Layn R. Phillips

In Marshall v. Nelson Electric, plaintiff Deborah Marshall sued her former employer Nelson Electric and foreman Luther Noah after her layoff, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress based on Noah's alleged workplace conduct and the employer's failure to address it. The jury awarded Marshall compensatory and punitive damages on the emotional distress claim, but the court granted the defendants' motions for JNOV on that claim and separately ruled for Nelson Electric on the Title VII claim following a bench trial. The court found that the alleged conduct was not sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support emotional distress liability, much of it fell outside the statute of limitations without a continuing tort, and the evidence did not establish a hostile work environment or retaliatory layoff under Title VII for which the employer could be held liable.

civil rightslabor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved Darrell Harris, Inc. suing the United States to recover taxes and penalties assessed for failing to treat its president and sole shareholder, Darrell Harris, as an employee and to file appropriate employment tax returns for 1986 and 1987. The United States counterclaimed for additional unpaid taxes and penalties. The court granted summary judgment to the United States, holding that Harris was an employee based on the level of control exerted by the corporation over his services, and that the plaintiff lacked a reasonable basis under Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 or other provisions to classify him as an independent contractor. The court also rejected arguments for relief from penalties due to reasonable cause or undue hardship, finding no evidence supporting such claims.

taxesbusiness & regulatorylabor & employment

This case was a civil rights lawsuit brought by Carl Lane, the former Chief of Police for the Town of Dover, Oklahoma, against the town and its officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lane alleged wrongful termination along with deprivations of liberty and property interests without due process, violations of equal protection and First Amendment rights, and a related state-law tort claim for wrongful discharge. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the federal claims (and dismissed the pendent state claims), holding that the undisputed facts showed no genuine issue of material fact because Lane had already obtained new employment as a police chief elsewhere and had failed to present specific evidence supporting his allegations of stigmatization or other harms.

civil rightslabor & employmentfree speech

In this Title VII case, plaintiff Maxine Gonzales Townsend alleged that the Oklahoma Military Department rejected her application for a shop foreman position because she is a woman. The state moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b) on grounds including failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the attorney general as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), along with lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient process, and failure to state a claim. The court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiff leave to correct an error in the case caption. It waived the attorney general right-to-sue letter requirement through equitable modification because the plaintiff had obtained an EEOC letter, made diligent but unsuccessful efforts to comply with the statute, and the attorney general had refused to issue the letter despite those efforts; the requirement is a condition precedent rather than a jurisdictional bar.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

This case involves gas purchasing companies challenging three Oklahoma statutes that impose direct liability on first purchasers of gas for royalty payments owed to the state Commissioners of the Land Office under oil and gas leases, contrary to the companies' existing contracts with producers. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes (64 Okla.Stat. § 293, 52 Okla.Stat. § 87.1, and 52 Okla.Stat. § 540) are unconstitutional, including on preemption grounds. The court dismissed the preemption claim with prejudice, abstained from deciding the remaining constitutional and related claims under the Pullman, Burford, and Younger doctrines due to parallel state proceedings and important state interests in oil and gas regulation, and retained federal jurisdiction pending resolution of the state court cases rather than dismissing outright.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedurefederal power

The case involved a claim by the EEOC that an advertising firm violated Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act by discharging a secretary, Phyllis Kay Torbeck, shortly after she announced her pregnancy and requested a reduced work schedule based on her obstetrician's letter citing typical pregnancy symptoms such as fatigue and back pain. The court found that the firm had fired Torbeck because of her pregnancy, as it treated her request for a schedule adjustment under a higher standard than it applied to other employees seeking similar medical or personal leaves under its unwritten policy. The core reasoning was that the firm's stated reason of insubordination and insufficient medical evidence was pretextual, since the firm had routinely granted comparable adjustments without demanding rigorous proof of necessity and had no consistent policy requiring such documentation for non-pregnancy requests.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case concerns the selection of a cleanup remedy for the Hardage Superfund Site, a toxic waste disposal area in Oklahoma, under CERCLA. The United States proposed an excavation and soil vapor extraction remedy estimated at $70 million, while the defendant companies advocated for a containment approach using barriers and pumping, costing about $54 million. After a bifurcated trial with extensive evidence including 45 witnesses and thousands of documents, the court ruled that the United States failed to prove its remedy was appropriate and determined that the defendants' containment remedy was superior. The decision resolved the remedy phase in favor of the defendants, also addressing related claims like response costs and consent decrees.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerns the liability of United States Pollution Control, Inc. (USPCI) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) for transporting hazardous waste to the Hardage Site in Oklahoma. The United States sought to hold USPCI liable as a transporter that selected the disposal site, while USPCI argued it was merely a common carrier that suggested sites without selecting them. After a liability trial, the court determined that USPCI selected the Hardage Site on at least one occasion for the disposal of hazardous substances from specific customers. The decision was based on stipulations, uncontested facts, and evidence presented at trial showing USPCI's involvement in site selection, leading to liability under CERCLA sections 106(a) and 107(a)(4) for response costs and injunctive relief.

environmenttorts & liability

The case concerned a building owner's lawsuit against the manufacturer of an asbestos-containing fireproofing product (Mono-Kote) sold in 1972 and later applied to the plaintiff's Oklahoma City office building, seeking damages for alleged contamination under various tort theories. Defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the claims were barred by Oklahoma's ten-year statute of repose (12 Okla. Stat. § 109) for actions arising from improvements to real property. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the statute does not protect product manufacturers. It reached this conclusion by predicting how the Oklahoma Supreme Court would rule, based on that court's prior decisions construing the statute as limited to building professionals such as architects and engineers, the 1978 legislative amendments, and the majority trend among other jurisdictions interpreting similar laws.

proceduretorts & liabilityproperty

This case concerns the United States' motion for partial summary judgment on liability against seven corporate defendants under CERCLA Sections 106(a) and 107(a) for response costs and injunctive relief related to contamination at the Hardage toxic waste disposal site in Oklahoma, where over 18 million gallons of waste were disposed between 1972 and 1980. The court granted the motion as to Cato Oil and Grease Company, Dal-Worth Industries, Double Eagle Refining Co., JOC Oil Exploration Company, Oklahoma National Stock Yards Company, and Rockwell International Corporation, finding each liable as a party that arranged for or transported hazardous substances to the site that caused releases or threatened releases. The motion was denied as to U.S. Pollution Control Inc. because of genuine issues of material fact regarding whether it selected the disposal site. The ruling rested on undisputed facts establishing the statutory elements of liability, including that the defendants sent hazardous wastes to the site and that the United States had incurred response costs, while construing facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties on summary judgment.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

In Roe v. Wert, landowners sued adjacent property owners and companies under CERCLA for response costs and environmental damage from alleged hazardous waste pollution on their land. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs did not provide the required 60-day pre-suit notice to the President, the state, and the alleged violators. The court granted the motions to dismiss, ruling that the statutory notice provision is a jurisdictional prerequisite for citizen suits under CERCLA and that notice given after the complaint was filed did not satisfy the requirement. The court also denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint to add an RCRA claim for the same reason and dismissed the pendent state claims.

environmentprocedure

This case involved an appeal by a judgment creditor bank from a bankruptcy court's order overruling its objection to a Chapter 7 debtor's claim of a homestead exemption under Oklahoma law for property consisting of her residence and an adjacent lot with a rented duplex. The bankruptcy court determined that the incidental rental of the duplex did not amount to using the homestead for both residence and business purposes under 31 Okla. Stat. §§ 1 & 2, allowing the full exemption despite the property's value exceeding $5,000. On appeal, the district court reviewed the bankruptcy court's factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, analyzing the statute's history and concluding that limited rental activity on the property did not trigger the $5,000 cap. The court emphasized that only uses meeting a business purpose standard, such as those qualifying for tax deductions, would limit the exemption, and noted the legislature's role in updating the law.

property

In the case In Re Duncan, debtors appealed a bankruptcy court order that partially sustained and partially denied their objections to a trustee's proposed sale of property free and clear of liens, and they sought a stay of that order pending appeal in the district court. The court denied the motion for stay, finding that the debtors failed to comply with Bankruptcy Rule 8005 by not showing why the relief was not obtained from the bankruptcy court. The court further held that the debtors did not meet the requirements for a stay, which follows the standard for a preliminary injunction, including a demonstration of substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal. The motion was therefore denied, leaving the September 28, 1988 bankruptcy order in effect.

procedureproperty

This case concerns whether a bankruptcy trustee can avoid and recover payments made by a debtor corporation to non-insider creditors between 90 days and one year before the bankruptcy filing, when those payments benefited an insider who had personally guaranteed the debts. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment for the creditors, holding that the transfers were not recoverable under 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 550 because the recipients were not insiders and equitable considerations protected standard guarantee practices. On appeal, the district court reversed, ruling that the transfers constituted avoidable preferences because they were made for the benefit of an insider guarantor within the one-year reach-back period, and that the trustee could recover from the initial transferees under § 550(a)(1). The court rejected the minority "two-transfer" theory and equity-based limitations, concluding that the plain language of the statutes permitted recovery even from non-insider creditors in these circumstances.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case is a Section 1983 civil rights action brought by Clark and Sharon Snell after DHS employees and Oklahoma City police officers removed seven children from their foster home on August 26, 1987, pursuant to an ex parte court order. The order was based on an application alleging neglect, lack of supervision, unlicensed operation of a child care facility, and unsubstantiated claims of child prostitution and pornography, though no evidence supported the most serious allegations and the District Attorney's office had declined to pursue the matter. The court considered a summary judgment motion raising absolute and qualified immunity defenses for the officials involved in the application, investigation, and removal. It denied summary judgment for several defendants, holding that factual disputes existed over whether they knowingly provided false information or otherwise participated in or acquiesced to potential constitutional violations, precluding immunity as a matter of law at this stage.

civil rightsfamily lawprocedure

The case involved a federal inmate's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging disciplinary actions, including loss of good time, that resulted from positive urinalysis tests for morphine at two prisons. The petitioner alleged that medical problems caused false positives and that collection, handling, and laboratory testing procedures were inadequate. The court found that administrative remedies had not been exhausted for three of the four incidents and that the petitioner failed to show good cause for the failure; for the one exhausted incident, it concluded that the Bureau of Prisons' two-test protocol using different methodologies produced reliable results that met the substantial-evidence standard. The petition was also dismissed for procedural default because the inmate did not file a required response to the government's motion to dismiss.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involves former employees of a failed bank and their participation in three employee benefit plans, who sued bank and bancorporation directors, plan fiduciaries, and the FDIC as receiver, alleging manipulation of the plans for the benefit of the bank and its stockholders rather than plan participants. Claims included breaches of fiduciary duty and prohibited transactions under ERISA, securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and related state-law claims. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss, dismissing the securities claims for lack of standing because plaintiffs were not purchasers or sellers of securities and for failure to plead fraud with particularity under Rule 9(b), while allowing most ERISA claims to proceed after finding that plaintiffs qualified as participants or beneficiaries with standing and that the allegations met pleading standards when taken as true. The reasoning centered on the standards for Rule 12(b)(6) motions, requiring indulgence of reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor, and application of ERISA and securities law precedents regarding standing and fiduciary obligations.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentprocedure

In Bennett v. Whitehouse, plaintiff Lawrence Bennett sued to quiet title to a severed term mineral interest in Oklahoma land under the state's Marketable Record Title Act, claiming an unbroken 30-year chain of title from tax deeds and conveyances that extinguished prior interests. Defendants asserted ownership interests and argued the Act was unconstitutional as a violation of due process because it extinguished property rights without prior notice. The court reviewed the Act's provisions, including its 30-year root-of-title mechanism, recording requirement for preservation, and exceptions for certain interests, and examined precedents upholding similar statutes. It concluded that the Act was constitutional, as it provided a reasonable opportunity to preserve interests through recording and aligned with U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Texaco, Inc. v. Short, and granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment to quiet title.

property

This case involved a Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuit by plaintiff Lindsey against the United States, alleging that the Veterans Administration negligently failed to admit or treat a mentally ill Vietnam veteran, Forest Neil Simon, Jr., despite knowing his dangerous propensities and a recent assault, which proximately caused Simon to stab the plaintiff. After a non-jury trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the defendant United States on the merits of the negligence claim. The court also imposed sanctions on the government under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) for its belated production of voluminous relevant medical records on the eve of trial, which had been requested earlier and necessitated a continuance, though the records were ultimately considered to resolve the case.

torts & liabilityprocedurefederal power

In Roberts v. McCrory, the plaintiffs, including the daughter and grandchildren of R.F. McCrory who died in 1950, asserted conflicting claims over his estate—one group alleging he died intestate and the other that he left a valid will—along with allegations that defendants had converted estate property worth millions. The court dismissed the consolidated cases with prejudice and imposed $5,000 in sanctions against plaintiffs' counsel, while referring the matter for potential bar discipline. The decision rested on plaintiffs' repeated noncompliance with pretrial scheduling orders, submission of frivolous claims and inconsistent evidentiary offerings, prior sworn statements contradicting the current positions, and failure to meet Oklahoma's statutory requirements for proving a lost will through two credible witnesses.

propertyfamily lawprocedure