Martin Pence

The case concerned debtor Robert Allen Smith’s appeal from the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of his adversary proceeding seeking to cancel IRS claims for unpaid employment taxes and § 6672 penalties tied to his law corporation RASCORP for 1987–1990. The district court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice, ruling that Smith was a responsible person who willfully failed to collect, account for, and pay over trust-fund taxes, that corporate loans to him were properly recharacterized as taxable wages, and that he was ineligible for safe-harbor relief under Section 530 or reduced rates under § 3509. The court also upheld the denial of a jury trial. Core reasoning rested on evidence that Smith restructured his practice into an S corporation using purported independent contractors, directed payments as loans to avoid withholding, and intentionally preferred other creditors over the IRS.

taxesbusiness & regulatorylabor & employment

The case involved an appeal by Carlsmith Ball from a bankruptcy court's July 1993 Turnover Order directing funds to Western Farm Credit Bank in the Hamakua Sugar Co. bankruptcy. The district court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction after reviewing the record sua sponte. It found the July 1993 order non-final because it conditioned turnover on later findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an audit that were never properly completed or entered. The subsequent May 1994 Memorandum Opinion was deemed the final disposition but remained interlocutory without Rule 54(b) certification and proper judgment entry under bankruptcy rules, precluding appeal as of right under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). The dismissal was without prejudice to allow curing of the jurisdictional defects.

procedure

In this bankruptcy appeal, debtor Gerald Michael Madison challenged the bankruptcy court's orders denying confirmation of his Chapter 13 plan and dismissing his voluntary petition. After the district court affirmed those orders, Madison moved for a default judgment against the United States because its responsive brief was filed one day late under local rules. The court denied the motion, holding that even a one-day delay does not warrant default when the appeal lacks merit on its face, that default is a sanction that must be proportionate to the violation, and that the court has discretion to reach the merits rather than enter judgment by default under these circumstances.

procedure

In this case, debtor Gerald Michael Madison appealed a bankruptcy court's denial of confirmation of his Chapter 13 plan and dismissal of his petition, which were based on a finding that his noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts exceeded the $100,000 limit under 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). Madison, an airline pilot convicted of tax evasion for failing to file returns from 1982 to 1985, faced IRS claims for unpaid taxes, interest, fraud penalties, and understatement penalties totaling over $200,000 related to his Amway business income; he listed only about $75,000 in unsecured debts in his schedules and argued the disputed additional amounts were unliquidated and excludable. The district court affirmed, holding that the IRS deficiency notices made the amounts readily ascertainable and thus liquidated regardless of any dispute or pending Tax Court proceedings, so they counted toward the eligibility cap and rendered Madison ineligible for Chapter 13 relief.

taxescriminal lawprocedure

This case involved an appeal by the IRS from a bankruptcy court's orders awarding compensation to the trustee of Charley's Tour and Transportation, Inc., both as trustee commissions and as attorney's fees for services rendered to the estate, while denying other claims. The district court first addressed procedural issues, determining that the IRS's motion for reconsideration, though labeled under Bankruptcy Rule 9024, was properly treated as a Rule 9023 motion that tolled the ten-day appeal period, making the notice of appeal timely. On the merits, the court held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in granting the compensation, as the trustee's services benefited the estate and any failures to obtain prior approvals or maintain separate accounting did not prejudice creditors or the estate. The district court therefore affirmed the bankruptcy court's August 30, 1989 judgment and its order denying reconsideration.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In United States v. Penny-Feeney, defendants Janice Penny-Feeney and Sean Feeney, indicted on federal drug and firearm charges, moved to suppress physical evidence seized from their home pursuant to a state search warrant and from a mailed package pursuant to a federal warrant, arguing lack of probable cause and false statements in the supporting affidavits. The court denied the motion to suppress after holding a Franks hearing limited to the affiant officer's statements about using a FLIR thermal imaging device. The core reasoning was that the affidavits established probable cause through detailed tips from multiple anonymous and known informants describing an indoor marijuana-growing operation, which were sufficiently corroborated by the officer's independent observations of the residence, vehicles, associates, and utility usage, and that the FLIR-related statements were neither knowingly false nor made in reckless disregard of the truth.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved multiple defendants charged in a superseding indictment with conspiracy and substantive offenses related to structuring financial transactions to evade federal currency reporting requirements under 31 U.S.C. § 5313, arising from two separate incidents in 1989 and 1990 involving cashier's checks and alleged money laundering of drug proceeds. The court dismissed Count 1 of the indictment as duplicitous and vague because it improperly conflated distinct transactions and failed to allege a cognizable offense, and dismissed Count 5 as defective for the same reason that the alleged conduct involved negotiable instruments rather than currency. The court denied motions for production of grand jury materials due to insufficient particularized need, denied severance requests as the counts and defendants were properly joined, and rejected other challenges to the remaining counts for failure to state an offense or allege specific intent.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Matsumoto, the defendant was indicted on charges of making a materially false statement on a nonimmigrant visa application under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and using a visa procured by false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 1546 after immigration officials discovered his prior assault convictions in Japan. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3512, because the visa application form lacked a required OMB control number. The court denied the motion, holding that § 3512 shields persons only from penalties for failing to provide information on unapproved forms but does not protect against prosecution for affirmatively providing false information, based on the statute's plain language limiting its scope to failures to maintain or provide information and its legislative history aimed at protecting the public from unauthorized forms rather than shielding fraud.

immigrationcriminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Washington residents who bought multiple artworks purportedly by Salvador Dali from a Hawaii gallery between 1978 and 1981, paying $36,200, after receiving repeated mailings of certificates of authenticity and appraisals that affirmed the works' genuineness and rising value. In 1988 the buyers learned of reports questioning the gallery's representations, investigated, and sued in 1989 alleging breach of express warranty under the UCC among other claims. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the action was time-barred by the UCC's four-year statute of limitations measured from the sales. The court denied the motion, holding that the statute did not bar the claims because artwork is a type of good whose authenticity may only become discoverable years later, similar to wine or antiques, and the defendants' continued representations could toll the limitations period or constitute warranties extending beyond delivery.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved appeals from bankruptcy court orders in the Chapter 7 proceedings of debtor Anthony Greco concerning property on Maui, Hawaii, that had been subject to a long-term lease and a confirmed Chapter 11 reorganization plan involving a trust agreement with Troy Corporation. After conversion to Chapter 7, the trustee did not assume or reject the agreements within the required time, leading Greco to seek a declaratory judgment that the Kishi-Troy lease was not an executory contract subject to the automatic rejection rules of 11 U.S.C. § 365(d). The bankruptcy court denied the motion and related reconsideration requests while also denying sanctions sought by the Kishi Trustees; on appeal, the district court affirmed the denial of the declaratory judgment and reconsideration as well as the denial of sanctions for the original motion but reversed the denial of sanctions for the reconsideration motions, holding that the integrated documents constituted executory contracts that had been deemed rejected and that the reconsideration filings were not substantially justified.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved a FOIA request by Walter R. Schoettle to the Department of Housing and Urban Development for a list of mortgagors owed vested, unpaid distributive shares and mortgage insurance premium refunds. The government moved for summary judgment, arguing the records were exempt from disclosure. The court granted the motion, holding that the information fell within FOIA Exemption 6 because its release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The ruling relied on Supreme Court precedent emphasizing individuals' control over personal information and on the ongoing efforts by HUD to locate eligible recipients, finding that any public interest in disclosure did not outweigh the privacy concerns.

federal powerprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In United States v. Muller, the petitioner sought to vacate his 1985 federal convictions for felony murder and related offenses under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that the jury selection conducted by a magistrate violated his rights based on the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Gomez v. United States and the Ninth Circuit's follow-up in United States v. France. The court denied the petition because Muller's conviction was already final when those rulings were issued. Applying Teague v. Lane, the court determined that Gomez and France announced a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively on collateral review, as the magistrate-led selection was consistent with then-prevailing law and did not seriously undermine the accuracy of the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns an application by the trustees under a revocable trust and related individuals to remove specific real property from the bankruptcy schedules and inventories of debtor William S. Ellis, Jr. in his Chapter XII proceeding filed in 1972. The court granted the application and ordered the property expunged from the debtor's filings. The core reasoning was that a 1967 state court judgment had cancelled the prior sale of the property, preventing any valid transfer of interest to the debtor after the bankruptcy petition was filed, a related 1967 bankruptcy was void on its face, and Bankruptcy Rule 110 authorized direct amendment of the schedules without an adversary proceeding.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involves a bankruptcy trustee's adversary proceeding seeking turnover of approximately $275,000 in proceeds from the sale of real property held in escrow, where the funds were attributable to interests owned by two corporations, Lilipuna Ventures, Inc. and Lilipuna Development Corporation. The bankruptcy court found these entities to be alter egos of the debtor Sammy G. Daily, sanctioned the defendants for repeated failure to produce subpoenaed records by deeming the complaint's allegations established as facts, and ordered the proceeds paid to the trustee after piercing the corporate veil. On appeal, the district court affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court had equitable authority to attribute the assets to the debtor's estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541 based on the debtor's control and beneficial ownership of the corporations. The court rejected arguments that the trustee could assert no greater rights than the debtor himself, citing precedent allowing attribution of assets used to prejudice creditors.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case concerns McBryde Sugar Co.'s motion for an award of attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 following its success in long-running litigation over water rights in Hawaii's Hanapepe River watershed. The litigation originated from a 1973 Hawaii Supreme Court decision asserting state ownership of stream waters and restricting out-of-watershed transport, which McBryde and other plaintiffs challenged through proceedings in state and federal courts up to the U.S. Supreme Court. After the district court re-entered judgment in McBryde's favor on remand, the court evaluated McBryde's request for over $1.1 million in actually paid fees plus upward adjustments for delay in repayment using either lost investment returns or current hourly rates. The court took judicial notice of prior case records and analyzed supporting exhibits while addressing objections from state officials, focusing on whether the fees were reasonable and compensable under the statute.

civil rightspropertyprocedure

This case involved a construction company and its owners suing a carpenters' union and its agents, alleging that the union targeted the company with threats, prolonged picketing, and interference with suppliers and contractors to force recognition and a union contract, despite employees rejecting the union in an NLRB election. The court dismissed the unfair labor practice claim under 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) as time-barred, the state antitrust claims as preempted by federal labor law, and the emotional distress claims as time-barred, while dismissing the civil RICO claim with leave to amend to properly plead the enterprise element. It allowed the federal antitrust claim and the state tortious interference with economic advantage/inducement to breach contract claim to proceed, and it denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment because factual issues remained unresolved and the defendants were barred from submitting certain evidence. The core reasoning relied on statutes of limitations, federal preemption principles from cases like Connell, and standards for motions to dismiss and summary judgment under Rule 12(b)(6) and related precedents.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case concerns a long-running dispute over ownership of surplus water rights in Hawaiian streams, stemming from territorial-era decisions like Gay II that recognized konohiki ownership, followed by the Hawaii Supreme Court's McBryde I and II rulings that altered those rights and prompted due process and takings claims by affected landowners. On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court after granting certiorari in light of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, the district court reconsidered whether the plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims were ripe. The court decided the claims were ripe, finding that the state supreme court's decisions were final, that prior law on surplus water was settled, and that no further state remedies remained unexhausted. Its core reasoning was that every reviewing judge had previously treated the McBryde rulings as conclusive takings of vested property interests, and the Solicitor General's arguments for unripeness were unsupported by the record or intervening precedent such as Yolo County.

propertycivil rightsprocedure

This case was a civil forfeiture action by the United States seeking to seize a 1984 Mercedes Benz allegedly used by owner Fred Murrell to transport cocaine, after agents tracked a package containing the drug from Portland to Honolulu and observed Murrell picking it up; Murrell filed counterclaims related to the seizure and his arrest. The court had previously dismissed the forfeiture complaint for unconstitutional delay violating due process but now considered the government's motion for a certificate of reasonable cause to shield it from costs and agents from liability. The court granted the certificate, finding probable cause existed from circumstantial facts including the vehicle's use to attempt pickup on May 11, its absence from Murrell's condominium upon agents' arrival, Murrell's presence with the empty package shortly after, and the later recovery of cocaine in his apartment, even without relying on any statements by Murrell. The reasoning emphasized that such evidence established a reasonable belief the vehicle transported the cocaine, and hearsay or otherwise inadmissible information could support probable cause in forfeiture proceedings.

criminal lawprocedureproperty

This case concerned whether the automatic stay triggered by attorney William Keith Maas, Jr.'s bankruptcy filing barred a federal district court from holding a hearing and imposing Rule 11 sanctions on him for prior conduct in a large civil lawsuit brought by chiropractors against insurers, doctors, and state agencies. The court held that the show-cause hearing could proceed and that any resulting sanctions were excepted from the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). It reasoned that Rule 11 enforcement serves a public regulatory purpose of deterring frivolous filings and upholding federal procedural rules, akin to other governmental actions that may continue to judgment even if they produce monetary penalties, without interfering with the bankruptcy estate's administration. The court noted it would not enforce any money judgment itself but left that to the bankruptcy court.

procedure

This case involved Pacific Loan's post-judgment efforts to garnish approximately $30,000 that counterclaim defendant ARL was owed by garnishee Theo H. Davies & Co. under a partnership termination agreement, following Pacific's 1985 summary judgment against ARL and Velzeyland Properties. After Davies failed to appear or file a written disclosure in response to the garnishee summons by the May 30, 1985 return date, and ARL later filed for bankruptcy, the court addressed whether Davies could still be held directly liable under Hawaii Revised Statutes § 652-8 or whether the automatic stay applied. The court determined that Davies had not complied with the statute's requirements for timely disclosure, that its later oral explanations and assumptions about bankruptcy proceedings did not excuse the failure, and that a judgment against the garnishee could be entered without interfering with the bankruptcy estate. It therefore imposed monetary sanctions on Davies and its counsel for the costs of litigating the order to show cause, payable after Pacific submitted documentation of its expenses.

procedure