John William Potter

Monte James Roberson filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his Ohio convictions for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, marijuana trafficking with school specifications, and marijuana possession. He argued that the indictment was constitutionally deficient because it omitted essential predicate acts for the corrupt activity charge, violating due process notice requirements under the Ohio Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied the petition, finding that the state appellate court's conclusion of harmless error was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as the bill of particulars provided sufficient notice of the unindicted predicate offenses and the petitioner showed no prejudice. The court further held that claimed deficiencies in a state indictment are generally not cognizable on federal habeas review except as to notice, and that any error here did not rise to structural error warranting relief.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves Kenneth Ray Papenfus's federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the revocation of his parole and related conditions imposed after his state convictions for carrying a concealed weapon and burglary. The petition raised eight grounds, including alleged ex post facto violations, improper use of his juvenile record, due process deprivations, and First Amendment infringements stemming from parole stipulations restricting contact with minors. The court determined that the claims had not been exhausted in state court, as required before seeking federal relief. It therefore dismissed the petition without prejudice, while equitably tolling the one-year statute of limitations to permit the petitioner to pursue available state remedies within specified time frames.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involves a federal prisoner's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate or correct his sentence for a supervised release violation. After pleading guilty to bank robbery and firearm charges, the petitioner was on supervised release when he admitted to violations including a domestic violence incident and failure to return to a community corrections facility; the court revoked supervision and imposed a 6-month prison term. The petitioner later sought relief based on the subsequent dismissal of the domestic violence charge in state court, arguing it constituted newly discovered evidence warranting a reduced sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The court denied the motion, holding that Rule 33 does not apply to supervised release revocations, that the dismissal was not evidence of facts existing at the time of the revocation hearing, and that revocation decisions rest on a preponderance of the evidence and the defendant's admissions rather than the outcome of parallel criminal proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

Lupe Hernandez filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence after pleading guilty to drug conspiracy, import conspiracy, and money laundering charges arising from a 1994 indictment; he argued that the government breached an oral plea agreement regarding forfeiture and sentencing recommendations, that he received ineffective assistance from trial and appellate counsel, and that Apprendi v. New Jersey should apply to his case. The court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, holding that claims about the plea agreement had already been resolved on direct appeal, that other grounds were procedurally defaulted absent cause and prejudice, and that Apprendi does not apply retroactively on collateral review of a final conviction. The decision rested on precedents barring relitigation of appellate issues in § 2255 proceedings and on the conclusion that drug conspiracy convictions do not require proof of overt acts or specific drug quantities admitted in the plea.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

Kevin Thomas filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 1997 classification as a sexual predator under Ohio Rev. Code § 2950.09(B) based on 1992-1993 convictions for sexual offenses. The district court denied the petition after finding that the state proceedings afforded a full and fair hearing and that the constitutional claims lacked merit. The court reasoned that the statute's classification, registration, and notification provisions are civil and regulatory rather than punitive, so they do not violate the ex post facto clause, double jeopardy, due process, or equal protection when applied to pre-1997 convictions, consistent with the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Cook.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal power

William Lucas filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 1985 Ohio convictions for three counts of attempted murder, aggravated burglary, and kidnapping, along with firearm specifications, on grounds including due process violations from multiple punishments, denial of the right to present relevant evidence, and improper dismissal of his state post-conviction petition. The court denied the petition in full. The core reasoning was that the claims were time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (with a grace period for pre-1996 convictions), procedurally defaulted due to failure to exhaust state remedies or comply with state appellate rules (constituting independent and adequate state grounds), and in one instance not cognizable on federal habeas review as it attacked only the collateral proceeding itself.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves defendant Neller's post-conviction motion to modify his detention and be released pending appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c). The court had previously denied bond after conviction, as had the Court of Appeals, and the defendant argued that alleged government misconduct, family financial hardship, and a recent illness constituted exceptional reasons for release. The court determined that the defendant was subject to mandatory detention under § 3143(b)(2) due to the nature of his drug-related offense carrying a maximum sentence of ten years or more. It held that the defendant failed to meet the conditions for release, including demonstrating exceptional reasons, as family hardship is a common consequence of incarceration and his medical needs could be addressed through Bureau of Prisons facilities. The motion was therefore denied.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a dispute over the amount of uninsured motorist coverage available under an auto insurance policy issued to Anissa Huff, who was killed by an uninsured driver, and whether statutory wrongful death beneficiaries who did not qualify as insureds under the policy could recover. The plaintiff, as administratrix, sought a declaratory judgment and damages on behalf of all next-of-kin after the insurer paid only the two nieces who met the policy's insured definition. Following certification, the Ohio Supreme Court held that such beneficiaries could recover, and the district court granted partial summary judgment, finding $200,000 in remaining coverage after the nieces' settlement payments and awarding prejudgment interest from November 18, 1994, the date the claim became due under the policy terms. The court rejected the insurer's arguments for a later interest start date or cutoff based on its settlement offer, applying the policy language and Ohio precedent to the undisputed facts.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerns Matthew Sweet's federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 1993 Ohio convictions on multiple counts of aggravated drug trafficking and having weapons while under disability, along with motions to alter or amend a prior order denying expansion of the record and an evidentiary hearing. The court denied the Rule 59(e) and 60(b) motions, finding no intervening change in law, new evidence, clear error, manifest injustice, or exceptional circumstances justifying relief. Turning to the habeas petition, the court concluded that the claims could be resolved on the existing record without a hearing, as many were either not exhausted in state court, procedurally defaulted due to untimely filings or failure to raise them properly on direct appeal or in post-conviction proceedings, or lacked merit based on the state courts' prior rejections of similar arguments regarding vindictive prosecution, venue, and admissibility of recordings.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

This case concerns a dispute over whether Karen Glauser-Nagy's employer-provided health plan, administered by Medical Mutual of Ohio, must cover high-dose chemotherapy with peripheral stem cell rescue (HDC-PSCR) for her Stage III breast cancer, which the insurer classified as experimental/investigational and thus excluded. The plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction to require coverage, asserting the treatment was medically necessary under the plan terms, while the defendant relied on plan definitions and independent medical guidelines that limit approval of HDC-PSCR to metastatic (Stage IV) cases. After hearing evidence and argument, the court denied the motion, holding that the plan gave the administrator discretion to determine experimental status based on criteria such as ongoing clinical trials, lack of consensus among experts, and failure to meet all five TEC guidelines for non-experimental use. The decision turned on the updated Summary Plan Description's explicit standards for experimental procedures and evidence that the treatment for non-metastatic breast cancer remained under study.

healthcare

This case was brought by a family of migrant farm workers against their former agricultural employer and a farm labor contractor, alleging violations of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA) for issues including wage records, payments, housing conditions and licensing, and violations of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) for failing to withhold and pay social security taxes. On summary judgment, the court found the defendants liable for specific FICA tax violations and several AWPA violations related to records, statements, timely pay, and unlicensed housing. After a bench trial on the remaining claims, the court issued findings of fact determining that the provided housing facilities were unsanitary and failed to meet state and federal health standards, that the labor contractor did not independently control the housing, and that the employer bore responsibility for compliance.

labor & employment

This case involved a plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act after prevailing in a social security disability benefits action against the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The court granted the motion and awarded $4,746 in fees. It found that the government's position was not substantially justified because the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding and related hypotheticals to the vocational expert were inconsistent with the evidence regarding the plaintiff's limitations from lung issues and stress. The court also determined reasonable hours and applied an adjusted hourly rate reflecting cost-of-living increases while staying below market rates.

healthcarefederal powerprocedure

This case involves an employment discrimination suit brought by a university employee under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, along with related state tort claims, after she filed grievances and charges with the EEOC and Ohio Civil Rights Commission. The plaintiff sought to stay the federal proceedings and compel the university to process her grievance under the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration procedure. The court examined CBA § 19.10, which suspends the grievance process if an employee pursues relief in an outside judicial or administrative forum. Relying on precedent such as E.E.O.C. v. Board of Governors, the court held that the provision was invalid under Title VII because it imposed an adverse consequence on employees for engaging in protected activity. It therefore granted the motion to compel use of the grievance procedure and stayed the case.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case concerns a former police officer's claims against his township, its trustees, and police chief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII, alleging retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights by supporting a colleague's sex discrimination complaint and testifying before a grand jury, plus a procedural due process violation in his 1994 termination. The court granted summary judgment to the township and trustees on all federal claims, to all defendants on the First Amendment association claim, and to all defendants on the due process claim, but denied summary judgment on the retaliation claims against the chief. It reasoned that there was no evidence of municipal policy or custom causing any violation, that the plaintiff received the required notice and opportunity to respond under federal due process standards regardless of state procedures, and that material factual disputes remained as to whether the chief's actions constituted retaliation.

civil rightsfree speechlabor & employmentprocedure

This case concerned a lawsuit by the estate of Fred Charon against Memorial Hospital and on-call physician Dr. Hull after they refused to admit Charon for treatment of a severe allergic drug reaction on April 17, 1992. Charon, who was HIV-positive and had AIDS, alleged the denial of admission violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Federal Rehabilitation Act because it was based on his disability rather than medical need. Following a bench trial on the ADA claims, the court found that the defendants' proffered reason for refusal—concern that the condition might be toxic epidermal necrolysis—was a pretext, and the motivating factor was Charon's HIV/AIDS status. The court concluded this constituted unlawful discrimination under the ADA, entered judgment for the plaintiff, issued a permanent injunction against further violations, and ordered the posting of signs stating the prohibition on such discrimination.

civil rightshealthcare

In United States v. Aberl, the IRS appealed a bankruptcy court's order discharging the appellees' 1981 and 1983 federal income tax liabilities under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) after they filed a Chapter 7 petition. The bankruptcy court found the taxes were assessed more than 240 days before the petition and that neither a pre-assessment formal offer in compromise nor a subsequent letter from the debtors' attorney tolled the 240-day period for priority status under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A)(ii). The district court affirmed on de novo review, ruling that the statute's tolling provision applies only to offers made within 240 days after assessment and that the letter was not a formal offer in compromise.

taxesprocedure

This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision regarding the dischargeability of Health Education Assistance Loans (HEAL) owed by a debtor who had received Chapter 7 relief. The debtor sought discharge under the general student loan provision in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B), but the district court held that the specific HEAL statute, 42 U.S.C. § 292f(g), governs and requires a showing that nondischarge would be unconscionable. The court found that the debtor failed to meet this standard, based on factors including his income as a teacher, his wife's earnings, family circumstances, and lack of prior repayment efforts over nearly a decade. It affirmed the determination that the debt was not dischargeable but reversed the bankruptcy court's partial reduction of the obligation, ruling that any modification requires a prior finding of unconscionability, and rejected a due process challenge to the statute's application.

federal powerprocedurehealthcare

This case involved a former employee's claims against Auto Zone for sexual harassment and discrimination under Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 4112, removed to federal court on diversity jurisdiction. The defendant moved for summary judgment based on the after-acquired evidence doctrine, citing the plaintiff's intentional omission of prior employment from her application, which it argued was material resume fraud that would have prevented her hiring. Applying Sixth Circuit precedent on after-acquired evidence to the state-law claims, the court determined there was no genuine issue of material fact, as the plaintiff's own testimony confirmed the misrepresentations and the doctrine barred recovery for discriminatory discharge. The court therefore granted the motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In Wedding v. University of Toledo, the plaintiff brought an employment discrimination action against her university employer alleging sex discrimination under Title VII and Title IX, age discrimination under an Ohio statute, violations of the Equal Pay Act, and common law claims including deceit. The court addressed the defendant's motion to dismiss the Title IX claim, the Ohio age discrimination claim, and the deceit claim. It dismissed the Title IX claim on the ground that Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for employment-related sex discrimination. The Ohio age discrimination claim was dismissed because the complaint did not allege denial of a job opening or discharge of an employee over age 40 without just cause. The deceit claim was dismissed for failure to plead with particularity under Rule 9(b), though the plaintiff was granted leave to amend.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

This case concerns defendants Memorial Hospital and Dr. Hull's motions to strike portions of evidence, including an affidavit from Dr. Lynn and expert deposition testimony, that the plaintiff offered in opposing summary judgment. The court denied the motion to strike the full Lynn affidavit, finding that the plaintiff's failure to timely identify the witness under discovery rules was a minor violation causing no prejudice. It also denied striking paragraph 7 of the affidavit as hearsay, explaining that Dr. Reardon's silence did not qualify as an assertive statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 801. Motions targeting other items were denied as moot because the court had not relied on them, and challenges to expert opinions on witness credibility were resolved by excluding only direct statements about veracity while allowing indirect effects on believability to remain for the jury's consideration.

procedurehealthcare