David Stewart Porter

The case was a class-action constitutional challenge brought by parents under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Ohio Child Removal Statute (Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.33) and related practices of the Hamilton County Department of Human Services and juvenile court, alleging inadequate notice and hearing procedures before children were removed from parental custody. The district court bifurcated the claims, tried the request for injunctive and declaratory relief, made detailed findings about specific investigations and removals, and ruled on the pending motion to dismiss the equitable claims. The court outlined a series of required procedural steps—including ex parte hearings before a judge or referee when immediate risk exists, a 72-hour hearing to review continued shelter care, and an adjudicatory hearing within ten days—while specifying that such hearings would be informal, without strict evidence rules, but would allow cross-examination and presentation of witnesses. The core reasoning focused on ensuring that emergency removals occur only upon a showing of imminent physical or emotional harm and that parents receive prompt opportunities to contest the removal while preserving the state's ability to protect children.

civil rightsfamily lawprocedure

This case involved the Cincinnati Board of Education's challenge to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's denial of funding under the Emergency School Aid Act for the 1974 and 1976 grant cycles, based on HEW's determinations that the district was ineligible due to issues including the rescission of a desegregation plan and related constitutional concerns. After remand from the Sixth Circuit for an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact, and following resolution of the related Bronson v. Board of Education litigation, the court reviewed the supplemented administrative record and conducted further proceedings. The court decided that HEW's ineligibility findings were improper and that the Board was entitled to the escrowed funds, reasoning that HEW had conducted no independent fact-finding on key issues like the existence of a constitutional violation, relied on an inadequate administrative record, and treated factual and legal questions without sufficient separation or evidence.

civil rightsfederal power

The case concerns a motion for summary judgment in a suit by R. Renaissance, Inc. (formerly Formco) against Rohm and Haas, where the defendant argued that Renaissance lacked standing because it had transferred its cause of action to Celotex through an asset sale contract or under a de facto merger theory. The court rejected the de facto merger argument, finding it inapplicable to a situation where the seller retained specific intangible assets like claims, and held that the contract documents did not convey the claim because they lacked specific language transferring rights of action. The court also excluded the plaintiff's expert report on damages due to numerous unsupported assumptions about market conditions and production. It denied the motion for summary judgment except on the expert issue and ordered a separate trial on whether ownership of the claims had been transferred.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerns two consolidated class action lawsuits filed by purchasers of Baldwin-United Corporation common or preferred stock and various debentures against the company and related defendants. The court reconfirmed class certification in the Stoller action for open-market buyers between December 14, 1981, and March 29, 1983, and certified a settlement-only class in the Bedel action for those acquiring DHB debentures pursuant to a registration statement or prospectus prior to April 19, 1983. It preliminarily approved stipulated settlements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), ordered settling defendants to deposit $9,775,000 into a settlement fund escrow and $300,000 into an administration fund escrow, and set a fairness hearing for December 22, 1986, to evaluate whether the settlements are fair, reasonable, and adequate and to address attorneys' fees applications.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, a Black plaintiff sued a landlord under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 (and initially the Fair Housing Act) alleging refusal to rent based on race. The court had previously granted summary judgment on liability due to the defendant's litigation defaults, but the defendant's guardian ad litem later moved to vacate that judgment, arguing that the defendant lacked capacity to form discriminatory intent because of insanity. The Fair Housing Act claim was vacated because the property fell within a statutory exemption for small rentals. On the §§ 1981 and 1982 claims, the court held that insanity is not a defense, reasoning that these civil rights statutes create duties analogous to torts but without importing common-law insanity defenses that would undermine their purpose. The motion to vacate was therefore denied, with trial on damages to proceed.

civil rightspropertyproceduretorts & liability

This case is a class action by purchasers of Baldwin-United Corporation securities against Merrill Lynch alleging violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 through deceptive practices, false statements, and omissions about Baldwin-United's financial condition that affected market prices. The court addressed Merrill Lynch's motions to transfer the case to the Southern District of New York, to compel arbitration, and to dismiss the complaint. The court denied the transfer motion after weighing factors including plaintiff's choice of forum, convenience of witnesses and documents, and pendency of related actions; it also denied the arbitration and dismissal motions after concluding that the fraud-on-the-market theory could apply to support the claims for this limited class of plaintiffs who purchased through Merrill Lynch.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case was an age discrimination lawsuit in which plaintiff Bailey alleged that his former employer, Container Corp. of America, wrongfully discharged him in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Ohio Revised Code § 4101.17. A jury found for the plaintiff and awarded back pay and benefits, liquidated damages, and punitive damages. On post-trial motions, the court denied the defendant's request for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, concluding that the evidence supported findings of willful violation and malice. The court granted a partial remittitur to offset the punitive damages award against the liquidated damages, ordered the defendant to reinstate the plaintiff in its pension plan, denied front pay, and awarded prejudgment interest on the compensatory damages amount.

labor & employment

This case is a class action by dock workers, yardmen, and drivers employed by McLean Trucking Company at its Cincinnati facility, who are members of Local 100 of the Teamsters union. The plaintiffs challenged McLean's 1982 implementation of a flexible work week without an employee vote, asserting claims under the Labor Management Relations Act for breach of the collective bargaining agreement against McLean and union bodies, breach of the duty of fair representation against various union defendants, violations of rights under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, and misrepresentation. The court considered multiple motions for summary judgment after a hearing and review of stipulated facts. It denied McLean's motion, granted Local 100's motion, and granted in part and denied in part the motion of the Ohio Conference of Teamsters, Ohio Joint State Committee, and Ohio Highway Drivers' Council, finding that some claims lacked material factual disputes or legal basis while others presented issues for trial.

labor & employment

This case involved an appeal from a bankruptcy court order in the Baldwin-United Chapter 11 proceedings, where the debtors sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce the automatic stay against third-party complaints filed by broker-dealers in a related multi-district class action litigation (MDL 581). The brokers, who had marketed the debtors' single premium deferred annuities and filed proofs of claim for indemnity and contribution in the bankruptcy case, had pursued similar claims against the debtors in the MDL court. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 applied to those third-party complaints because they constituted claims against the debtor that could have been brought before the bankruptcy filing. The court also upheld the bankruptcy court's issuance of a preliminary injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 105 to prevent interference with the reorganization process, following a prior Second Circuit decision that had vacated an MDL court order attempting to block bankruptcy court proceedings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a motion by broker-dealer claimants to withdraw the reference of their contingent, unliquidated claims for indemnity and contribution against Baldwin-United Corporation from the bankruptcy court to the district court, in connection with ongoing multidistrict securities litigation. The court denied the motion for mandatory withdrawal under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). The court reasoned that the motion was not timely because it was filed after significant progress in the Chapter 11 proceedings and could delay reorganization, and that the bankruptcy court's estimation of the claims for administrative purposes did not require resolution of the underlying federal securities law issues. The court also found no cause for discretionary withdrawal.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case originated from a 1973 civil rights class action alleging that the City of Cincinnati engaged in racially discriminatory recruiting, testing, selecting, and promoting of firefighters. The parties entered into a consent decree without admitting discrimination, setting goals for increasing the percentage of black firefighters and requiring efforts to increase minority promotions under paragraph 27. After a 1984 promotional exam for fire lieutenant resulted in few or no black promotions, plaintiffs moved to enforce the decree by ordering "double-filling" of positions to promote black candidates in proportion to their representation in the applicant pool. The court granted the motion, ruling that the decree requires affirmative action in promotions and that double-filling fulfills this requirement while remaining consistent with federal law, including Sixth Circuit precedents permitting voluntary affirmative action plans by public employers.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case is a wrongful death action under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States, alleging that the FAA negligently certified and failed to suspend the airworthiness of a Robinson R-22 helicopter whose design defect caused it to crash, killing Dr. Joseph Porter. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It held that the claims fell within the discretionary function exception of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), because FAA decisions on aircraft certification, production certificates, and suspension of airworthiness are discretionary regulatory functions immunized from tort liability under precedent such as United States v. Varig Airlines. The court also noted procedural deficiencies in the timing of the administrative claim and amended complaint but reached the merits of the exception. It dismissed the claims against the United States and, sua sponte, the remaining non-federal defendants.

torts & liabilityfederal powerprocedure

This case involves an age discrimination claim by a 42-year-old plaintiff terminated after 22 years of employment, asserting violations of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Ohio state law. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff's failure to timely file with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission under Ohio's exclusive remedy scheme barred both the federal and state claims. The court denied the motion to dismiss the federal claim, holding that Supreme Court precedent in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans permits commencing state proceedings after the federal suit is filed, with the federal action stayed for 60 days. It also permitted the state claims to proceed with compensatory and punitive damages and denied the motion to strike the jury demand. The decision relied on the ADEA's requirements for deferral states and prior district court rulings interpreting Ohio law.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

This case under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) concerns two severely behaviorally handicapped children living at a residential facility who were removed from their special education classroom by the local Ohio school board after incidents of violent and disruptive behavior, prompting a motion for a preliminary injunction to return them to class during ongoing proceedings. The court examined whether the removals amounted to a unilateral change in educational placement under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)'s stay-put provision and whether safety concerns justified the action without following statutory procedures. It reasoned that the Act's procedural safeguards apply to prevent schools from making such changes unilaterally, akin to limits on parents, while allowing normal disciplinary measures short of ending all services. The opinion analyzes the balance of harms and concludes the provision imposes duties on educational agencies to maintain placements pending resolution.

civil rightsprocedure

This case concerns consolidated appeals from bankruptcy court orders allowing Baldwin-United Corporation and D.H. Baldwin Company, Chapter 11 debtors, to advance estate funds to cover legal defense costs for their present and former directors in pending securities and tort actions alleging misconduct in their official roles. The district court held that the Bankruptcy Code permits such advances for current directors if supported by appropriate findings that the expenditures qualify as administrative expenses benefiting the estate and are consistent with corporate bylaws authorizing indemnification, but does not authorize them for former directors whose relationship with the debtors ended prepetition. The court reversed the bankruptcy court's orders and remanded for further proceedings limited to the present directors, emphasizing that any payments must be justified under Code provisions governing estate administration rather than solely by state-law indemnification rights.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This securities fraud case involves allegations of market fraud against two Chapter 11 debtor corporations and various other defendants, including directors. The non-debtor defendants moved to stay the proceedings against them in light of ongoing bankruptcy reorganizations. The court imposed a limited, temporary stay of the litigation using its inherent authority to manage its docket, rather than granting or denying a full stay. The decision drew on the Supreme Court's standard in Landis v. North American Co. for balancing interests, citing the bankruptcy court's findings of prejudice to the debtors from ongoing litigation costs, the risk of asset depletion, and the lack of clear benefit to plaintiffs from proceeding immediately, with a hearing to follow if needed to assess continuation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved plaintiffs Harry and Mary Davis suing Sebring Forest Industries for alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, claiming that an exclusive distribution contract for their Realwood firewood product, combined with fraudulent non-performance by the defendant, constituted an antitrust conspiracy that led to their bankruptcy. The court granted the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on the antitrust claims, dismissing those counts. The reasoning was that exclusive distributorship arrangements are generally legal, the alleged fraud was unilateral conduct not qualifying as a conspiracy under Section 1, and there was insufficient evidence of monopoly power or dangerous probability of monopoly under Section 2, with no genuine issues of material fact.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns a plaintiff's effort to revive and enforce a 1964 Texas federal court money judgment that had been registered in Ohio under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 but remained uncollected for nearly two decades. The plaintiff moved for a conditional order of revivor after discovering the defendant's location, prompting objections on grounds including improper registration, lack of jurisdiction, statute of limitations, and presumption of payment. The court granted the motion, holding that a consent judgment is final for registration purposes once the time to appeal has expired and that the statute is intended to streamline inter-district enforcement of federal judgments. It reasoned that reading the registration statute broadly, consistent with due process, allows revival while preserving the defendant's opportunity to seek relief from the judgment under applicable rules.

procedure

The case involves five tenants in the Pendleton III low-income housing project suing the property manager, owners, and the Secretary of HUD for failing to maintain apartments and common areas in a decent, safe, and sanitary condition, in alleged breach of the warranty of habitability implied under Ohio Rev. Code § 5321 and local building codes. After removal to federal court, the Secretary moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, raising defenses including sovereign immunity, inapplicability of state law to federal activities, and lack of a private right of action under federal housing statutes. The court found that the "sue and be sued" clause in 12 U.S.C. § 1702 waives sovereign immunity for claims against HUD, and that as mortgagee-in-possession performing traditional landlord functions, HUD may be subject to state landlord-tenant obligations regarding habitability, while recognizing limits based on discretionary federal functions and noting that tenants remain responsible for conditions they cause.

propertyfederal power

This case involves a federal § 1983 action by an independent Baptist church and its leaders against a state court judge, alleging that the judge's restraining orders and adoption of arbitration rulings in a dispute between church factions improperly interfered with internal church governance, including member discipline and expulsion, in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. The dispute arose when dissident members challenged the church's efforts to place them on inactive status, leading the state court to issue orders limiting church business and imposing procedural requirements on ecclesiastical matters. The federal court had previously dismissed claims seeking to vacate the state judgments under Younger abstention principles regarding ongoing state proceedings. The court decided to grant declaratory relief, finding that the state court's assumption of control over church internal affairs amounted to excessive entanglement with religion, while denying injunctive relief as unnecessary. The reasoning centered on the congregational church's autonomy in spiritual matters under its own covenant and bylaws, which the state court had overridden by dictating due process rules and membership status.

religious libertycivil rightsfederal power