidence. The decision applied federal and state limitation periods separately to each count, including shorter periods under Tennessee and Missouri law for the state claims.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved four defendants charged with conspiracy and distributing cocaine near a school, who entered guilty pleas and provided testimony against a co-defendant in exchange for potential sentencing concessions. The defendants moved for the court to either direct the government to file a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) or to impose a sentence below the one-year mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 845a(a) based on their substantial assistance, despite the government's failure to file such a motion. The court granted the motion after reviewing stipulated facts, affidavits, and government letters, finding that the government's prior communications effectively constituted the functional equivalent of a § 3553(e) motion and confirmed the defendants' cooperation satisfied the statutory requirements for departure authority.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involves a federal employee's EEO complaint alleging race discrimination and reprisal in the denial of promotions to multiple positions at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare starting in 1976. After the agency purged relevant records, the EEOC applied an adverse inference rule, found that the agency had discriminated on the basis of race in failing to select the plaintiff for five positions, and ordered retroactive promotion, back pay, and benefits. The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment to enforce the EEOC's finding of discrimination and related relief, while the defendant cross-moved for summary judgment. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and deferred ruling on the defendant's motion until the parties complied with an order for further proceedings on relief.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involved a dispute between Empire Gas Corp. and several defendants, including True Value Gas of Florida, Inc., and individuals Paul Fallon, Garlan Williams, and Carl Stenger, arising from employment contracts with non-compete covenants and related claims of breach and tortious interference in the liquefied petroleum gas business. Plaintiff requested transfer of the action from the Western District of Missouri to the Middle District of Florida under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The court granted the transfer on its own motion, finding that it could do so even without personal jurisdiction over the defendants, that venue would be proper in Florida because the claims arose there, and that transfer served the convenience of parties and witnesses as well as the interest of justice. The court rejected defendants' objections based on jurisdiction and venue, noting that the transfer could occur in the case's current procedural posture for the transferee court to address pending motions.

procedure

This case involved three consolidated ERISA actions in which former Macy's employees sought severance pay under Macy's Severance Allowance Plan after their stores were sold to Dillard's in 1986 and they were offered or took employment with Dillard's or a subsequent buyer. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on the severance claims after separating those issues for decision under Rule 42(b). It held that the plan administrator's denial of benefits was subject to review under the arbitrary and capricious standard and concluded that prior cases cited by the parties were factually distinguishable. The core reasoning focused on the terms of the plan, which limited severance to permanent terminations exceeding 90 days, the fact that most plaintiffs continued working without such a gap, and ERISA precedents governing fiduciary decisions and plan interpretation.

labor & employmentprocedure

In this case, Maislin Industries sued Primary Steel to recover $187,923.26 in undercharges on 1,081 steel shipments, representing the difference between published tariff rates and the lower amounts originally billed and paid. The district court had referred the matter to the Interstate Commerce Commission, which determined that collecting the undercharges would constitute an unreasonable practice under the Interstate Commerce Act. The court held that the ICC acted within its primary jurisdiction, that its factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, and that its policy change was adequately explained. It therefore granted summary judgment to Primary Steel and denied Maislin's cross-motion. The decision rested on deference to the agency's expertise in rate reasonableness and the lawfulness of carrier practices.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved defendant Elana Roxanne Terrill's motion challenging the constitutionality of the federal Sentencing Guidelines promulgated under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The court held that the Guidelines are invalid, adopting the reasoning from prior district court decisions such as United States v. Estrada and United States v. Bolding that found the Act unconstitutional due to defects in the Sentencing Commission's structure and the delegation of legislative authority. The opinion emphasized the duty to decide justiciable questions presented and noted alignment with multiple courts that had reached the same conclusion on facial challenges. It certified the issue for immediate appellate review given its broad impact on federal sentencing.

criminal lawfederal power

This case involves a breach of contract action by a Missouri corporation against an Italian partnership and its partners over the proposed U.S. distribution of a vacuum stuffer machine manufactured by the defendants. The court addressed multiple motions, primarily denying the defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds of improper parties, insufficient service, and lack of personal jurisdiction, while granting their motion to quash service. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's amended petition properly named the partnership and partners under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), that the defendants' contacts with Missouri through business negotiations satisfied the state's long-arm statute and due process minimum contacts requirements, and that service must be effected properly under the Hague Convention rather than the methods initially attempted. The opinion defers ruling on discovery motions pending resolution of these threshold issues.

procedure

This case involves a state prisoner's petition for federal habeas corpus relief after being convicted of first-degree robbery in two separate trials. The first conviction was reversed on appeal due to issues with the prosecution's use of undisclosed surprise witnesses and the absence of a key evidence technician, after which the petitioner was retried and convicted again over his double jeopardy objections. The court granted the petition, holding that the second trial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment as incorporated against the states. It applied federal standards from Benton v. Maryland and concluded that the circumstances of the first trial, including prosecutorial errors and the reversal, barred retrial for the same offense. The decision emphasized that jeopardy had attached and the errors did not permit a second prosecution.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a declaratory judgment action by United Fire & Casualty Company (UFCC) against New Hampshire Insurance Company (NHIC) to determine whether NHIC's policy covered liability for personal injuries from an auto accident. The accident occurred when an employee of J & K Clean-Up (UFCC's insured) was returning a car owned by Royal Chevrolet (NHIC's insured) after performing detailing services on it. The court granted summary judgment to NHIC, holding that the policy's exclusion for anyone using a covered auto while working in a business of servicing automobiles applied, as the delivery was part of J & K's detailing operations and not Royal Chevrolet's garage operations. The decision rested on the plain language of the policy under Missouri insurance law rules requiring unambiguous terms to be given their ordinary meaning without creating ambiguities.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case is a federal habeas corpus petition filed by a state prisoner challenging his convictions for first-degree burglary, rape, and armed criminal action. The petitioner raised four claims: ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call alibi witnesses, use of a coerced confession, insufficiency of the evidence, and ineffective assistance for not objecting to evidence of an unrelated crime. After determining that the claims were exhausted and holding an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance allegations, the court denied the petition in full. Applying the Strickland v. Washington standard, the court found that counsel's investigation and decisions were reasonable and not deficient, that any alleged deficiencies did not prejudice the defense, and that the remaining claims lacked merit based on the record and prior state proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved employees suing their employer, Montgomery Ward, for allegedly breaching a collective bargaining agreement by subcontracting their work to a subsidiary, and suing their union for failing to fairly represent them by not pursuing related grievances. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the hybrid Section 301/fair representation claims were time-barred by the six-month statute of limitations established in DelCostello v. Teamsters. The court granted the motions after finding that the plaintiffs' cause of action accrued no later than August 1, 1986, when plaintiff Burnett filed NLRB charges on behalf of the group stating that the grievances were deadlocked and the union would take no further action, and the complaint was not filed until March 1987. The court applied either the "knew or should have known" standard or the Eighth Circuit's rule that the claim accrues when the union commits the acts of unfair representation and concluded the suit was untimely under both.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case is a federal habeas corpus petition filed by a Missouri state prisoner who was convicted by a jury of attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud and sentenced to life imprisonment as a persistent offender. The petitioner raised claims that his arrest warrant was invalid because it was issued by a court clerk, that he was sentenced under the wrong state statute, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the admission of certain evidence seized from a car. The court denied the petition in full. It reasoned that an illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction under Supreme Court precedent, that sentencing errors under state law are not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings absent a due process violation, and that the state court's findings rejecting the ineffective assistance claim were consistent with federal standards and supported by the record.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power