In Camire v. United States, parents sued the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act for alleged medical malpractice by an Air Force physician who misdiagnosed their infant's meningitis as a cold in April 1971, delaying proper treatment until late that month. The district court dismissed the complaint on remand, holding that the administrative claim filed in January 1974 was untimely under the two-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Applying the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Kubrick, the court found that the claim accrued no later than fall 1971, when the parents knew or reasonably should have known of the injury and its probable cause from the misdiagnosis and its effects, rather than in 1972 or 1973 as plaintiffs argued under theories of continuing treatment or later discovery. The court rejected any tolling based on the child's infancy and noted that the facts did not support a claim of blameless ignorance.
The case involved the U.S. Secretary of Labor suing an automobile dealership and its owners for failing to pay minimum wages to car salespeople and maintain accurate records of hours worked, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The court found that a three-year statute of limitations applied, that most employees worked 55 hours per week prior to 1976 (with some exceptions and adjustments later), and that they were entitled to back wages based on the minimum wage for those hours, as their compensation sometimes fell below the required amount when only base pay was received. The decision was based on trial testimony regarding work hours, pay plans involving base salary, commissions, and bonuses, and the dealership's practices with demonstrator vehicles.
This case is a $72 million antitrust action brought by developers of regional shopping centers against competing developers and related parties, alleging a conspiracy to obstruct zoning changes and finance sham lawsuits aimed at delaying or blocking construction of competing malls in Onondaga County, New York. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim or for summary judgment. Accepting the complaint's allegations as true, the court analyzed whether the defendants' instigation of public opposition, retention of witnesses, and funding of multiple legal challenges to zoning amendments constituted protected petitioning activity or fell within the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine under antitrust law, citing precedents such as California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited and United States v. Otter Tail Power Co. The opinion details the sequence of zoning proceedings and lawsuits, finding that the complaint sufficiently alleged intent to misuse judicial processes to eliminate competition.
This case involved the Oneida Indian Nation's claim for damages against Oneida and Madison counties for their use and occupancy in 1968 and 1969 of land that New York State had acquired from the tribe in a 1795 transaction. The court held that the 1795 transfer violated the Indian Nonintercourse Act because it lacked the required federal approval, that the counties' asserted defenses failed, and that the counties were therefore liable for damages measured by the fair rental value of the occupied portions. The decision rested on the plain requirements of the Nonintercourse Act, which rendered the title invalid regardless of subsequent good-faith purchases, and on the longstanding federal policy protecting Indian land transactions. The court noted that the ruling was compelled by federal Indian law even after decades of acquiescence by later owners.
Plaintiffs sued to challenge the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare's approval of the board of directors for the Central New York Health Systems Agency under the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, claiming the board lacked adequate representation from minorities, the poor, and inner-city residents. The Secretary moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court dismissed the action against the Secretary for failure to state a claim, finding that the board met the Act's statutory requirements for consumer and provider representation and that the Secretary had not violated the Act or abused discretion in approving it. The court also dismissed the claims against the remaining defendants sua sponte for lack of independent jurisdictional grounds.
This case involved a challenge by cable television operators and related parties to the authority of the New York State Commission on Cable Television to regulate rates for pay cable services, on the ground that the Federal Communications Commission had preempted the field. The plaintiffs and intervenors, including the United States and the FCC, moved for summary judgment, arguing that federal rules barred state rate regulation of pay cable while permitting it only for basic cable services. The court examined the FCC's regulatory history, including its 1972 decision and 1974 clarification that explicitly preempted pay cable rate regulation to allow marketplace experimentation without conflicting federal and local oversight. The core reasoning centered on the FCC's stated intent to keep pay cable channels free from rate restrictions that could hinder growth, supported by its statutory mandate over interstate communications.