Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit — appointed by William Jefferson Clinton
District Court, D. Vermont — appointed by George H.W. Bush
Alling v. C.D. Cairns Irrevocable Trusts Partnership
District Court, D. Vermont · 1995-05-25 · cited 6×
This case involves an interpleader action filed by Vermont resident Beatrice Ailing in state court seeking a declaratory judgment on the rights of two defendants, Vermont-based Cairns and New York-based Mobil, both of whom sought to purchase a parcel of land from her. Defendant Cairns moved to remand the case to Chittenden Superior Court, arguing lack of diversity, failure of all defendants to join the removal, and untimely filing of the notice of removal. The court denied the motion, holding that the parties should be realigned according to their actual interests, making the dispute one between diverse parties Cairns and Mobil with Ailing as a nominal plaintiff. It further ruled that the 30-day removal clock under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) begins upon perfection of service under Vermont law, which occurred when Mobil acknowledged receipt, rendering the notice timely, and that realignment eliminated any requirement for Cairns to join the removal.
procedureproperty
Wilkinson v. Balsam
District Court, D. Vermont · 1995-04-17 · cited 11×
The case involves Thomas Wilkinson suing psychiatrist Stephen Balsam and Vermont SRS employees Carolyn Russell and James Adams, alleging he was falsely accused of sexually abusing his son and stepson during a custody dispute; the claims include slander, negligence, malpractice, civil rights violations under federal law, conspiracy, and emotional distress. The court reviewed undisputed and disputed facts from the investigation, including interviews, medical evaluations, and reports of abuse that led to Wilkinson’s arrest, noting issues like leading questions and withheld contrary information. The court denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, determining that genuine issues of material fact existed on immunity and misconduct claims, and also denied the plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion along with other pending motions on sanctions and discovery.
civil rightsfamily lawtorts & liabilityprocedure
Goodstein v. Bombardier Capital, Inc.
District Court, D. Vermont · 1995-01-27 · cited 15×
In Goodstein v. Bombardier Capital, Inc., two former female employees sued their employer and several individual supervisors, alleging sexual harassment and gender discrimination under Title VII as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from a hostile work environment and specific incidents of harassment that led to their terminations in 1991. The defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss, arguing among other things that individual defendants could not be held personally liable under Title VII, that certain claims were barred by administrative filing requirements or Vermont’s workers’ compensation statute, and that punitive damages were unavailable for pre-1991 conduct. Applying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard that dismissal is proper only if no set of facts could entitle the plaintiffs to relief, the court accepted the allegations as true and found them sufficient to state claims, including potential post-1991 discriminatory rehiring that could support punitive damages. The court therefore granted the unopposed motion to file a second amended complaint and denied the partial motion to dismiss in full.
labor & employmentcivil rights
Fellheimer v. Middlebury College
District Court, D. Vermont · 1994-08-24 · cited 33×
The case concerned Ethan Fellheimer, a Middlebury College student accused by another student of rape in 1992; the college notified him of a disciplinary charge of rape and later referenced disrespect of persons, held a hearing under its handbook procedures, and suspended him after finding him not responsible for rape. Fellheimer sued the college, claiming it breached its contractual promises of fundamental fairness and adequate notice in the student handbook. The court analyzed the undisputed facts and found that the college failed to clearly inform Fellheimer of the specific conduct underlying any separate disrespect of persons charge or its distinct factual basis apart from the rape allegation, even though the handbook allowed discipline under general terms like respect for persons. It concluded that these notice deficiencies raised questions about whether the college met its own procedural standards before imposing discipline.
procedurecivil rights
Frank v. United States
District Court, D. Vermont · 1994-08-02 · cited 8×
This case involved Vermont Sheriff Samuel Frank challenging the constitutionality of the Brady Act's requirement that local chief law enforcement officers (CLEOs) conduct background checks on proposed handgun purchases before allowing transfers by federally licensed dealers. Sheriff Frank, who had been performing these checks for Orange County, sought to enjoin enforcement of the Act, arguing it exceeded Congress's powers under Article I and violated the Tenth Amendment by compelling state and local officials to carry out federal regulatory duties. After consolidating the preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits, the court analyzed the Act's framework, the definition of CLEO, and relevant precedents such as New York v. United States. The court addressed standing issues arising from a state agency's offer to assume the CLEO role and evaluated whether the federal mandate improperly commandeered local officials. It concluded that the Brady Act's background check provisions violated the Tenth Amendment.
gunsfederal power
Gravel & Shea v. Vermont National Bank
District Court, D. Vermont · 1993-11-30 · cited 3×
The case Gravel & Shea v. Vermont National Bank concerns a law firm's appeal from a bankruptcy court's ruling that awarded certain escrow funds held by the debtor to Vermont National Bank. The firm challenged the timeliness of its own notices of appeal, citing a clerk's error in docketing an order denying reconsideration, lack of notice to the parties, and arguments for extending time based on excusable neglect or giving effect to an earlier notice. The court addressed whether the February 7, 1992 docket entry was sufficient to start the ten-day appeal period under F.R.B.P. 8002 and 9022, whether arguments about the entry's deficiency were waived, and related motions to vacate or extend time. It concluded that a substantially incorrect docket entry does not trigger the appeal clock regardless of the parties' actual knowledge, while confirming that lack of clerk notice alone provides no basis for relief from the filing deadline.
procedure