This case involves Warner Communications' motion to modify a 1951 antitrust consent judgment from the Paramount Pictures litigation, which prohibited Warner from owning or operating motion picture theaters as a remedy for prior Sherman Act violations involving monopolization and restraints in film distribution and exhibition. Warner sought approval for a joint venture with Paramount to acquire a 50% interest in Cinamerica, a theater chain with hundreds of screens, after the Justice Department declined to challenge the deal following investigation. The court found the factual record inadequate to fully assess competitive effects due to gaps in the Department's review and Warner's submissions, noting concerns over industry concentration and practices like exclusive licensing. It therefore granted the modification on express conditions, requiring Warner to hold its interest separately and subjecting bidding and licensing practices to court review by the end of 1989.
This case involved criminal contempt charges against Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation and its branch manager Leila Goldstein for violating a 1951 consent decree that enjoined block booking of motion pictures. The decree stemmed from the Paramount antitrust litigation under the Sherman Act and prohibited conditioning the license of one film on the licensee's acceptance of others. After a bench trial, the court found both defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding that the decree's relevant provision was clear, the defendants had actual knowledge of it, and Goldstein willfully violated it while acting within the scope of her managerial authority for Fox's benefit. The evidence included testimony from booking agents and theater operators showing conditioned licensing practices. The court noted Fox's prior nolo contendere plea to a similar violation in 1978.
The case involves criminal contempt charges against Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. and an individual employee for allegedly violating the injunctive provisions of a 1951 antitrust consent decree entered in United States v. Loew’s Inc. The defendants filed pretrial motions seeking grand jury transcripts under Fed.R.Crim.P. 16, exculpatory Brady material, a jury trial, and dismissal for improper venue. The court denied all motions, holding that Fox must stipulate that its employees could bind the corporation to obtain the transcripts, that the requested Brady information was not exculpatory or already known to the defense, that the offense was petty so no jury trial was required, and that venue was proper. The opinion explains that a corporation can be held criminally liable for willful violations of a court order by managerial employees acting within the scope of their authority, and that good-faith compliance efforts are irrelevant to the intent element once willfulness is shown.
This case is a declaratory judgment action brought by sixty-five U.S. citizens and organizations challenging the constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, which explicitly targets the PLO by prohibiting receipt of funds, expenditures, and maintenance of offices or facilities in the U.S. for the purpose of furthering PLO interests. The plaintiffs, including individuals seeking to receive PLO reimbursement for speaking engagements or to establish an office disseminating information about Palestinians, claim the law violates their First Amendment rights to free speech and association as well as the constitutional ban on bills of attainder. The court previously construed the ATA as inapplicable to the PLO's Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations to avoid conflict with U.S. international obligations, while addressing standing requirements for the remaining constitutional claims.
The case concerned the U.S. government's effort to enforce the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (ATA) by obtaining an injunction to close the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) permanent observer mission office in New York, which was maintained pursuant to an invitation from the United Nations. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that closure would violate the 1947 UN Headquarters Agreement, a treaty that provides for access and facilities for UN observers. The court examined the ATA's text, legislative history, and its interaction with the treaty, noting explicit statements by executive officials and legislators that the statute could not override U.S. treaty obligations. It concluded that the ATA did not require or authorize closure of the PLO mission, thereby denying the requested injunction.
The case involves three U.S. citizen plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctive relief against enforcement of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, which prohibits receiving value from the PLO, expending PLO funds, or maintaining offices at its direction, with the Attorney General tasked with enforcement via equitable relief. The plaintiffs challenge the Act's constitutionality under the First Amendment, asserting that it prevents them from accepting PLO funding for speaking engagements, travel, and establishing an office to disseminate materials on Palestinian issues. The court addresses whether the plaintiffs have shown entitlement to preliminary relief before trial in the declaratory judgment action, separate from a parallel government enforcement suit against the PLO, while noting the novel constitutional and international law questions presented. Core reasoning centers on the Act's specific prohibitions, the plaintiffs' described activities, and the standards for granting injunctive relief on First Amendment grounds without resolving the merits at this stage.
