
United States v. Ostrowski
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-10-26 · cited 1×
The case involved defendant Michael Ostrowski, indicted on charges including conspiracy to commit mail fraud, mail fraud, interstate transportation of stolen property, receipt of stolen property, monetary transactions in unlawful proceeds, and willful failure to file a tax return, arising from his alleged improper use of funds while serving as temporary guardian for his grandfather's assets. He moved to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his home conducted pursuant to a warrant supported by an IRS agent's affidavit detailing financial transactions and purchases, and alternatively requested a Franks hearing to challenge the affidavit. The court denied the motion, concluding that the affidavit provided probable cause through specific descriptions of bank accounts, expenditures, and links to the defendant's residence, that any potential deficiencies did not require suppression, and that the Leon good faith exception would apply absent evidence of reckless disregard for the truth by the affiant. The court further denied the Franks hearing request because the defendant made no substantial showing of knowingly false statements necessary to probable cause.
criminal lawproceduretaxesfamily law
Bachorz v. Miller-Forslund
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-09-22 · cited 3×
In Bachorz v. Miller-Forslund, tenants who operated an autobody shop on leased commercial property sued the deceased landlord's heir to enforce a purchase option for $175,000 after the landlord died. The defendant contended that unauthorized subletting and other lease violations placed the tenants in default, barring exercise of the option, and filed counterclaims for breach of contract and related relief. The court denied the defendant's summary judgment motion and granted the plaintiffs' partial summary judgment motion. It reasoned that Massachusetts law requires a material breach to forfeit the option, any alleged defaults were not substantial or had been waived by the landlord's conduct and silence, and precedents supported specific performance despite technical violations.
propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure
United States v. Rosario
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-09-08
The case involved a federal indictment charging defendant Jimmy Roman Rosario with one count of distribution and possession with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine. The cocaine was found during a search of his residence at 50 Putnam Circle pursuant to a state warrant obtained after the arrest of Eugenio Negron, who identified Rosario as his supplier and provided details about prior and ongoing drug transactions. Rosario moved for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence and requested further evidentiary hearings, arguing deficiencies in the supporting affidavit by Trooper Soto, including reliance on Negron's statements and disputed surveillance. The court denied both motions, holding that the affidavit established probable cause based on Negron's detailed admissions against his penal interest, his identification of Rosario, and other corroborating facts, without needing to resolve disputes over surveillance or invoke the good-faith exception.
criminal lawprocedure
International Union of Operating Engineers v. Ray Haluch Gravel Co.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-07-25 · cited 5×
This ERISA case involved a union seeking to recover delinquent employee benefit contributions from an employer following a three-day bench trial, resulting in a judgment for plaintiffs of $26,897.41. Plaintiffs then moved for attorneys' fees and costs totaling over $143,000. The court applied the lodestar method to calculate reasonable fees, reducing the hourly rates for paralegals, substantially cutting billed attorney hours due to overstaffing in a straightforward case, time spent on abandoned claims and an unsuccessful summary judgment motion, and the limited success achieved relative to the amounts originally demanded. The court ultimately awarded $18,000 in attorneys' fees plus $16,688.15 in costs.
labor & employmentprocedure
Berliner v. Pappalardo (In Re Puffer)
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-07-08 · cited 3×
The case was an appeal by attorney L. Jed Berliner from a bankruptcy court order that allowed only $299 in fees for his representation of debtor Wayne Eric Puffer in a Chapter 13 proceeding and required him to return the rest to the debtor. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling. The core reasoning was that the debtor was an ideal Chapter 7 candidate with no non-exempt assets or prior filings, yet the proposed Chapter 13 plan was a "fee-only" arrangement under which virtually all distributions would go to the attorney's fees rather than creditors, violating the good-faith requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) and (a)(7) as previously held in In re Buck.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
C.A. Acquisition Newco LLC v. DHL Express (USA), Inc.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-07-07 · cited 1×
The case involved a contract dispute between plaintiff C.A. Acquisition Newco LLC, successor to software developer Cyphermint, and defendant DHL Express over a 2006 Master Services Agreement and Statement of Work for kiosk-based shipping software. After DHL ended its U.S. domestic delivery services in 2008 due to economic conditions, thereby terminating the project, the plaintiff sought monthly termination fees specified in the contract. The court granted the plaintiff's cross-motion for partial judgment on the pleadings on Count I for breach of contract, holding that DHL's cessation of the project triggered the fee obligation under the plain language of the agreement, and allowed the defendant's motion only as to the unjust enrichment count while denying it on the remaining claims. The decision rested on the contract terms providing for termination fees absent material breach by Cyphermint and the plaintiff's assumption of all rights and obligations under the agreement.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Yelle v. UNITED WATER SPRINGFIELD LLC
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-07-07 · cited 2×
In this case, a former employee sued his employer for breach of contract, claiming the company failed to provide retirement benefits equal to or exceeding those from his prior municipal job as promised in his transfer offer letter, and that his termination lacked just cause under the service contract between the employer and the municipal commission; he also brought ERISA claims and a wage payment claim. The court denied summary judgment on the primary breach of contract count, finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the termination was justified and the proper valuation of owed pension benefits based on actuarial evidence and the contract terms. It granted summary judgment on the remaining breach, ERISA, and compensation counts, concluding those lacked factual or legal support, with the wage claim time-barred under state law. The decision leaves the contract issues for trial while resolving the others in the defendant's favor.
labor & employmentprocedure
In Re Fisher
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-06-28
This case involved reciprocal attorney discipline in federal court after the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court suspended Chaz Robert Fisher from practicing law in the state for ninety days. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued an order to show cause why it should not impose identical discipline under its local rules. The court decided to withhold any additional formal suspension, closing the matter on the condition that Fisher comply with the state court's reinstatement requirements, which would then apply to his federal practice as well. The core reasoning was that Fisher had already effectively served the suspension period by withdrawing from all representations in both state and federal courts during the relevant time, making further sanction unnecessary under the unique facts presented.
procedure
Gable v. Borges Constraction, Inc.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-06-17 · cited 4×
In this case, plaintiffs John and Wendy Gable sued their neighbor Brian Tenczar, Borges Construction, and the Town of Cheshire over a land dispute involving the alleged redirection of a stream onto their property, which they claimed caused flooding, along with related violations of state laws, nuisance, trespass, negligence, the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, and federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court addressed motions to dismiss and a request for a temporary restraining order after the case was removed from state court. It dismissed all federal claims with prejudice, finding them without merit, along with certain related state claims against the defendants, while dismissing the remaining state claims without prejudice to refiling in state court. The court relied on the lack of substantial federal claims to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law issues under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs and denied the motion for injunctive relief. The case was closed following these rulings.
propertycivil rightsproceduretorts & liability
Intl. Union of Op. Engr. v. Ray Haluch Gravel
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-06-17 · cited 2×
This case was an ERISA action by union-sponsored health, welfare, pension, and training funds against a gravel company to recover alleged delinquent fringe benefit contributions owed under a collective bargaining agreement. The court denied the defendant's motion to enforce a purported settlement reached during trial, ruling that the parties' exchange of offers and counteroffers never produced a binding agreement under basic contract principles. After a three-day bench trial, the court awarded plaintiffs $26,897.41 in contributions, interest, and liquidated damages for covered work performed by one identified employee but denied recovery for other unidentified employees, finding insufficient evidence that they performed covered work or triggered the employer's record-keeping obligations. The ruling rested on the plaintiffs' failure to prove violations of ERISA's record-keeping requirements beyond speculation.
labor & employmentprocedure
Cyr v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-06-16
In this case, plaintiff Nicole Cyr sued her former employer United Parcel Service (UPS) alleging disability discrimination and failure to accommodate her multiple sclerosis under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Massachusetts law, as well as retaliation for seeking accommodations. The court denied summary judgment on the discrimination and accommodation claims but granted it on the retaliation claims. The decision on the discrimination claims rested on genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Cyr was a qualified individual with a disability who could perform her job with or without reasonable accommodations, and whether UPS engaged in an interactive process. On the retaliation claims, the court found no evidence that UPS acted with retaliatory animus when it placed Cyr on short-term disability leave, as the record showed only safety concerns rather than any intent to punish her for asserting her rights.
labor & employmentcivil rights
Berliner v. Pappalardo (In Re Sullivan)
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-06-15 · cited 1×
In this case, attorney L. Jed Berliner appealed a bankruptcy judge's reduction of his requested fees from $11,857 to the original $3,684 retainer in a Chapter 13 proceeding for debtors David and Luz Eneida Sullivan, after the trustee opposed the application for exceeding the district's no-look limit and questioned the necessity of the hours billed. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision and denied the motion to stay the proceedings, concluding that the case was relatively uncomplicated, many of the additional hours appeared duplicative or unnecessary, and the fee application itself accounted for a disproportionate share of the total. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard, noting the bankruptcy judge's superior familiarity with the case and the lack of any compelling reason to deviate from typical fees in the district under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(B).
business & regulatoryprocedure
Auger v. Astrue
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-06-14 · cited 12×
This case involved judicial review of the Social Security Administration's denial of Supplemental Security Income benefits to plaintiff Michael Auger, who alleged disability due to multiple impairments such as sleep apnea, depression with anxiety, and various physical conditions. The ALJ found that Auger had the residual functional capacity for a limited range of light work involving simple and unskilled tasks and could perform the job of surveillance system monitor based on vocational expert testimony. The district court decided to affirm the Commissioner's decision, denying the plaintiff's motion to reverse and allowing the defendant's motion to affirm, while declining to adopt the magistrate judge's recommendation for remand. The core reasoning was that the ALJ had properly inquired into and resolved any apparent conflict between the vocational expert's testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles' reasoning level for the job, and substantial evidence supported the conclusion that no unresolved inconsistency existed.
labor & employmentprocedurefederal power
United States v. Jacques
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-05-17 · cited 5×
The case concerned a defendant charged with conspiracy against civil rights, damage to religious real property, and use of fire to commit a felony after the arson of an African-American church in Springfield, Massachusetts, shortly following Barack Obama's 2008 election. The defendant, who had confessed during a recorded interrogation, sought to introduce expert testimony on false confessions at trial. Following a Daubert hearing, the court excluded the proffered testimony of Professor Alan Hirsch on two main grounds: the witness lacked specialized knowledge that would assist the jury, and the testimony was not grounded in sufficient facts or data and did not apply reliable principles or methods. The jury convicted the defendant after a seventeen-day trial at which the confession was admitted.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
Kerlinsky v. Sandoz, Inc.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-05-09 · cited 10×
Plaintiff Louis Kerlinsky sued Sandoz, Inc. and the United States Department of Veterans Affairs in a products liability action, alleging that medication manufactured by Sandoz and prescribed by a VA clinic caused him to suffer cardiac arrest due to inadequate warnings about side effects like dizziness or fainting; the remaining claims were for breach of warranty and negligent failure to warn against Sandoz, plus negligent failure to obtain informed consent against the USDVA. The court granted the defendants' motions to strike the plaintiff's expert disclosure and for summary judgment, while denying as moot the motion for judgment on the pleadings. It reasoned that the sole proposed expert, the plaintiff's daughter, was unqualified to opine on medical causation in a pharmaceutical case, had not properly prepared or signed an expert report under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, and provided no admissible evidence linking the drug to the injury or establishing any breach of duty. Without competent expert testimony on causation, the plaintiff could not survive summary judgment on any of the remaining counts.
healthcareproceduretorts & liability
United States v. Jacques
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-05-09 · cited 4×
The case involved defendant Michael Jacques, charged with conspiracy against civil rights, damage to religious property, and use of fire to commit a felony after the 2008 arson of the Macedonia Church of God in Christ in Springfield, Massachusetts. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress inculpatory statements made during a lengthy police interrogation, arguing that his Miranda waiver was not knowing and voluntary due to drug intoxication or withdrawal and that coercive tactics by officers compelled his confession. The court denied the motion to suppress, concluding after review of the videotaped interview and hearing testimony that the defendant understood and voluntarily waived his rights, that the questioning methods did not overbear his will, and that his statements were made voluntarily. The court also denied the related motion for reconsideration. The defendant was subsequently convicted on all counts following a jury trial.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure
Lucey v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-05-05 · cited 6×
This case is a putative class action brought by beneficiaries of life insurance policies issued under the Servicemembers Group Life Insurance Act to servicemembers and veterans, alleging that Prudential violated 38 U.S.C. § 1970(d) and related contract terms by depositing lump-sum proceeds into interest-bearing Alliance Accounts rather than paying them directly, while retaining use of the funds. The seven-count amended complaint asserted claims including statutory violations, breach of contract, breach of implied covenant, unjust enrichment, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. The court denied Prudential's motion to dismiss, finding that setting up the accounts did not fulfill the obligation to pay lump sums under the statute and contract. The core reasoning relied on the statutory language allowing election of lump-sum settlement, contract provisions requiring payment with interest, and First Circuit precedent in Mogel v. UNUM holding that insurers remain obligated until beneficiaries actually receive the funds.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Sixx Gunner Music v. Quest, Inc.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-04-15 · cited 1×
This case involved a copyright infringement lawsuit brought by members of ASCAP against The Quest, Inc., owner of a small bar in Massachusetts, for playing four copyrighted songs without obtaining a required license despite multiple prior contacts from ASCAP. After granting summary judgment on liability, the court addressed the plaintiffs' request for $22,000 in statutory damages, attorney's fees, and a permanent injunction. The court awarded $14,000 in damages, the full $18,495 in attorney's fees, and the requested injunction, reasoning that this amount—roughly twice the unpaid license fees—accounted for the defendant's willful infringement while considering mitigating factors such as the bar's small size, minimal profits, and subsequent decision to obtain a license from another organization.
propertybusiness & regulatory
Cmi Associates, LLC v. Regional Financing Co., LLC
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-04-05 · cited 6×
The case centered on claims by CMI Associates, LLC and Cynthia Michaud against Hallinan Capital Corporation, Regional Financing Co., LLC, and related parties for slander of title, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, wrongful execution, and unfair trade practices under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. These arose from a series of land development and financing deals in Palmer, Massachusetts, where defendants allegedly obtained an invalid property execution against land in which debtor George Petropoulos no longer held an interest, clouding title and contributing to foreclosure after a later refinancing. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all counts in the amended complaint, finding insufficient evidence to support liability. It denied without prejudice the third-party defendants' summary judgment motions on contribution, indemnification, and related claims, pending further proceedings. The core reasoning focused on the validity of the execution process, absence of provable damages or breaches, and procedural bars to the plaintiffs' assertions.
propertytorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryprocedure
United States v. Watts
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-04-05 · cited 9×
This case concerns whether the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which reduced mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine offenses, applies to defendants like Antoine Watts who were charged before the Act's passage but not yet sentenced. The court decided that the FSA does apply, granting the defendant the benefit of the new, lower sentencing guidelines rather than imposing the previous five-year minimum. The reasoning centers on the congressional intent evident in the FSA to correct an acknowledged injustice, which conflicts with the General Saving Statute's presumption against retroactivity, allowing the new law to supersede it. The court emphasized that perpetuating the old penalties would contradict the explicit will of Congress as recognized across branches of government.
criminal law