The case involved a plaintiff diagnosed with electromagnetic sensitivity who sought a writ of mandamus to force the City of Santa Fe to enforce its land development code and halt 3G broadcasts from cell towers whose radio frequency emissions allegedly exacerbated his condition and violated the ADA. The court granted the city's motion to dismiss for failure to state a viable claim. It reasoned that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempts local regulation of such emissions on environmental grounds or to protect individuals with disabilities under the ADA. The court further found no equal protection or due process violation because disabled persons are not a suspect class and the federal preemption scheme has a rational basis.
This case involved a motion to suppress evidence obtained after a traffic stop on Interstate 40 in New Mexico, where an officer observed the defendant's vehicle touch and drive on the solid stripe dividing the right lane from the shoulder. The defendant argued that such contact did not violate NMSA 1978, § 66-7-317, which requires driving “as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane,” and that the subsequent consent to search was invalid. The court interpreted the statute to mean that the “lane” excludes the dividing lines and stripes, establishing a bright-line rule that touching those markers constitutes a violation and provides reasonable suspicion for a stop. It further held that the stop was not impermissibly extended and that the defendant's oral and written consent to search was valid and independent of any pat-down. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to suppress.
The plaintiffs, grand jury targets in custody, sued the district attorney under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that providing less than four days' notice of their right to testify before the grand jury violated their Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights by failing to follow NMSA 1978, § 31-6-11(C). The defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), contending that the complaint alleged only a state-law violation and did not state a plausible federal claim. The court examined whether the statute created a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, reviewing case law requiring substantive limitations on official discretion and explicitly mandatory language, and considered whether terms like "shall" necessarily impose such duties.
The case concerned the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe's challenge to New Mexico's imposition of five taxes on oil and gas extraction and related equipment on the tribe's unallotted reservation lands located within the state. The tribe claimed the taxes violated federal common law, the Supremacy Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the state's Enabling Act disclaimer of taxing jurisdiction over Indian lands. After a bench trial with extensive findings on the reservation's treaty history, boundaries, trust status, absence of residents or state services, and economic activities limited to grazing and resource extraction, the court analyzed precedents such as Merrion, Cotton Petroleum, and Bracker balancing to determine the legal incidence and permissibility of the state taxes.
In Bales v. Chickasaw Nation Industries, a non-Native American plaintiff filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against a corporation wholly owned by the Chickasaw Nation, asserting claims under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and New Mexico common law. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that tribal sovereign immunity barred the suit. The court granted the motion, holding that the tribal corporation, chartered under 25 U.S.C. § 503, enjoys the Chickasaw Nation's sovereign immunity, which had not been waived in its charter for these claims and had not been abrogated by Congress with respect to Title VII or the ADEA.
The EEOC sued Wal-Mart under Title VII, alleging that the company retaliated against employee Ramona Kay Bradford by refusing to hire her adult children, Robin and John Bradford, after she filed a discrimination charge in 2004. Wal-Mart moved to dismiss the claims on behalf of all three individuals. The court granted the motion as to Robin and John Bradford, finding they had not engaged in any protected activity themselves and thus could not establish a prima facie retaliation claim. The court denied the motion as to Ramona Kay Bradford, holding that she could pursue a claim that the failure to hire her children constituted an adverse action against her as an employee in retaliation for her protected activity.
