This case involved a motion by plaintiff's counsel, Eric Deters, to vacate a prior order imposing sanctions on him for filing an affidavit in a lawsuit against prosecutors. The court denied the motion, upholding sanctions in the amount of $12,765.45 under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying proceedings. The core reasoning was that sanctions under § 1927 are independent from Rule 11's safe-harbor procedures, counsel had not made any nonfrivolous argument for modifying existing law on prosecutorial immunity, and the improper affidavit extended the litigation by requiring responses from the court and opposing parties.
The case involves plaintiff Sarah Jones, a Kentucky resident, teacher, and cheerleader, suing Dirty World, LLC, an Arizona-based operator of the website thedirty.com, along with related defendants, for defamation, libel per se, false light publicity, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on user-submitted posts and the site owner's comments alleging her sexual misconduct and other personal matters. The court addresses the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction following an evidentiary hearing and default judgment against one entity. Applying Sixth Circuit precedent from CompuServe v. Patterson, the court examines whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of Kentucky by operating an interactive website that caused harm there, whether the claims arise from those activities, and whether exercising jurisdiction would be reasonable given the regional impact and accessibility of the site.
This case involved a former teacher who was charged with first-degree sexual abuse based on a student's allegations of voluntary sexual relations, arrested pursuant to a warrant, tried in state court, and acquitted by a jury. She then filed a federal civil rights action against the prosecutor, alleging improper investigation and prosecution despite inconsistencies in the evidence and the student's initial denials. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the prosecutor was protected by absolute immunity for actions in the judicial phase of the prosecution, such as seeking an indictment, and by qualified immunity for investigative steps. The core reasoning was that probable cause existed from the student's consistent statements, matching descriptions of the plaintiff's apartment and tattoos, and admissions of sexually toned communications, and that an acquittal after proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not retroactively eliminate the lower probable-cause threshold required to initiate prosecution.
This case is a legal malpractice suit brought by Corporex Companies and related entities against the law firm Proskauer Rose after the IRS disallowed tax deductions from a 2001 tax shelter investment for which Proskauer had issued an opinion letter stating there was a greater than 50% likelihood the treatment would be upheld. The IRS assessed an approximately $9 million tax deficiency, leading Corporex to settle the underlying tax dispute in 2008 before suing Proskauer in 2009. The court addressed the defendant's motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6), focusing on personal jurisdiction and whether the claim was barred by Kentucky's statute of limitations for legal malpractice. The core reasoning examined when the plaintiffs' injury became fixed and non-speculative under state precedent, the inapplicability of the continuous representation rule, and the date the limitations period began to run following the IRS adjustment and settlement.
business & regulatorytaxesproceduretorts & liability
This case involved two women who were detained at the Kenton County Detention Center and were sexually assaulted by Deputy Jailer Michael Stokes; they brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the detention center, county, jailer, and chief deputy, alleging violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on deliberate indifference to the risk of harm. The court granted summary judgment to all defendants on the federal claims and dismissed them with prejudice, while declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, which were dismissed without prejudice. The core reasoning was that the plaintiffs could not establish deliberate indifference because the defendants lacked actual knowledge of a substantial risk posed by Stokes, their background checks and policies were adequate, and isolated prior incidents did not put them on notice. The court treated the official-capacity claims as claims against the county and applied the same standards to pretrial and convicted detainees.
The case involved plaintiff Summe, a former chief deputy county clerk, who sued defendant Eldridge (the newly elected Kenton County Clerk) in his individual and official capacities for terminating her employment allegedly due to her Democratic candidacy against him, and sued Kenton County for releasing documents from her prior employment at the animal shelter. The court granted summary judgment to both defendants. It held that the First Amendment political patronage claim failed because political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the confidential and policymaking role of chief deputy clerk. The court further found no constitutional violation from the records release, as the documents were performance-related rather than medical and concerned a matter of legitimate public interest regarding a candidate's qualifications.