Robert William Porter

The case concerned MBank New Braunfels' suit against the FDIC to recover $17.1 million in federal funds it had loaned to the insolvent MBank Dallas, which the FDIC had valued at only 80 percent of par when assessing the solvency of MCorp's banks in March 1989. MBank New Braunfels contended that the FDIC's valuation and related actions violated the National Bank Act and other statutes requiring equal treatment of creditors, as well as Fifth Amendment rights. The FDIC raised jurisdictional defenses including sovereign immunity and argued it had discretion in its determinations. After reviewing the motions for summary judgment, the court granted judgment in favor of MBank New Braunfels, finding the case appropriate for resolution on the pleadings and that the plaintiff's claims succeeded under the applicable banking laws.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case centered on MCorp, a bank holding company, and its subsidiary MCorp Financial challenging actions by the FDIC and Comptroller of the Currency after several MBanks faced financial trouble in 1988; the agencies declined open-bank assistance, imposed a Standstill Agreement requiring continued funding of troubled banks, and monitored liquidity until declaring multiple MBanks insolvent in March 1989 amid bankruptcy proceedings. Plaintiffs and intervenors filed suits alleging improper agency conduct to facilitate control and sale of the banks, while defendants moved to dismiss or for summary judgment and asserted counterclaims. The court granted summary judgment to MCorp and MCorp Financial on the claims after reviewing all motions, pleadings, exhibits, arguments, and authorities. The core reasoning was that the record supported judgment for the plaintiffs as a matter of law under the applicable pre-FIRREA standards governing the agencies' receivership and insolvency determinations.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case involves a former temporary employee of the U.S. Postal Service who sued over an alleged on-the-job injury from 1989, citing various federal statutes including Title 5 provisions, the Rehabilitation Act, and others rather than Title VII. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for judgment against the defendant based on a missed status report meeting, attributing the issue to a miscommunication for which the defendant's counsel was not responsible. Upon sua sponte reconsideration, the court vacated its prior order denying dismissal, concluding that the plaintiff had not exhausted required administrative remedies under the relevant statutes, which deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Picker International seeking a preliminary injunction against former employee Carl Blanton to enforce confidentiality and non-competition provisions in his employment agreement. Blanton had worked as a field service engineer maintaining MRI systems, received extensive proprietary training and materials, and signed agreements prohibiting disclosure or use of confidential information and restricting post-employment competition in servicing Picker equipment. The court granted the injunction for one year, enjoining Blanton from servicing the relevant equipment, disclosing or using Picker's confidential information, and retaining proprietary materials. The reasoning centered on Picker's likelihood of success on the merits under Texas law governing covenants not to compete, the risk of irreparable harm from loss of trade secrets and goodwill, the balance of equities favoring enforcement, and the public interest in upholding valid contracts without undue restraint on trade.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentprocedure

This case is a Title VII class action alleging disparate impact employment discrimination in the City of Dallas police hiring process. In Phase I, the court found that facially neutral criteria such as education, criminal history, driving record, and drug usage produced a statistically adverse impact on black applicants that was not justified by business necessity, establishing liability for the class of black applicants from 1973 to 1979; no such impact was found for female applicants. The opinion addresses Phase II remedies, including back pay, individual damages determinations, and injunctive relief against specific criteria like college credits, marijuana use, and traffic convictions. The court applies a framework under which the employer's burden to prove job-relatedness is lighter for high-skill, high-risk positions like police officer than for low-skill jobs, while noting the City's good-faith efforts and subsequent modifications to many criteria.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved a dispute over the Hardemans' 1985 purchase of a limited partnership interest in Hall Dadeland Towers Associates, a Texas partnership formed to own and operate a Florida office building and garage, through a broker who sold the $108,000 unit via a subscription agreement, promissory note, and related documents. The Hardemans paid $20,000 before seeking recovery of their investment from the Hall entities, claiming violations of Florida securities laws. The court ruled that the Hardemans could recover from Hall Dadeland Partnership, Hall 85 Associates, and Craig Hall. Its core reasoning was that the limited partnership interests were securities that did not qualify for a Regulation D-style exemption from registration under Florida blue sky laws, because the offering involved improper general solicitation and advertising by persons acting on behalf of the issuer.

business & regulatory

The case involved MBank New Braunfels seeking a preliminary injunction against the FDIC to recover $17.1 million in federal funds it had lent to MBank Dallas, which the Comptroller of the Currency declared insolvent on March 28, 1989, after MBNB's demands for repayment went unmet. The FDIC had transferred the bank's assets to a bridge bank via a purchase and assumption agreement, leaving MBNB to recover only a pro rata share estimated at no more than 80% through the receivership estate. The court denied the application for a preliminary injunction, holding that 12 U.S.C. § 91 bars such equitable relief against a national bank in this context and that MBNB's claims must proceed as those of a general creditor in the receivership process.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

This case involved a dispute between the Garland Independent School District and the parent of a severely autistic child over the adequacy of the school's individualized educational plan (IEP) under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA). The parent had unilaterally supplemented the IEP with after-school and summer services and appealed to a hearing officer, who ordered residential placement; the district sought review and other relief, while the parent counterclaimed for reimbursement, constitutional violations, and due process issues. After the family moved away, the court held that the IEP was inadequate under Rowley standards because the child showed little progress and deterioration, entitling the parent to partial reimbursement for private expenses per Burlington and Alamo Heights precedents. The court denied §1983 damages claims, found injunctive and declaratory relief moot or unnecessary, and awarded attorney's fees related to the reimbursement. Other requests by both parties were denied.

civil rightsfederal power

This case involved multiple bankruptcy appeals and a related attorney's fees dispute arising from the Chapter 11 filings of Texas Extrusion Corporation, Pickens Industries, and the Pickens individuals, which stemmed from failed aluminum supply contracts with Lockheed and subsequent lawsuits alleging breach and fraud. The bankruptcy court approved a joint reorganization plan under which a competitor would purchase assets, Lockheed would waive deficiency claims and release suits in exchange for releases of claims against it, and various creditors would be paid. On appeal, the district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over untimely challenges to the disclosure statement approval, found the bankruptcy court's fact findings on the plan were not clearly erroneous, determined that the court did not abuse its discretion in handling or approving the plan on the merits, and concluded that certain findings on prior attorneys' fees were clearly erroneous. The core reasoning focused on appeal timeliness rules, the absence of clear error in plan-related findings, and procedural discretion in bankruptcy administration.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a union's lawsuit against an employer to compel arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement's arbitration clause concerning enforcement of a work preservation provision. The court granted the union's motion for summary judgment and denied the employer's cross-motion, ordering the parties to arbitrate the dispute. It applied Supreme Court precedents establishing a presumption of arbitrability when a contract contains an arbitration clause, holding that the court decides arbitrability but not the merits, and that doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration. The court rejected arguments that the provision was unlawful under the NLRA or that the NLRB had exclusive authority over related representational issues, noting that the NLRB had not found the clause facially violative and that arbitrators may address such questions.

labor & employmentprocedurefederal power

This case involves a declaratory judgment action filed by Navistar International Corp. in federal district court seeking a ruling on whether a valid contract existed for the purchase of truck parts from Navistar by the defendants, Marshall Truck Equipment Company. The defendants had previously filed an antitrust suit against Navistar in federal court that was dismissed, followed by a new suit in Texas state court raising claims including Texas antitrust violations, breach of contract, tortious interference, and conspiracy. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the federal action. It reasoned that federal courts have broad discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act to decline to hear such cases when a parallel state proceeding can more effectively resolve all issues between the parties, and that staying rather than dismissing would prevent the state court from addressing the claims due to Texas rules against advisory opinions.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved private ambulance companies suing the City of Dallas and Dallas County under the Sherman Antitrust Act, alleging that the City's ordinance granting its fire department exclusive rights to provide emergency ambulance services, along with a single emergency dispatch number, unlawfully restrained competition. The court addressed whether the state action immunity doctrine from Parker v. Brown shielded the City from antitrust liability. It decided that the City was entitled to Parker immunity. The reasoning was that Texas statutes and the city's home-rule authority authorized municipalities to regulate and provide emergency medical services through public entities, foreseeably displacing private competition with a municipal monopoly in a manner consistent with state policy to prioritize public safety over market competition.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

The case involved parents and their children suing Texas state officials, including the governor, human resources department employees, and two district judges, alleging constitutional violations arising from state intervention in the family home and the placement of the children in foster care. The court first dismissed the claims against the judicial defendants on grounds of absolute judicial immunity, as the alleged acts were within their judicial capacity. It then exercised abstention and dismissed the remaining claims without prejudice, citing the traditional state court role in domestic relations matters, principles of comity, the presence of ongoing state proceedings, and Burford abstention concerns over difficult questions of state law and policy. The court noted that plaintiffs could refile after the state proceedings concluded.

civil rightsfamily lawfederal powerprocedure

This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court order that granted Citizens National Bank relief from the automatic stay in Harold Munce Toyota, Inc.'s bankruptcy proceeding, allowing the bank to pursue used cars it claimed as collateral under a floor plan arrangement with Harold Mounce individually. The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's ruling and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the record did not support the conclusion that the used cars belonged to Mounce rather than the debtor corporation. The court found no evidence that titles were ever transferred to Mounce, that the cars were handled and sold as part of the dealership's inventory, or that any security interest properly attached, because Mounce lacked ownership rights in the collateral as required under the Uniform Commercial Code. Instead, the facts indicated the used cars remained assets of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved appeals from a bankruptcy court's rulings in the Chapter 7 bankruptcy of a partnership, specifically whether a single partner could convert the case to Chapter 11 and whether the sale of the partnership's primary asset, 130 acres of land, should be approved. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision to quash the conversion, holding that all general partners must consent to such a conversion under the Bankruptcy Code and prior rules. It also affirmed the approval of the sale, finding that the price was fair based on expert testimony and that delaying the sale would not be in the best interest of the debtor and creditors due to accruing interest on secured debts.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involves a § 1983 civil rights suit brought by pretrial detainee Thurman Wayne Armon against Dallas County Sheriff Clarence Jones, alleging that the jail's prisoner classification system and conditions caused him to be assaulted by two other inmates after a transfer between facilities. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue of material fact and that the plaintiff failed to establish a constitutional violation. The core reasoning was that the jail's segregation of felons from misdemeanants was supported by a rational basis, including differences in potential sentences, incentives to behave, likelihood of making bond, and the greater risk of violence posed by felony charges, and that these classifications did not violate equal protection or other rights. The opinion also referenced the statute of limitations but resolved the claims on the merits of the classification system.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case involved Preston State Bank challenging the Comptroller of the Currency's approval of the name 'Preston Center National Bank' for a newly chartered national bank, on grounds of state unfair competition and trademark infringement laws as well as the Lanham Act. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), contending that the National Banking Act preempted those claims and that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The court denied the motion, reasoning that Section 22 of the NBA and its regulations do not conflict with or preempt the state laws or Lanham Act because their 'likelihood of confusion' and 'substantial confusion' standards are complementary, and that exhaustion was unnecessary given the futility of review and the presence of independent causes of action.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

This case involves a defendant's motion to dismiss a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq., on the grounds that the statute applies only to activities connected with organized crime. The court denied the motion, holding that RICO is not limited in this way. The core reasoning was that the statute's language is unambiguous and that legislative history shows Congress intended to target defined patterns of racketeering behavior rather than requiring proof of a nexus to organized crime, while distinguishing prior cases where plaintiffs alleged only underlying fraud injuries rather than enterprise infiltration. The decision emphasized that stringent pleading requirements help limit incidental applications beyond organized crime.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the EEOC's lawsuit to enforce conciliation agreements between Safeway Stores and four charging parties (two Black and two Hispanic employees) who alleged race and national origin discrimination in hiring and promotion under Title VII. The agreements provided retroactive seniority dates, but Safeway initially implemented then retracted them (or never implemented them) due to threats from union members and the collective bargaining agreement, later entering addenda offering temporary layoff protection instead. The court held that the original conciliation agreements must be specifically enforced to grant the agreed-upon seniority dates. It rejected Safeway's impossibility defense, finding that union resistance was anticipated at the time of the agreements and did not rise to the level of making performance impossible, and that the addenda did not permanently supersede the original terms. The union was joined but no relief was ordered against it absent evidence of interference.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involves a former employee's lawsuit under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act against his employer and union, alleging breach of the collective bargaining agreement through his discharge and breach of the duty of fair representation in grievance processing. On motions for summary judgment, the court addressed statute of limitations, exhaustion of union remedies, and whether the union's conduct was actionable. Relying on United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, the court applied Texas's 90-day arbitration limitations period to bar the claim against the employer but used the two-year tort limitations period to find the claim against the union timely; it denied summary judgment on exhaustion and merits grounds for the remaining claims. The court granted the motions in part and denied them in part, resetting the case for trial.

labor & employment