Richard Owen

This case is a shareholder derivative suit brought by Pfizer investors against the company's current and former directors and officers. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants knew of or should have known about cardiovascular risks tied to Celebrex and Bextra from clinical studies, concealed that information, and continued aggressive marketing of the drugs, which generated billions in sales before the FDA imposed black-box warnings and Pfizer suspended Bextra sales. No pre-suit demand was made on the board; instead, plaintiffs pleaded that demand was futile because a majority of directors lacked independence or were interested due to alleged insider trading, long-term ties, committee roles, stock holdings, and failure to act on known risks. Applying Delaware law under Rule 23.1, the court assessed whether the particularized allegations created a reasonable doubt that the board could have exercised independent and disinterested judgment on the claims. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint did not meet the threshold for excusing demand.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a shareholder derivative action under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against the CEO and major shareholder of IVAX Corp. and his partnership, seeking to recover alleged short-swing profits from purchases of IVAX stock by the defendants and sales of IVAX stock by another company, NAVI, in which the defendants held a stake. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that they were not liable because they qualified for a safe harbor exception under SEC rules, as they were not controlling shareholders of NAVI and did not exercise investment control over NAVI's portfolio. The reasoning focused on the strict liability provisions of Section 16(b) for beneficial owners but applied the exemption where the defendants lacked the requisite control or pecuniary interest in NAVI's transactions.

business & regulatory

In this capital case involving triple murder charges arising from an alleged drug racketeering robbery by a gang called Murder Unit, defendant Henderson invoked 18 U.S.C. § 3432 to obtain a list of government witnesses that included their addresses. The government supplied the names of 66 potential witnesses but withheld addresses for 27 of them, arguing that disclosure would endanger their safety. After a hearing and review of the indictment and government proffers describing the gang's history of violence, ongoing presence of members in the community, and specific instances of witness intimidation, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that providing the addresses may jeopardize life or safety and therefore permitted the government to withhold them.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Becton, a federal capital case charging triple homicide and approaching trial, the defendant sought broad production of the father's entire Social Security and Veterans Affairs files to support claims that the mother had misused benefits intended for the defendant as a child, a supplemental subpoena to Bronx Supreme Court, and authorization to hire a videographer to record the testimony of the defendant's children without requiring their in-court appearance. The court denied the expansive agency record requests, finding they would be burdensome and offered no evidentiary support for the misuse allegations since interviewed witnesses and the mother herself could address the issue, but exercised discretion to order the agencies to provide a schedule of benefits paid. The supplemental subpoena was granted, while the videographer request was approved only on condition that the government be permitted to attend and cross-examine the children, consistent with precedent emphasizing the prosecution's right to confrontation for reliability. The court reiterated that the children were available to testify and that videotaped testimony without cross-examination was disfavored.

criminal lawprocedure

In this capital case, defendants Becton and Henderson, charged with racketeering, robbery, triple homicide, and related crimes, moved to declare the Federal Death Penalty Act unconstitutional, strike mental intent and aggravating factors from the government's death penalty notices, require grand jury review of non-statutory factors, and obtain other procedural relief. The court denied the motions in part and granted them in part, rejecting challenges to the FDPA's constitutionality, its "sufficiently outweigh" standard, separation of powers issues, ex post facto concerns, and various statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors. It reasoned that Supreme Court precedent upholds the death penalty, other courts have uniformly rejected similar arguments, non-statutory factors do not require grand jury indictment as they affect only sentencing selection, and mental intent factors all require proof of intent without improper duplication. The court noted that sufficiency challenges to factors and some notice issues would be addressed later in the proceedings.

criminal law

This case involves a joint motion by two defendants in a federal capital case seeking various procedures for jury selection, including a questionnaire, attorney-led voir dire, punishment-related questioning, sequestered individual voir dire, the struck jury method, additional peremptory challenges, and bifurcation of the penalty phase. The court granted the request for individually sequestered voir dire but denied the others, following Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 for court-conducted questioning and the standard allocation of 20 peremptory challenges per side. It rejected punishment-specific voir dire as not required by Supreme Court precedent like Morgan v. Illinois, which focuses on impartiality regarding the death penalty rather than case-specific views, and declined to depart from established rules on jury methods and challenges. The core reasoning relied on applicable federal rules, Supreme Court standards for capital jury impartiality, and circuit precedent indicating that certain expanded questioning or procedures are neither mandated nor preferable.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves two defendants charged in a 16-count superseding indictment with participating in a racketeering enterprise and committing crimes including a January 2001 robbery, triple homicide, and attempted arson. The court denied the defendants' motions for severance, finding that a redacted version of one defendant's post-arrest statement using neutral pronouns could be admitted against him with a limiting instruction without violating the other defendant's confrontation rights under Bruton and related precedents, and that joint trials serve judicial economy absent a serious risk to specific trial rights. It also denied the motion to dismiss Count Ten regarding the attempted arson, ruling that the defendants had not shown the lost stove evidence was material and exculpatory or that the government acted in bad faith, and denied the request for a bill of particulars given the indictment and discovery already provided.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved investors in Merrill Lynch mutual funds who brought claims under the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and state breach of fiduciary duty law, alleging that defendants failed to disclose incentive structures and payments (such as directed brokerage and revenue sharing) that caused brokers to steer investors into certain 'Shelf Space Funds,' resulting in undisclosed and excessive fees. Plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of purchasers and holders of shares in funds from multiple families during a specified period. The court addressed defendants' motions to dismiss under the PSLRA and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b), 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 23.1. It held that plaintiffs lacked standing to assert claims on behalf of shareholders in non-Merrill Lynch Shelf Space Funds because those funds were issued and managed by non-parties under different prospectuses, and it set forth the legal standards for evaluating the remaining claims, including common elements under Sections 12(a)(2) and 10(b).

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned defendant Rafael Penn, who was indicted in 1993 on conspiracy charges involving federal narcotics laws but was not arrested and produced in the Southern District of New York until 2005, prompting his motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right. The court applied the four-factor Barker v. Wingo balancing test, noting that the nearly twelve-year delay was presumptively prejudicial and required further analysis. It determined that Penn was primarily responsible for the delay due to his use of a false identity, off-the-books work, and inconsistent residences as an illegal alien, which frustrated government efforts to locate him, and that he likely knew of the charges from his brothers' related prosecutions. The court also found Penn's claims of prejudice to his defense vague and unsubstantiated, leading it to deny the motion to dismiss.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the validity of five notices of termination served in 2004 by John Steinbeck's son Thom and granddaughter Blake to reclaim copyrights in his pre-1978 works that Steinbeck had granted to various parties before 1978. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether the notices complied with Sections 304(c) and 304(d) of the Copyright Act. The court explained that the statute creates inalienable termination rights vesting in the author or specified statutory heirs, which may be exercised during defined five-year windows beginning 56 or 75 years after the copyright was secured. It further held that any prior agreement, including a 1983 settlement granting Elaine Steinbeck exclusive control, cannot contract away or negate these rights under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5).

propertyfamily lawprocedure

The case concerns a challenge by the Automobile Club of New York to New York City’s Department of Consumer Affairs practices of seizing tow trucks licensed outside the city that enter to perform tows, tire changes, or related services crossing city lines. After a bench trial, the court addressed whether these licensing and enforcement rules violate the dormant Commerce Clause by substantially burdening interstate and inter-county commerce. The court applied the Pike balancing test, noting that out-of-city towers had long operated under an informal reciprocal agreement with minimal interference, that towing has become highly nationalized with thousands of annual interstate tows, and that the city’s scheme would require either costly local licenses, inefficient hand-offs at borders, or lengthy detours. The court concluded that the burdens on commerce are clearly excessive in relation to the asserted local benefits of regulating towers and preventing unlicensed operations.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case is a securities fraud class action brought by injured stockholders against the CEO, EVP, and outside auditors of ProNetLink under Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Exchange Act, alleging a pump-and-dump scheme involving false public statements about subscriber numbers, a voluntary stock lock-up, and the company's viability while insiders sold shares. The court addressed defendants' motions to dismiss under Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6), focusing on pleading sufficiency, statute of limitations, and control-person liability. It dismissed the Section 20(a) claim without prejudice because the bankrupt company was not named as a nominal defendant but permitted amendment within 30 days, while holding that the remaining Section 20(a) and 20A claims were adequately pleaded. The court also considered but rejected certain timeliness challenges under the applicable limitations periods.

business & regulatory

This case involves a copyright dispute between Troll Co., the exclusive licensee of the original Troll dolls created by Thomas Dam, and Uneeda Doll Co., a former licensee that resumed producing similar "Wish-nik" dolls after the copyright was restored in 1996. Plaintiff Troll Co. sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Uneeda from manufacturing and selling the dolls, claiming infringement under U.S. copyright law. The court granted the injunction, finding that Troll Co. demonstrated irreparable harm presumed from copyright infringement, direct evidence of copying due to Uneeda's prior licensing relationship, and substantial similarity between the dolls. The court rejected Uneeda's defense as a reliance party under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, noting that Uneeda had stopped production before restoration and only resumed afterward, thus not qualifying for the one-year sell-off period.

property

This case is a collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 of Mark Reiter's 1988 conviction on narcotics, racketeering, and tax charges, including RICO and continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) counts. Reiter raised claims of due process violations from the government's alleged failure to disclose exculpatory evidence about witness James Jackson and murders, as well as ineffective assistance by trial and appellate counsel, and errors in the jury instructions on the CCE supervision requirement. The petition was initially dismissed as time-barred under AEDPA, remanded on appeal, and then analyzed on the merits. The court rejected the claims, finding the jury instructions adequately covered the statutory elements including the 'in concert' requirement, and that other asserted errors lacked merit in light of the trial record.

criminal lawprocedure

In the 1980s, Raymond Clark was convicted after a four-month trial of participating in a large-scale narcotics distribution conspiracy in New York and elsewhere that involved multiple murders, including three that Clark personally committed according to trial evidence. Clark later moved to challenge the conviction, asserting that hearsay from a confidential informant constituted the only evidence against him and that certain police reports had been improperly withheld. The court denied the motion, finding that substantial non-hearsay evidence existed—including direct testimony from the conspiracy leader recounting Clark's detailed confessions to the murders—and that any undisclosed reports were neither reliable nor material enough to have altered the trial outcome. Clark's conviction had previously been affirmed on direct appeal by the Second Circuit.

criminal lawprocedure

In this insurance coverage dispute, Hartog Rahal Partnership sought reimbursement from its insurer Kemper for legal fees and settlement payments arising from sales of defective apple juice concentrate that led to claims by food manufacturers. The court held that Kemper must reimburse the legal fees because demand letters from the manufacturers constituted the functional equivalent of a lawsuit under New York law, triggering the duty to defend. However, the court denied coverage for the portion of settlements representing the cost of Hartog's own product, ruling that it fell under the policy's "your product" exclusion for property damage to the insured's own goods. The reasoning relied on New York precedents distinguishing between damage caused by the product to others, which is covered, and damage to the product itself, which is not.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

World Book, publisher of the World Book Encyclopedia, sued IBM alleging that IBM's 1999 authorization of its UK subsidiary to enter a distribution agreement with Time Group resulted in unauthorized sales channels in the United Kingdom, violating the parties' Joint Development Agreement and other contracts. The claims included trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, breach of contract, common law misappropriation, and an accounting. The court granted IBM's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the case, holding that the Lanham Act claim failed because the complaint did not plead the required substantial effects on U.S. commerce for extraterritorial application under Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Arco Globus International Co. The contract and misappropriation claims were time-barred by the two-year limitations period in the Base Agreement, and the misappropriation claim additionally failed for lack of alleged effects on domestic commerce; the accounting request was dismissed as a remedy rather than an independent claim.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case is a habeas corpus petition by Martin Armstrong challenging his civil contempt incarceration for failing to comply with a court-ordered turnover of corporate assets held as custodian for Princeton entities. The receiver, appointed in related SEC and CFTC proceedings, sought production of gold bullion, rare coins, and antiquities that Armstrong had purchased with corporate funds, but Armstrong refused on Fifth Amendment grounds and later claimed inability to produce the items after partial compliance. The court denied the petition, holding that as a corporate custodian Armstrong had no Fifth Amendment privilege to withhold the assets under Braswell v. United States, that he bore the burden of proving inability to comply which his unsupported testimony failed to meet, and that the district court's contempt authority permitted continued coercive detention without a specific statute. Core reasoning relied on the distinction between personal and corporate records, the limited evidentiary protection for the act of production, and precedents requiring clear evidence of impossibility before excusing noncompliance.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

This case arose from an SEC civil action against Princeton Economics International and its CEO Martin Armstrong alleging a Ponzi scheme that defrauded investors of approximately $1 billion. After a receiver was appointed, the district court ordered Armstrong to turn over roughly $15 million in corporate assets (including gold bars, valuable coins, and a historic bust) that he had taken into his personal possession; his failure to comply led to a civil contempt finding and confinement in the MCC beginning in January 2000 to coerce compliance. Over four-plus years of hearings and appeals, Armstrong repeatedly stated he would not or could not comply, citing various grounds including the Fifth Amendment, while the courts found he had not met his burden to show inability to comply. The district court concluded that the indefinite confinement order retained coercive potential, particularly given a newly filed habeas petition, and therefore continued the order without setting a release date.

criminal lawprocedurebusiness & regulatory

DC Comics sued Kryptonite Corporation for breach of a 1983 agreement that limited KC's use of the 'kryptonite' mark to bike locks and related products, along with claims of trademark infringement, unfair competition, and dilution under the Lanham Act. KC counterclaimed for rescission of the agreement, a declaration that DC has no trademark rights, cancellation of DC's registration, and other relief. The court denied KC's motion for summary judgment on DC's claims and granted in part and denied in part DC's motion for partial summary judgment on the counterclaims, dismissing KC's abandonment-based claims because DC had not stopped using the mark, denying summary judgment on KC's request to enjoin DC's use on two-wheeled vehicles due to factual disputes over product definitions, and granting summary judgment to DC on portions of its breach claim where KC conceded violations by using impermissible 'krypto' formative marks and the word 'super'.

business & regulatoryproperty