Thomas W. Phillips

In Brubaker v. Barrett, the plaintiff sued her former employer Combined Insurance, its affiliate AON, and her supervisor for state-law claims including sexual harassment, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, constructive discharge, invasion of privacy, and related torts, alleging that the supervisor secretly recorded her undressing in a hotel room during a work conference, leading to her resignation. The defendants moved to compel arbitration and dismiss based on an arbitration agreement the plaintiff signed in 2008 as part of her employment documents with ACE (Combined Insurance's parent), which required arbitration of all employment-related legal claims against the company and its affiliates. The court granted the motion in part, holding the agreement enforceable due to mutual assent and consideration, and ruling that the claims against the corporate defendants fell within its scope as employment-related disputes, but denied arbitration as to the individual supervisor; it stayed rather than dismissed the arbitrable claims to align with the Federal Arbitration Act. The core reasoning focused on the broad language of the agreement covering statutory and common-law claims arising from employment and the incident's connection to a work event.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a Title VII claim by Kimberly Crider, a Seventh Day Adventist hired as a Coordinator in the University of Tennessee's Programs Abroad Office, who alleged that the University failed to accommodate her religious observance of the Sabbath by refusing to exempt her from monitoring an emergency cell phone and performing other weekend duties from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday. After exploring possible accommodations with Crider and her coworkers, the University concluded that none were feasible without imposing undue hardship and terminated her employment in June 2008. The court granted the University's motion for summary judgment, finding that Crider had established a prima facie case but that all proposed accommodations would require more than a de minimis cost, force other employees to shoulder additional burdens permanently, or result in unequal treatment based on religion, which Title VII does not require. The opinion emphasized that employers have no duty to accommodate when an employee will not cooperate or when every option creates undue hardship, leading to dismissal of the remaining claim.

religious libertycivil rightslabor & employment

In Roopchan v. ADT Security Systems, Inc., the owner of a convenience store sued ADT after a burglary and truck damage to his premises, claiming the security system was inadequate because it lacked cellular backup and alleging intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent inducement, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, breach of contract, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The contracts signed in 2006 and 2007 contained exculpatory clauses requiring the plaintiff to look to his insurance for any losses and limiting ADT's liability. The court granted ADT's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims with prejudice, finding no genuine issue of material fact on the misrepresentation and TCPA claims and holding that the exculpatory clauses barred the remaining claims.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In Maness v. Boston Scientific, the plaintiff sued manufacturers and a sales representative for injuries allegedly caused by an implanted spinal cord stimulation device that was later subject to a recall, bringing state-law product liability claims including negligence, strict liability, and failure to warn. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint failed to meet federal pleading standards. The court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, holding that the allegations did not contain enough factual content to state plausible claims under the Twombly and Iqbal standards, but allowed the plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a contract dispute over gemstone purchases between a Tennessee corporation and its Thai subsidiary as plaintiffs and several Hong Kong and Thai defendants. After the defendants removed the action from Tennessee state court to federal court on grounds of diversity and federal question jurisdiction under the CISG treaty, the plaintiffs moved to remand. The court granted the motion and remanded the case, holding that diversity jurisdiction was absent because U.S. citizens were not present on both sides and foreign parties appeared on both sides of the dispute. It further held that federal question jurisdiction did not exist because Hong Kong and Thailand are not Contracting States under the CISG, rendering the treaty inapplicable.

procedurefederal power

In United States v. Kernell, the defendant was tried on charges of identity theft, wire fraud, unauthorized computer access in furtherance of other violations, and destruction or alteration of records to obstruct an investigation. The jury convicted him on a lesser-included offense of unauthorized access and on the obstruction count, acquitted him of wire fraud, and deadlocked on identity theft, leading to a mistrial on that count. The defendant then moved for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, arguing insufficient evidence, and for arrest of judgment under Rule 34, arguing that the indictment failed to charge an offense in the obstruction count. The court denied both motions, holding that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, supported the convictions and that the indictment properly charged the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1519 without regard to trial evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerns a City of Knoxville employee in the Public Service Department who alleged three incidents of physical and sexual harassment by a coworker in June 2006, including being kneed in the groin and pinned against a truck while sexual acts were simulated; the employee reported the incidents after being encouraged to falsify an injury report, leading to an internal investigation that resulted in limited discipline for some supervisors but allowed the main alleged harasser to resign. The plaintiff sued the City under Title VII and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), and sued individual defendants under the THRA for accomplice liability as well as under state tort claims for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court addressed multiple defense motions for summary judgment and numerous procedural motions, including motions to strike evidence and compel discovery, while applying legal standards under which THRA claims against employers follow Title VII precedents from Burlington and Faragher but allow individual accomplice liability, and noting that conspiracy claims require an underlying wrongful act.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

In this case, plaintiff Eliza Campbell sued Anderson County, Sheriff Paul White, and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that a reserve deputy sexually assaulted her while on duty and that the county's policies on training and supervising volunteer officers caused the violation of her constitutional rights; she also brought related state-law tort claims. The court granted summary judgment to the county and sheriff, dismissing all claims against them. The core reasoning was that Campbell failed to show any county custom, policy, or deliberate indifference that was the moving force behind the alleged deprivation, and her state-law claims were barred by the civil rights exception to governmental immunity under Tennessee law.

civil rightstorts & liability

This case involves Invisible Fence, Inc. suing Fido's Fences, Inc. for trademark infringement, unfair competition, breach of contract, and related claims after Fido's Fences allegedly continued using Invisible Fence's registered trademarks for pet containment systems following termination of a distribution agreement. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of standing, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim, and alternatively sought transfer of venue; the plaintiff sought a stay pending resolution of related litigation in another district. The court denied the motion to dismiss in full, holding that the plaintiff had standing under the Lanham Act provisions at issue, that personal jurisdiction existed, and that the contract claims were adequately pleaded against the defendant as a third-party beneficiary. It granted the plaintiff's motion for a stay, reasoning that the related New York case would resolve key issues of contract enforceability affecting this dispute.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of defendant Reginald Seigle's home, where officers found a Colt AR-15 rifle leading to a charge of felon in possession of a firearm. Seigle, who was on enhanced state probation following prior felony convictions, had signed probation conditions that included consent to searches without a warrant of his person, vehicle, property, or residence by probation or law enforcement officers. The magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and recommended denying the motion, concluding that officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the totality of circumstances, which when combined with the probation search condition rendered the search reasonable under Supreme Court precedent. The district judge accepted the report and recommendation in full and denied the suppression motion.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

In United States v. Johnson, the defendant, charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine, moved to suppress evidence seized from his person and residence pursuant to a search warrant, arguing that the supporting affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that the issuing judge was not neutral and detached. The district court denied the motion, adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation after de novo review. The court found that the affidavit, based on statements from three confidential informants—including admissions against penal interest by two of them that were corroborated by a known informant—established a fair probability that contraband would be found at the described locations under the totality of the circumstances. It also concluded there was no evidence that the issuing judge failed to act neutrally. The ruling allowed admission of the seized evidence at trial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case under the Fair Labor Standards Act involved a former canine police officer suing the City of Oliver Springs for unpaid compensation for off-duty care and training of his narcotics detection dog, which lived with him and required about one hour of daily work outside scheduled shifts. The court found that the city had previously litigated and lost a nearly identical FLSA claim by two prior canine officers, after which it briefly provided compensation but failed to do so for this officer despite knowing the legal requirements. The court ruled for the plaintiff, awarding $21,107.68 in back wages plus an equal amount in liquidated damages, along with attorney fees and costs, because the city did not act in good faith or with reasonable grounds when denying the compensation. The decision rested on findings that the off-duty duties were compensable work under the FLSA and that the city's prior litigation history precluded any defense of ignorance or good-faith belief in compliance.

labor & employment

In Shepherd v. EMC Mortgage Corp., a Chapter 13 debtor appealed bankruptcy court orders that prevented her from modifying the secured claim on her mobile home under the anti-modification provision of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), based on the new statutory definition of “debtor’s principal residence” in BAPCPA. The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's ruling and vacated the order confirming the amended plan. The court reasoned that the definition in § 101(13A)(A) does not extend the anti-modification provision to structures that are not real property, and under Tennessee law, the debtor's mobile home, which was not permanently affixed to land she owned, constituted personal property. Therefore, the debtor could modify the claim in her Chapter 13 plan.

propertyprocedurefederal power

This case involves a defendant charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. After entering a guilty plea to two counts under a cooperation plea agreement that called for dismissal of the first count, the Sixth Circuit vacated the plea and remanded for the defendant to plead anew. The district court considered multiple defense motions to suppress statements, dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy or vindictiveness grounds, and declare the plea agreement void, as well as the government's motion to reinstate the dismissed count. The court overruled the defendant's objection to the magistrate judge's report, sustained the government's objection, denied the motion to void the plea agreement, granted the motion to reinstate count one, and denied the remaining defense motions, reasoning that withdrawal of the guilty plea nullified the agreement and permitted reinstatement of the original charges without violating double jeopardy or other protections.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved adult bookstore, video store, and cabaret operators challenging Knox County Ordinance 0-05-2-102 under the U.S. and Tennessee constitutions, which imposed licensing, registration, and operational rules on sexually-oriented businesses such as adult bookstores, cabarets, and related establishments. The court held that the Ordinance is constitutional except for the need to redact "racketeering" and "dealing in controlled substances" from the definition of "specified criminal activity," as those terms are unrelated to the regulated conduct. The core reasoning was that the provisions constitute reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions supported by evidence of secondary effects, consistent with precedents like Renton v. Playtime Theatres, that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain sections such as adult motel rules, and that state statutes did not preempt the local hours-of-operation limits.

free speechbusiness & regulatorycriminal law

This case involved parents who sued a school board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they were unconstitutionally prevented from speaking at a board meeting about their sons' removal from a high school football team, in violation of their First Amendment rights. After a jury trial resulted in a verdict for the defendants, the court denied the plaintiffs' motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. The court found no prior restraint or viewpoint discrimination, as the board's agenda policy was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, and the plaintiffs had other opportunities to communicate their concerns. The court granted the defendants' request for attorney fees under § 1988, concluding that the lawsuit was frivolous, groundless, and brought to harass the defendants.

free speechcivil rightsprocedure

This case consists of consolidated civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by Candice Sulfridge and Adam Travis Davis against Knox County and several sheriff's department employees, stemming from an April 2004 incident in which Deputy John Huff fired two shots at their vehicle during a confrontation in a Wal-Mart parking lot, wounding Davis. The court ruled on multiple pending motions for summary judgment and other procedural requests. It denied summary judgment to Knox County and Deputy Huff after determining that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Huff's use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, given plaintiffs' evidence that the car was not directed at Huff and that department policy required a warning and probable cause of serious threat before firing at a vehicle. Summary judgment was granted to defendants Harris and Moore because the record showed no evidence of their direct involvement in any constitutional violation. The court granted Sheriff Hutchison's motion for a protective order limiting his deposition and allowed plaintiffs additional time to respond and to amend their complaints.

civil rights

This case involves a civil lawsuit by Elizabeth Teles against Big Rock Stables and Lil’ Ponderosa for personal injuries she sustained after falling from a rented horse, which she attributed to the defendants providing a saddle with stirrups that were too long. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Tennessee Equine Activities Act barred liability for inherent risks of equine activities, that Teles had signed a release waiving claims for ordinary negligence, and that any alleged conduct did not rise to the level of willful or wanton negligence. The court denied the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants supplied faulty tack and whether their actions could constitute willful disregard for safety, which would fall outside the Act’s protections and the release’s scope. The court also held that evidence of joint operations could make Lil’ Ponderosa liable alongside Big Rock Stables. The ruling allowed the case to proceed to trial on these disputed factual and legal issues.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned a dispute between the City of Rockwood, Tennessee, through its utility division, and IMCO Recycling over natural gas transportation and imbalances under an arrangement that began in 1995 but lacked a formal contract after 1999. The city sued IMCO for unjust enrichment, alleging that IMCO's under-deliveries in certain months forced the utility to supply gas from its reserves at a cost exceeding $94,000, while IMCO counterclaimed for compensation related to its net over-deliveries of 3,518 dekatherms. The court ruled for the city on its claim and dismissed IMCO's counterclaim. It reasoned that no agreement existed allowing monthly imbalances to be banked or carried over by volume, that industry custom required monthly cash-outs based on market prices, and that IMCO received a measurable benefit without any understanding that the city would absorb the costs of imbalances.

business & regulatory

This case involved a breach of contract claim by Baptist Physician Hospital Organization and Baptist Hospital of East Tennessee against Humana Military Healthcare Services over a 1996 network provider agreement for medical services to CHAMPUS beneficiaries. Baptist sought payment under stop-loss provisions for high-dollar inpatient claims that required Humana to pay a percentage discount off provider charges, while Humana asserted a counterclaim for outpatient overpayments and argued that the claims had been modified or waived to follow only the standard TRICARE/CHAMPUS DRG rates. The Sixth Circuit had previously held that the contract incorporated federal regulations but permitted the alternative stop-loss payments so long as they were not made with government funds. After trial, the district court found no modification or waiver by Baptist, determined that Humana had underpaid by a stipulated $1,277,872.90 on the inpatient claims, offset the stipulated $237,924.89 outpatient overpayment, and awarded Baptist prejudgment interest at ten percent, resulting in a total judgment of $2,009,361.40.

business & regulatoryhealthcare