The United States sued Mary Levin in 2005 to recover funds paid for her medical school tuition under a National Health Service Corps scholarship contract, alleging breach when she failed to maintain academic standing and was dismissed from school in 1996. Levin moved for summary judgment, claiming the suit was barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to government contract claims. The court denied the motion, holding that the government's right of action accrued three years after the breach (upon dismissal in June 1996), making the accrual date in 1999 and the 2005 filing timely under the limitations period. The decision turned on the regulatory definition of breach and the contract terms specifying when repayment becomes due.
In this case, plaintiff Jerry Lewis Bey sued the Department of Justice under FOIA seeking FBI records from a St. Louis file on the Moorish Science Temple of America, including his own telephone toll records from 1985, as well as records about Doris Lewis Bey and Tonya Timmons. The FBI had released some redacted documents while withholding others under exemptions such as 7(C), 7(D), 7(E), and 7(F), and the plaintiff challenged the adequacy of the searches and withholdings. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, concluding that the FBI's searches were reasonable and adequate under the circumstances, that the claimed exemptions properly protected the withheld information, and that all reasonably segregable non-exempt material had been released.
This case involves pet owners suing the Washington Humane Society and the District of Columbia after their animals were seized under D.C.'s animal cruelty statute, alleging that the law and its enforcement violated due process by failing to provide notice or hearings, was unconstitutionally vague, and supported various common-law tort claims. The court addressed multiple motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). It granted the motions in part and denied them in part, allowing the procedural due process claims to proceed while dismissing others such as certain vagueness challenges. The core reasoning was that the statute, as applied, did not afford pet owners an opportunity to contest seizures or conditions of return, though the term 'neglect' was interpreted in light of related provisions to avoid facial invalidity.
The case concerned the federal government's decision to take two parcels of land in Michigan into trust for the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians to develop a casino, following the tribe's federal recognition in 1999 and its 2001 application. Plaintiff Michigan Gambling Opposition challenged the action under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Constitution's non-delegation doctrine, arguing that the site did not qualify as an initial reservation, that an environmental impact statement was required instead of a finding of no significant impact, that no tribal-state compact existed, and that the land acquisition authority was invalid. The court granted the defendants' and intervenor's motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, holding that no genuine issues of material fact existed. It reasoned that the land met IGRA criteria for an initial reservation, the environmental assessment adequately supported the FONSI under NEPA guidelines, a compact was not yet required for the approval stage, and the delegation of authority to take land into trust was constitutional with intelligible principles.
The case involved Spray Drift Task Force's petition to confirm a 2005 arbitration award requiring Burlington Bio-Medical Corp. to pay $671,472 plus interest as compensation under FIFRA Section 3(c)(1)(F) for relying on Spray Drift's data in its pesticide registration application for carbaryl. The court confirmed the award in full, noting that Burlington neither opposed confirmation nor filed a timely motion to vacate, modify, or correct it under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 12. The court also authorized immediate registration of the judgment in other districts under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 for good cause, based on Burlington's lack of assets in the District of Columbia but presence of substantial assets elsewhere, and rejected arguments limiting such registration to pending appeals.
In Smith v. Koplan, a former attorney adviser at the International Trade Commission alleged national origin discrimination and reprisal under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 after resigning from her position. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not responding to EEOC discovery requests or orders during a hearing she had requested. The court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff's failure to comply with the administrative judge's Acknowledgment Order, explain her absence after returning from travel, or otherwise cooperate constituted abandonment of the administrative process. The ruling relied on precedents requiring strict adherence to EEOC procedures, under which non-cooperation with discovery equates to failure to exhaust remedies and bars federal court claims.