This case involved an attorney's attempt to file a federal RICO lawsuit based on allegations of medical malpractice that had already been dismissed in state court due to the failure to submit an Affidavit of Merit. The court had previously warned the attorney against pursuing such a claim and issued an order to show cause regarding potential sanctions. The court determined that the attorney, Frank D. Branella, violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by persisting with the action despite these warnings. As a result, the court ordered the attorney to complete continuing legal education courses in federal practice and procedure as well as professionalism and professional conduct rules.
The case concerns residents of the predominantly minority Waterfront South neighborhood in Camden, New Jersey, who sued the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and related defendants after the agency issued air permits for a cement grinding facility operated by St. Lawrence Cement Co. The plaintiffs alleged intentional discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause, discriminatory effects under the Fair Housing Act, and private and public nuisance claims, asserting that the permitting decision disproportionately harmed their already burdened community. The court addressed the defendants' motions to dismiss these remaining claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It granted the motions in part and denied them in part, allowing certain intentional discrimination and Fair Housing Act claims to proceed on the basis of alleged patterns of prior permitting decisions while dismissing other claims for failure to state a viable cause of action.
This case involves defendant Tank I. Alsugair, who was charged with conspiracy and mail fraud under federal statutes for allegedly using an imposter to take the TOEFL exam on his behalf and then submitting falsified results to schools. The government claimed this scheme deprived the Educational Testing Service (ETS) of property interests including trademarked and copyrighted test materials, administration services, and goodwill. After previously dismissing an earlier indictment for failing to adequately allege a property deprivation, the court denied the motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. The court reasoned that the new indictment sufficiently alleged that Alsugair obtained specific property from ETS, satisfying the elements of the mail-fraud statute. The decision focused on the facial sufficiency of the indictment's allegations at the pretrial stage without addressing the evidence's strength.
In White v. Camden City Board of Education, plaintiff Rachel White, a substitute teacher born in 1940 who lacked full teaching certification despite multiple applications starting in 1992, sued the Camden County Board of Education under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act alleging that her repeated failures to obtain a permanent teaching position were due to age discrimination. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that White was not qualified for the positions because she never completed required credits for certification and that younger successful applicants possessed the necessary credentials. The court granted summary judgment to the Board after finding no evidence that age played any role in the hiring decisions and that the lack of certification was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason supported by the record; it denied the accompanying request for Rule 11 sanctions against White's attorney. The decision rested on the absence of any genuine issue of material fact regarding discriminatory intent or pretext.
This case under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) involved an autistic child, S.C., whose parents sought a residential educational placement after determining that his day program at the Bancroft School was inadequate and causing regression. An administrative law judge had previously ruled that the Deptford Township Board of Education failed to provide a free appropriate public education and ordered residential placement, which Deptford resisted and challenged in federal court while seeking contribution from state agencies. The court granted summary judgment to S.C., enforcing the residential placement and holding the local district responsible, while denying reargument by the state defendants but dismissing one agency on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The decision rested on the administrative findings that residential services were necessary for meaningful educational benefit, the district's obligations under IDEA, and limits on state sovereign immunity in this context.
The case concerned whether a Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) from Barbara Smith’s divorce from her ex-husband, a former DuPont employee, qualified as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) under ERISA entitling her to 50% of his pension or death benefits, despite the plan never having received a copy. DuPont denied benefits on the ground that ERISA preempted the state divorce order and required a QDRO submitted to the administrator. The court ruled that the PSA satisfied ERISA’s statutory criteria for a QDRO exempt from preemption, that submission to the plan was not a prerequisite to enforceability, and therefore granted Smith’s motion for summary judgment while denying DuPont’s cross-motion.