
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hecht
District Court, D. Maryland · 1992-07-27 · cited 16×
The case involves the Resolution Trust Corporation, acting as assignee of a failed federally chartered savings and loan, suing ten former officers and directors for approving six speculative commercial real estate loans between 1983 and 1985 that caused losses exceeding $32 million, with claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, gross negligence, and breach of contract but no allegations of self-dealing or fraud. The court ruled on multiple pending motions to dismiss, for summary judgment, and to strike affirmative defenses, addressing issues including the statute of limitations under FIRREA, the doctrine of adverse domination, and the standard of care applicable to the defendants. The core reasoning was that the action was timely because RTC has six years from the conservatorship date to file suit if the claims were viable then, Maryland law limits liability to gross negligence, and adverse domination principles from other jurisdictions support tolling the limitations period in the absence of controlling state precedent.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability
United States v. Calle
District Court, D. Maryland · 1992-06-23 · cited 8×
In United States v. Calle, defendant Nefdale Calle pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and faced a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii). The government moved for a four-level downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 based on Calle's cooperation, including testimony against co-defendants, which would have produced a sentence below the statutory minimum. The court denied the motion and sentenced within the applicable guideline range, reasoning that the judge must independently assess whether a departure furthers the sentencing purposes in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), ensures certainty and fairness, avoids unwarranted disparities among similarly situated defendants, and reflects the defendant's actual offense conduct rather than accepting the government's recommendation wholesale.
criminal law
RCO Investment Co. v. Belair 301-50 S.W. Quadrant Commercial Properties, Inc.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1992-02-14
This case involved an appeal by creditor RCO Investment Company from a bankruptcy court's denial of its motions to dismiss (or abstain from) a Chapter 11 petition filed by debtor Belair 301-50 S.W. Quadrant Commercial Properties, Inc., and for relief from the automatic stay. The debtor, a Maryland corporation whose sole asset was a joint development project with a closely related entity (CofC), filed its petition on the eve of a foreclosure sale, shortly after CofC's prior Chapter 11 case had been dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute, pay fees, or propose a confirmable plan. The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's rulings, holding that the petition was filed in bad faith under the standards of Carolin Corp. v. Miller, because the alter-ego relationship between the entities allowed imputation of CofC's prior bad faith, the timing of the filing evidenced subjective bad faith, and there was no realistic prospect of reorganization. The court therefore granted RCO's motion to dismiss the petition for cause under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b).
business & regulatoryprocedureproperty
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Goldberg
District Court, D. Maryland · 1992-01-10 · cited 8×
This diversity action involves plaintiffs, as principal creditors of several debtor limited partnerships, suing former general partners and a successor corporation on state-law claims including breach of promissory note, guarantee, fraudulent transfer, and tortious interference with contract, arising from unpaid loans. The debtor partnerships had filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, and defendants moved to refer the action to the Bankruptcy Court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) on grounds that it was related to the bankruptcy proceedings and would promote judicial economy. The court denied the referral motion, finding that while the action was sufficiently related to the bankruptcies under the Pacor test to permit referral, the plaintiffs' timely jury demand rendered the proceeding non-core and made referral inefficient, with no compelling showing of practical benefit to the bankruptcy administration or reorganization plans.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Wileman v. Frank
District Court, D. Maryland · 1991-12-10 · cited 5×
This case involved a Title VII claim by plaintiff Wileman against the United States Postal Service alleging sex and race discrimination. The court previously entered judgment for the plaintiff on the sex discrimination claim but against her on the race discrimination claim. In the present opinion, the court addresses the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs, using the lodestar method derived from the twelve Johnson factors to assess reasonable hourly rates and hours expended. The court determines that the number of hours claimed is largely reasonable given the results obtained, while addressing objections to research time, hours spent on the unsuccessful race claim, and certain duplicative entries, and makes limited reductions such as adjusting legal assistant rates. The core reasoning relies on precedents like Hensley v. Eckerhart and E.E.O.C. v. Service News Co., which require a fully compensatory fee for prevailing parties in Title VII actions based on hours reasonably expended.
civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure
Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1991-08-15 · cited 231×
The case involved Mylan Laboratories, a generic drug manufacturer, suing other manufacturers and FDA employees for allegedly paying bribes to FDA officials to expedite approvals of the defendants' abbreviated new drug applications while delaying Mylan's, along with submitting false information and sharing confidential data. Mylan asserted claims under RICO for racketeering through bribery and obstruction, as well as Sherman Act antitrust conspiracies and a state unfair competition claim. The court considered motions to dismiss these counts, applying standards that require accepting well-pleaded facts as true while examining whether the allegations sufficiently showed a RICO enterprise nexus, pattern of activity, and antitrust injury tied to the FDA approval process.
criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryhealthcare
McGreevy v. ITT Financial Services
District Court, D. Maryland · 1991-06-19 · cited 3×
In McGreevy v. ITT Financial Services, the debtor appealed the bankruptcy court's denial of her motion to avoid a nonpossessory, non-purchase-money lien on two firearms that she had pledged as collateral for a loan, arguing the items qualified as exempt household goods under Maryland law. The district court affirmed the denial, holding that while the firearms could be claimed as exempt under Maryland's state exemption statute (Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 11-504), federal bankruptcy law controls lien avoidance. The court concluded that firearms do not qualify as "household goods" under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A), following precedent that limits avoidable liens to specifically enumerated categories of personal property held for personal or household use.
gunsproperty
United States v. Fairchild Industries, Inc.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1991-05-02 · cited 51×
This case concerns the United States' efforts to recover cleanup costs and obtain declaratory relief under CERCLA for hazardous substance contamination at the Limestone Road Site in Maryland, after the EPA placed the site on the National Priorities List. The defendants, including Fairchild Industries, Cumberland, Kelly-Springfield, and Precise Metals, asserted numerous affirmative defenses in response to the government's complaints. The court addressed the government's motions to strike insufficient defenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), applying standards that permit striking only those defenses that cannot succeed under any set of facts while preserving those involving disputed facts or substantial legal questions. The opinion evaluates defenses by category, striking some outright (such as certain equitable or constitutional challenges), allowing amendment for others (like lack of proper party status), and retaining those tied to consistency with the National Contingency Plan or statutory liability limits.
environmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory
Fenwick-Schafer v. Sterling Homes Corp.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1991-04-01 · cited 3×
This case involves claims by Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. and Kim Fenwick-Schafer against real estate developers Sterling Homes Corporation and Sterling Properties Associates V, Inc. for allegedly violating the Fair Housing Act under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) by publishing over 70 advertisements from 1988 to 1990 that featured only white human models in the Baltimore area, which has a sizable black population. The defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that their all-white model ads, which included the Equal Housing Opportunity logo and no discriminatory language, could not as a matter of law indicate a racial preference. The court denied the motion, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the ads would suggest racial discrimination to the ordinary reader and whether the defendants acted with sufficient knowledge or intent to support punitive damages.
civil rights
Polansky Ex Rel. State Accident Fund v. Ryobi America Corp.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1991-03-28 · cited 1×
This case involves a products liability claim by plaintiff James Polansky against defendant Ryobi America Corp. for injuries to his hand from a miter saw, alleging negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, and failure to warn. The court addressed a motion for reconsideration of its prior order granting Ryobi's motion in limine to exclude evidence of a later-designed saw model with a dual activation switch under Federal Rules of Evidence 407 and 403. The court granted the motion, holding that Rule 407 does not bar the evidence because Ryobi continued selling the original saw model without the switch, meaning no remedial measure was taken to address the alleged defect. The court further found that the evidence's probative value on issues like feasibility and consumer acceptance was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403, as Ryobi could mitigate any inference of liability by showing it still markets the original model.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Radio Parts Co. v. Lowry
District Court, D. Maryland · 1991-02-26 · cited 3×
This case is an appeal from a U.S. Bankruptcy Court decision in a non-core proceeding involving a claim by the bankruptcy trustee of Columbia Data Products, Inc. against RPC Computer Electronics, Inc. and related entities for an unpaid balance on goods sold under a distributorship agreement. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling that the defendants owed approximately $214,959, rejecting their claim of no liability. The core reasoning was that the trustee met its burden of proof through properly admitted testimony and a summary exhibit based on Columbia's business records, which accurately reflected the account despite complexities from entity mergers, shared operations, and debit/credit adjustments.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Koppers Co., Inc.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1991-02-26 · cited 111×
The case concerns cross-motions for summary judgment in a dispute over liability for environmental contamination on property in Baltimore that Weyerhaeuser leased to Koppers's predecessor from 1944 to 1977 for use as a wood treatment facility. Weyerhaeuser sought partial summary judgment holding Koppers liable under CERCLA section 107 for response costs arising from hazardous substances including creosote, benzene, and heavy metals, while Koppers moved for summary judgment on both the CERCLA claims and its counterclaim as well as on Weyerhaeuser's state-law counts. The court denied Koppers's motion and granted Weyerhaeuser's motion on the issue of Koppers's CERCLA liability, holding that Koppers qualified as a person who owned or operated a facility at the time of disposal of hazardous substances; the court reasoned that the undisputed facts showed the contamination originated on the property during Koppers's operations and that no government-ordered cleanup or violation of a statutory standard was required to establish a release. The court noted that questions of the scope of liability and allocation of damages would be addressed separately.
environmentpropertyprocedure
Federal Realty Investment Trust v. Pacific Insurance
District Court, D. Maryland · 1991-02-01 · cited 11×
This case involves a dispute over coverage under a directors and officers liability insurance policy issued by Pacific to FRIT, specifically regarding the allocation of defense costs from a settled fraud and breach of contract lawsuit brought by a former leasing agent. The court addressed motions in limine concerning the legal standard for allocating defense costs between covered and non-covered claims and parties. The court determined that the applicable standard is whether legal services are "reasonably related" to the defense of the insured trustees on covered claims, following Maryland precedent, rather than requiring an arm's length allocation between insured and uninsured parties. This standard allows full recovery for costs reasonably related to covered defenses, even if they also benefit uncovered aspects.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Dorsey v. Morgan
District Court, D. Maryland · 1991-01-24 · cited 8×
In Dorsey v. Morgan, plaintiff Dorsey sued attorney Morgan, in-house counsel for Outdoor World, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) §§ 1692d, 1692e(11), and 1692g after Morgan sent a single letter demanding payment of overdue amounts on a campground membership contract and threatening possible legal action and attorney fees. Dorsey moved for summary judgment on liability for two counts, while Morgan moved for summary judgment on the harassment claim under § 1692d. The court denied Dorsey's motion and granted Morgan's, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The core reasoning was that the letter's statements were neither false nor harassing, oppressive, or abusive, as they accurately described the client's rights under the contract to pursue collection, including legal action and fees, and no other communications occurred.
business & regulatory
G & M OIL CO. v. Glenfed Financial Corp.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1991-01-10 · cited 13×
This case involved G & M Oil Co.'s claims against Glenfed Financial Corp. for negligent misrepresentation and promissory estoppel stemming from a failed loan application after earlier breach of contract claims had been dismissed. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on both remaining counts. The court held that the claims were barred by Maryland's three-year statute of limitations, as the negligent misrepresentation claim did not relate back to the original complaint and both claims were filed too late. On the merits, the court found no genuine issue of material fact because Glenfed made no unconditional promise that could reasonably induce reliance and G & M, as a sophisticated party represented by counsel, could not have reasonably relied on any conditional statements without an executed commitment letter.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability
Schwartz Bros., Inc. v. Striped Horse Records
District Court, D. Maryland · 1990-08-30 · cited 20×
This case involved a breach of contract suit filed by Schwartz Brothers against Striped Horse Records and its officer Carlo Nasi in Maryland state court. After Nasi, an Italian resident, received the complaint but contested service, he later removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds more than 30 days after first receiving the pleadings. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand, holding that the 30-day removal deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) begins upon the defendant's receipt of the complaint through service or otherwise, based on the statute's plain language, the narrow construction of removal statutes against removal, and the principle that actual notice triggers the clock rather than perfected service. The court did not address Nasi's separate challenges to personal jurisdiction or service.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Welsh Ex Rel. Welsh v. Century Products, Inc.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1990-08-16 · cited 5×
This case arose from a 1983 car accident in which a two-and-a-half-year-old child, Michael Welsh, was seriously injured after slipping out of a Century 200 child car seat whose shoulder straps had come loose; the parents sued the seat's manufacturer and related companies alleging negligence in design and failure to instruct, along with strict liability and warranty claims. The defendant moved for partial summary judgment on the negligence counts, contending that the federal National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and FMVSS 213 preempted those state common-law claims under the Supremacy Clause. The court denied the motion, holding that the Safety Act's savings clause (15 U.S.C. § 1397(k)) expressly preserves common-law liability and that compliance with the federal minimum standard does not exempt manufacturers from state tort duties.
torts & liabilityfederal powerbusiness & regulatory
Dashiell v. Montgomery County
District Court, D. Maryland · 1990-03-14 · cited 3×
This case involved six non-union employees of Montgomery County who sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the union's procedures for collecting reduced agency fees from nonmembers violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to provide adequate information under the standards set in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the court granted after reviewing the fee notification letter, audited financial statements, and detailed breakdowns of chargeable versus nonchargeable expenditures provided to nonmembers. The court reasoned that the union's disclosures met Hudson's requirement for an adequate explanation of the fee calculation, as the materials allowed nonmembers to understand and potentially challenge the 82.59% reduced fee amount. Only the adequacy of the fee explanation was disputed, and the procedures satisfied constitutional minima without needing additional categories like "gray area" expenditures.
labor & employmentfree speechcivil rights
Vogel v. Independence Federal Savings Bank
District Court, D. Maryland · 1990-01-03 · cited 29×
This case concerned Leonard Vogel's entitlement to continued coverage under a group health insurance policy sponsored by Independence Federal Savings Bank after he suffered a disabling stroke in 1982, as well as disputes among the bank, its insurance agency, and insurer Guardian Life over switching policies and excluding Vogel. The court denied most of the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the claims in the Third Amended Complaint but granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on Guardian's counterclaim seeking to rescind or deny coverage. The core reasoning was that the incontestability clause in the Guardian policy barred challenges to Vogel's eligibility based on his employment status once the contestability period had passed, and that distinctions between conditions of insurance and limitations of risk did not apply to prevent enforcement of the clause under applicable law.
business & regulatoryhealthcarelabor & employment
G & M Oil Co. v. Glenfed Financial Corp.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1989-12-21 · cited 4×
The case arose from failed negotiations between G & M Oil Co. and Glenfed Financial Corp. for a working capital loan, where preliminary letters in April and June 1985 outlined potential financing terms contingent on conditions such as a $1 million guarantee from the Maryland Industrial Development Financing Authority. G & M sued on claims including breach of contract, breach of good faith duties, negligent misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel after Glenfed withdrew the proposal following a management change and dissatisfaction with the guarantee obtained. The court granted Glenfed's summary judgment motion in part on the contract-based counts, finding no binding obligation due to unmet express conditions precedent and disclaimers in the letters that they imposed no duty to lend, while denying it in part and granting leave to amend the complaint to properly plead negligent misrepresentation and promissory estoppel claims.
business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure