Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
Customs classifications receive the statutory presumption of correctness, yet the opinions readily overturn agency denials when the text does not support them, as in the drawback and classification rulings. Central Soya Co., Inc. v. United… ↗ Kalan, Inc. v. United States ↗
This case concerns customs duty classification disputes over imported Japanese toner, dry imaging ink, and developer products. The Government moved to remove four suspended actions from the court's suspension calendar and amend its answers to assert counterclaims for reclassification under different TSUS provisions and recovery of additional duties, based on the outcome of a related test case. Plaintiff opposed the amendment as untimely and cross-moved to dismiss the actions. The court held the Government's motion timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1583, granted it to permit the counterclaims, and denied plaintiff's motion, reasoning that amendment would avoid prejudice to the Government, align with the statute's purpose of enabling recovery of proper duties, and allow the court to determine the correct classification without undue burden.
The case involved Central Soya Co., Inc., which imported crude degummed soybean oil and paid customs duties, then sought a refund or "drawback" after exporting a similar quantity of domestic soybean oil in the same condition. Customs denied the claim because Central Soya was not the exporter of the substituted merchandise. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding that the Customs Service acted illegally in denying the drawback. The decision rested on the conclusion that 19 U.S.C. § 1313(j)(2) does not require the drawback claimant to be the exporter, based on the statute's language and legislative history.
In Kalan, Inc. v. United States, an importer challenged the U.S. Customs Service's classification of imported key tags as jewelry subject to duty and obtained a court ruling reclassifying them as duty-free articles of plastics under the Generalized System of Preferences. After receiving a refund of the estimated duties paid at entry, the importer sought interest under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(d) from the date those estimated duties were paid, rather than from the later date of liquidation. The court ruled that interest under section 1520(d) is available only on refunds of increased or additional duties determined to be due upon liquidation or reliquidation pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c), so the importer could recover interest only from the liquidation date. It separately held that the importer was entitled to interest from the filing of the summons under 28 U.S.C. § 2644, a point the government conceded.
The case concerned the proper tariff classification under the Tariff Schedules of the United States of imported Apple x-y plotters and plotter pens. The court had previously held that the plotters were classifiable as office machines not specially provided for under item 676.30 TSUS rather than as drafting and drawing machines under item 710.80 TSUS, while upholding Customs' classification of the pens as marking pens under item 760.15 TSUS. The United States moved under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment, contending that the court had overlooked whether the plotters fit other terms in item 710.80 and had misapplied precedents on use and eo nomine provisions. The court denied the motion, concluding that its original opinion had already addressed and rejected those arguments after full consideration of the evidence and that the motion merely restated prior contentions.
In Mertz v. United States Customs Service, the plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and for appointment of counsel under § 1915(d), claiming inability to pay litigation costs. The court reviewed the plaintiff's affidavit showing an annual salary of about $30,000, plus ownership of stocks and bonds valued at $15,000, a house worth $46,000, and a car valued at $12,000. Comparing this to precedents like Potnick v. Eastern State Hospital, where the plaintiff had only minimal welfare income and assets, and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Charles W. Sears Real Estate, Inc., which denied similar relief to someone with $20,000 income, the court found the plaintiff had not shown the required level of indigence. Accordingly, the court denied both the motion to proceed without prepayment of fees and the request for pro bono counsel.
This case involved the proper tariff classification for customs duties of imported molded plastic shoe soles from Brazil, described as "plastic shoe soles" or "Icicles." The Customs Service classified the merchandise as "other footwear" under TSUS item 700.60, subjecting it to a 20% ad valorem duty. The importer argued it should be classified under item 700.58 as footwear with uppers over 90% rubber or plastics, at 6% duty. The court granted summary judgment to the government, holding that the imported items lacked the required uppers and were correctly classified under the higher duty rate in their condition as imported.