The case involved a plaintiff suing debt collection attorneys and a debt buyer under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and California's Rosenthal Act, alleging they improperly filed an arbitration claim on a debt without adequate proof of ownership. The court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing the claims. It reasoned that challenges to the arbitration must be made through the Federal Arbitration Act procedures, not a collateral FDCPA suit, and that the state claim was barred by California's litigation privilege protecting communications in arbitration proceedings. The plaintiff was allowed to amend the complaint within 20 days.
This case was an ERISA action under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) in which a beneficiary sued an insurer for denial of benefits and later settled for payment of back benefits plus reinstatement to the plan. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $29,880. It reasoned that the plaintiff qualified as a prevailing beneficiary because she obtained the relief sought through settlement, and Ninth Circuit precedent favors awarding fees to prevailing beneficiaries absent special circumstances. After reviewing the Hummel factors, the court found the requested hourly rate of $450 reasonable based on supporting declarations and prior decisions, determined that the 66.4 hours billed were reasonable including time spent on discovery and case preparation, and concluded no reduction or multiplier was warranted.
This case involved a dispute over long-term disability benefits under an ERISA plan where plaintiff Peggy Hawkins-Dean challenged MetLife's denial of benefits after she was diagnosed with fibromyalgia and unable to work. The key issue was whether stock options should be included in calculating her "Basic Monthly Earnings" for determining monthly benefit amounts, with MetLife excluding them and the plaintiff seeking inclusion based on her W-2 earnings. On remand from the Ninth Circuit to apply Abatie standards, the district court reviewed MetLife's decision under an abuse of discretion standard adjusted for the inherent conflict of interest since MetLife both administered and funded the plan. The court held that MetLife abused its discretion by excluding the stock options from the calculation under the plan's language. It remanded the matter to MetLife for recalculation of benefits and awarded the plaintiff unpaid benefits from 1999 onward along with prejudgment interest at the statutory rate.
The case involved Philip Morris USA Inc. suing John X. Liu for importing and transporting counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes, alleging violations of the Lanham Act sections 32, 43(a), and 42, the Tariff Act, and California unfair competition law. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Philip Morris, finding no genuine issues of material fact and establishing liability based on the defendant's admission of handling the counterfeit goods and the strict liability nature of the trademark claims. The court awarded statutory damages of $2,000,000, determining the defendant's actions were willful.
The case involved a dispute between employee Ms. Lucas and her employer Gund, Inc., regarding the enforcement of an arbitration provision in a non-compete agreement. The court granted the defendant's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the Federal Arbitration Act applied because the employment contract involved interstate commerce. Applying California contract law, the court determined that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable, either procedurally or substantively, and thus enforceable, with any issues regarding the underlying contract to be decided by the arbitrator.
Jarek Molski, a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair, sued Kahn Winery under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act after visiting its tasting room once and encountering alleged architectural barriers such as high entrances, narrow doorframes, and an inaccessible restroom; he sought only injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the claim for lack of standing following an evidentiary hearing at which Molski and his attorney testified. The court found that Molski failed to demonstrate a real or immediate threat of future injury because his testimony about plans to return was not credible, his history of filing numerous similar lawsuits indicated the visits were primarily for litigation purposes rather than genuine patronage, and the winery's location made repeated visits implausible. Standing under Article III requires a concrete, particularized injury that is actual or imminent and redressable by the court, which was not shown here.