Raymond Eugene Plummer

The case involved a group of commercial king crab fishermen seeking to block Alaska from enforcing state fishing regulations in the Bering Sea beyond three miles from the coast. After prior regulations were enjoined, the state repealed them, adopted new ones, and filed criminal charges against seven of the plaintiffs, leading to a state supreme court decision upholding the regulations' constitutionality. The federal court dismissed the action as to all plaintiffs and claims, relying on Younger abstention principles applicable to pending state criminal prosecutions. It imputed the state proceedings to the remaining federal plaintiffs due to their joint activity and common interest through industry associations, and treated the challenge to the new regulations as equivalent to a new claim that warranted deference to the state process.

criminal lawfederal powerenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

In United States v. Krell, defendants were charged with possession of controlled substances after drugs were discovered in a package shipped by air from Portland to Anchorage. The court addressed a motion to suppress evidence under Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e), focusing on the initial search of the package by airline employees in the presence of police officers, the subsequent retrieval of the package, and the search of one defendant's purse. The court granted the motion, ruling that the airport search was subject to the Fourth Amendment because the employees' sole purpose was to aid law enforcement in locating drugs, making it not a purely private search. As a result, the evidence obtained at the airport and all derivative evidence, including from later searches, were suppressed as fruits of the illegal search.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Washington crab fishermen challenging Alaska regulations that set an annual quota for king crab in the Bering Sea Shellfish Area and barred the transport or sale of crab taken in violation of those rules even from waters beyond Alaska's territorial limits. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on constitutional grounds, leading to the convening of a three-judge district court. The court confirmed its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 because the regulations effected statewide policy and the constitutional claims were substantial, then granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement. The core reasoning was that Alaska could not extend its regulatory authority to the high seas above the outer continental shelf, as federal law and international principles limit state jurisdiction to territorial waters.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case concerned whether a liquor license used as collateral for a Small Business Administration loan could be transferred to the SBA after the borrower defaulted on the loan. The Alaska Alcoholic Beverage Control Board had approved the transfer, which the borrower challenged on the grounds that the license was a non-transferable personal privilege rather than property. The court, applying Alaska state law including the Uniform Commercial Code, held that the license qualified as property subject to a security interest and could be transferred pursuant to the security agreement. It distinguished this situation from cases involving privileges between a license holder and the Board, granted summary judgment to the SBA, and rejected arguments based on exemption statutes or limits on the SBA's authority.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case arose from a construction worker's personal injury when he fell and grabbed a hoist guide while working on an Anchorage hotel project, where the hoist lacked required walkways, guardrails, and toeboards in violation of the Alaska General Safety Code; the defendant controlled the leased hoist. The court had previously ruled the defendant's use of the hoist constituted negligence per se that proximately caused the injury. On the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the issue was whether contributory negligence could still be raised as a defense to that negligence per se claim based on the safety code violations. The court denied the motion and held that contributory negligence remains an available affirmative defense, reasoning that the Alaska statutes provided only for fines and penalties without any indication of legislative intent to eliminate the defense or place entire responsibility on employers, and that federal courts in diversity must follow the rule the state supreme court would likely adopt.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

This case involved a plaintiff who suffered personal injuries in 1969 after contacting the tail rotor of a helicopter made by the defendant manufacturer; the plaintiff, an employee of a company that used the helicopter, sued on theories of negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the negligence and strict liability claims were time-barred by Alaska's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions and that the warranty claim could not proceed due to lack of privity between the plaintiff and defendant. The court reasoned that strict liability claims are governed by the tort statute of limitations rather than the UCC's four-year contract period because they do not require a contract, cannot be disclaimed, and fall under the residual personal injury limitations provision, while privity remains necessary for warranty claims under Alaska precedent even though strict liability offers an alternative remedy for injured parties without it.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves a Federal Tort Claims Act suit by plaintiff John C. Vance against the United States for injuries sustained after he was served alcohol while intoxicated at a Non-Commissioned Officers’ Club in Alaska. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Vance was contributorily negligent as a matter of law under recent California precedents. The court denied the motion, holding that Alaska statute A.S. 04.15.020(a) (prohibiting service of liquor to intoxicated persons) sets a minimum standard of care under Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 286 and 288, that the consumer falls within the protected class, and that a statutory violation constitutes negligence per se with contributory negligence available as a defense only if the statute was not violated. The court further ruled that the defendant owed a duty of reasonable care in dispensing alcohol and that a breach could be found to proximately cause the plaintiff's injuries, whether based on the statute or other reasonable precautions.

torts & liability

This case concerns a 1961 plane crash at Shemya Airfield and the enforceability of a 1959 indemnity agreement between Northwest Airlines and Alaska Airlines, under which Alaska agreed to hold Northwest harmless from claims arising from services provided. After prior litigation established that the agreement could not shield Northwest from its own negligence due to public policy, and subsequent rulings found that Northwest's negligence was not the proximate cause of the crash, Northwest sought indemnification from Alaska for wrongful death settlements and related costs. Alaska argued that prior decisions rendered the indemnity clause unenforceable via res judicata and collateral estoppel, and that other legal barriers like workers' compensation laws applied. The court held that the indemnity agreement became enforceable once it was determined Northwest bore no sole proximate negligence, granting Northwest summary judgment for the settlement amounts plus attorneys' fees and costs.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved the Aleut League's lawsuit against the Atomic Energy Commission seeking to halt the planned CANNIKIN nuclear detonation on Amchitka Island, alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, fiduciary duties to Alaska Natives, water pollution laws, the Atomic Energy Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The court first addressed jurisdiction under statutes including the Administrative Procedure Act and federal question provisions, then proceeded to the merits after denying a preliminary injunction. It dismissed all claims, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to prove any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, that the AEC's final environmental statement was adequate and complied with NEPA requirements, and that the agency's decision was within its authority, based on relevant factors, and neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court found no evidence of discrimination against Aleut people or any vested property interests that would support the constitutional or statutory claims.

environmentcivil rightsfederal power

The case concerned the distribution of proceeds from the court-ordered sale of the vessel Sonya after foreclosure of a preferred ship mortgage, with various intervenors asserting maritime liens including claims by six individuals for unpaid wages as alleged crew members. The United States opposed paying the wage claims into the registry on the ground that the vessel was not in navigation at the relevant time and thus the claimants could not qualify as crew under 46 U.S.C. § 953. The court reviewed prior findings that the Sonya was anchored without a propeller, supplying electricity to shore, and otherwise withdrawn from active service, and analyzed case law and statutes distinguishing the narrower definition of vessel and crew for wage liens from broader rules applicable to other maritime liens such as supplies. It concluded that the wage claims required proof that the vessel remained in navigation, a factual issue to be resolved before disbursement.

propertyprocedure

In Douglas v. Beneficial Finance Co. of Anchorage, plaintiff Sandra J. Douglas brought a class action alleging that the defendant finance companies violated the Truth in Lending Act by failing to disclose a confession of judgment provision in their loan notes signed by class members. The court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment that the notes violated the Act and Regulation Z because the confession of judgment clause was a security interest requiring specific disclosure, which was absent from the statement of disclosure. The core reasoning was that the Act's purpose requires meaningful disclosure of credit terms to allow consumers to compare options, the clause allowed judgment without notice or opportunity to defend, and adequate space existed on the form for an explanation that was not provided.

business & regulatory

This case concerned a challenge by the Sierra Club and other conservation groups to the U.S. Forest Service's approval of a large-scale timber sale in Alaska's Tongass National Forest and the related issuance of permits for a pulp mill by U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the sale and land patent under the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging inadequate environmental review. The court first addressed jurisdiction under the APA and 28 U.S.C. § 1361, as well as the plaintiffs' standing based on their members' recreational and aesthetic interests in the area. On the key substantive issue, the court held that the National Environmental Policy Act applied because the critical federal permits were issued after NEPA's effective date, rejecting arguments that prior informal commitments by the company rendered the Act inapplicable. The decision turned on the timing of the government's formal actions and the need for environmental impact analysis of the mill project.

environmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case involved families in Alaska whose children were needy due to a father's involuntary unemployment but who were denied AFDC benefits because state law limited eligibility to situations involving a parent's death, continued absence, or incapacity. Plaintiffs sought summary judgment, claiming the exclusion violated equal protection by burdening family integrity and incentivizing desertion, and the court addressed jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 along with Eleventh Amendment concerns before reaching the merits. The court applied rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, consistent with Dandridge v. Williams, and upheld the classification as rationally related to the AFDC program's goals of supporting families and encouraging self-support. It rejected arguments that the distinction lacked any reasonable connection to those purposes or required stricter scrutiny.

civil rightsfederal power

This case involved Standard Oil Company of California challenging the Secretary of the Interior's decision to raise annual rental rates from 50 cents to $1 per acre on nonparticipating portions of five federal oil and gas leases after they were partially eliminated from the Soldotna Creek Unit agreement. The leases, approved in 1958 and later committed to the unit, covered acreage over a known geologic structure, and the Bureau of Land Management created a new rental category for the contracted lands based on lease section 2(d)(1)(b)(i). The court granted summary judgment to Standard Oil, holding that the proper rate was 50 cents per acre under the nonparticipating provisions of the lease. It reasoned that the unit agreement and lease terms did not authorize segregating the lands for higher rentals, that any ambiguity from the government's drafting must be construed against it, and that no precedent or consistent administrative practice supported the increased rate.

business & regulatorypropertyfederal power

The case involved the State of Alaska suing the owners of the vessel O/S LYNN KENDALL in federal court to recover for salvage services and costs to abate a public nuisance arising from maritime torts. The defendants responded with counterclaims seeking affirmative damages for the state's alleged negligence, wrongful taking of property, and related losses. The court granted the state's motion to limit any recovery on the counterclaims to setoff or recoupment that could only reduce or defeat the state's own recovery, without permitting affirmative judgments against the state. The core reasoning was that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court absent express consent, which Alaska's constitution and statutes had not provided, and that merely filing suit does not waive this immunity for counterclaims.

federal powerprocedure

The case involved nonresident plaintiffs who were experienced salmon fishermen challenging Alaska's 1969 regulations on commercial salmon net gear licenses. These rules limited eligibility in each of the state's twelve fishing regions to individuals who had previously held a local gear license since 1965 or a commercial fishing license with active engagement in the area for three years since 1960, with only narrow hardship exceptions. The plaintiffs argued that the scheme violated the U.S. and Alaska Constitutions by preventing outsiders from obtaining licenses. The court held that the licensing requirements violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as they arbitrarily protected a closed class of local fishermen and created monopolistic barriers rather than serving legitimate conservation goals through rational means. It denied the defendants' motions to dismiss or for summary judgment and entered judgment for the plaintiffs.

civil rightsbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned the relative priority of a mechanic's lien filed by plaintiff Ault for labor and materials used to install a well on property owned by the Harrises, versus a deed of trust on the same property that the Small Business Administration (SBA) received from the Harrises and recorded shortly after the well work was completed. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding that the mechanic's lien had priority over the SBA's deed of trust and ordering foreclosure of the lien. The court rejected the government's arguments for priority under federal insolvency statutes or a general first-in-time rule, finding no evidence of insolvency and determining that no federal statute or policy required overriding local law in SBA lending transactions. Instead, it adopted Alaska law as the governing federal rule for such cases, consistent with the approach Congress took in the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 for mechanic's liens.

propertyfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involved an Alaska attorney seeking to have a federal district court declare null and void a suspension order issued by the Alaska Supreme Court for professional misconduct and to enjoin its enforcement. The plaintiff invoked the Civil Rights Act and other federal statutes after his petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied. The court decided it lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief, reasoning that 28 U.S.C. § 2283 prohibits federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings, the Civil Rights Act does not override this prohibition, and the right to practice law is regulated by the states with federal review limited to due process claims via certiorari.

civil rightsprocedurefederal power

In Ness v. National Indemnity Company of Nebraska, the plaintiff sought to recover insurance proceeds for damage to his parked Kenworth tractor after the 1964 Alaska earthquake and resulting seismic sea wave moved and overturned the vehicle. The policy provided separate coverages, and the plaintiff had purchased only collision and upset coverage, explicitly excluding comprehensive, windstorm/hail/earthquake, and combined additional coverages. The court held that the damage was not covered under the collision or upset provision because the loss resulted from an earthquake and tsunami, which constituted an act of God or natural catastrophe rather than an accidental collision or upset. It reasoned that the policy language and structure distinguished earthquake-related losses from collision coverage, and that the wave's action was directly caused by the earthquake. The decision was based on Alaska law as predicted in this diversity case, leading to judgment for the defendant insurer.

business & regulatoryproperty

In Cocherl v. State of Alaska, a seaman employed on a state-owned vessel sued the State of Alaska for personal injuries, claiming negligence under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness under general maritime law. The State moved to dismiss, arguing Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. The court held that the State had waived its immunity with respect to the Jones Act claim by operating the vessel as a common carrier in interstate commerce, relying on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Parden v. Terminal Railroad Co. that such activity subjects the State to federal regulation and remedies under laws like the Federal Employers' Liability Act. However, the court sustained the State's immunity defense as to the unseaworthiness claim under general maritime law. The decision allowed the Jones Act portion of the case to proceed while dismissing the other claim.

federal powerlabor & employmenttorts & liability