William J. Rea

The case arose from a 1998 bombing by the Colombian Air Force near an oil pipeline operated by Occidental Petroleum in Colombia, which killed and injured civilian plaintiffs; the plaintiffs sued the American company and its security contractor under the Alien Tort Statute and related laws alleging assistance to the military operation. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) but ultimately dismissed the entire case. The core reasoning was that adjudication would require the judiciary to second-guess foreign military actions and Executive Branch foreign policy determinations favoring non-judicial remedies, rendering the dispute a non-justiciable political question under the Baker factors.

civil rightsfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

The case involves Colombian plaintiffs suing American companies Occidental Petroleum and AirScan for their alleged role in a 1998 Colombian military bombing of a civilian village that killed 17 people, including family members of the plaintiffs, under claims pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, the Torture Victim Protection Act, and state tort laws. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the case should proceed in Colombia under the doctrines of forum non conveniens and international comity. The court denied the motion to dismiss. It reasoned that the existence of parallel foreign proceedings did not require abstention, there was no certain true conflict with Colombian proceedings or interests, and the federal statutory claims involving US companies and extraterritorial conduct supported the exercise of jurisdiction in US court.

civil rightstorts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved members of the band KISS and their company suing a DVD distributor for releasing footage of a 1976 concert without authorization, asserting claims including copyright infringement and anti-bootlegging under federal law. The court denied the motion to dismiss the copyright claim, holding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged ownership of the work and infringement by the defendants. However, it granted dismissal of the anti-bootlegging claim, ruling that 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) is unconstitutional because it conflicts with limitations in the Copyright Clause, such as the fixation requirement. The decision focused on the adequacy of pleadings for copyright and constitutional constraints on Congress's authority to enact the anti-bootlegging statute.

federal powerbusiness & regulatory

In Wesley v. Davis, a recently released prisoner sued prison officials and medical staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights by retaliating against his internal appeal for stronger pain medication for a re-aggravated back injury; the alleged retaliation included shredding his medical records and other corrupt acts to derail the appeal. The district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed claims against certain defendants, such as Dr. Doan, due to lack of evidence of personal involvement or deliberate indifference. However, it denied summary judgment on claims involving the intentional destruction of medical records, holding that such acts violate the Eighth Amendment both by preventing accurate assessment of medical needs and as independent malicious punishment that offends standards of dignity and decency, regardless of physical harm.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved the sentencing of defendant Kelli Davis after her conviction on six counts of wire fraud for submitting false information about borrowers in applications for FHA-insured loans. The government sought a 13-point sentencing enhancement under the guidelines based on losses from 82 additional uncharged transactions, but the court addressed whether Blakely v. Washington required those facts to be found by a jury. Applying the Ninth Circuit's Ameline decision, which held that Blakely applies to the federal sentencing guidelines, the court ruled that a sentencing jury could not be used for the enhancement because the additional offenses were time-barred by the statute of limitations and could not have been charged or presented to the jury at trial. The court therefore decided to sentence the defendant based on an eight-point offense level without the enhancements or a sentencing jury, while also noting plans for an alternative indeterminate sentence pending Supreme Court review of related cases.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Loree Rodkin Management Corp. suing various defendants for copyright infringement of five jewelry designs after submitting registration applications and fees to the Copyright Office but before receiving any certificates. Defendant Charles Winston Enterprises moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), which states that no infringement action shall be instituted until registration has been made. The court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice, holding that the statute requires actual issuance of a registration certificate by the Copyright Office after examination rather than mere delivery of the application. It reasoned from the plain language of §§ 410(a) and 411(a) that registration occurs only after the Register determines the material is copyrightable and issues the certificate, and that delivery alone does not suffice even if registration is later refused.

procedureproperty

The case concerned a copyright infringement action filed by Películas Y Videos Internacionales (PVI) against Harriscope and related entities, alleging unauthorized licensing and broadcasting of 29 Mexican motion pictures produced between 1930 and 1960. PVI claimed ownership of the restored U.S. copyrights under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act as the producers' assignee. The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on whether an assignee qualifies as an "author" eligible to enforce the restored copyrights and whether PVI could recover statutory damages or attorney's fees. The court examined the URAA's definitions of author and reliance-party status under 17 U.S.C. § 104A, the timing of infringement relative to copyright registration under 17 U.S.C. § 412, and the admissibility of evidence regarding broadcast dates, concluding that defendants qualified as reliance parties for certain films and that untimely registration barred statutory damages.

propertyprocedure

This case arose from two extended LAPD wiretap investigations targeting Downey Communications and Atel Cellular, which intercepted thousands of calls; plaintiffs, who were not named targets but were overheard as customers or associates, alleged that officers violated their constitutional rights by using the intercepted information against them through an informal "hand off" procedure to other investigations. Plaintiffs brought §1983 and related claims against city and county officials and entities. The court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. It held that individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the constitutionality of the hand-off procedure was not clearly established at the time and they had a good-faith belief it was lawful; municipal liability claims failed for lack of a policy reflecting deliberate indifference to plaintiffs' rights; and state-law claims were barred by statutory immunities.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Lozano v. AT&T Wireless, the plaintiff challenged the enforceability of an arbitration clause contained in a Welcome Guide provided after signing a cellular service contract, arguing it was not part of the original agreement and was unconscionable. The court granted the defendant's motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings under the Federal Arbitration Act. It held that the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable despite being provided post-transaction, citing precedents allowing such terms in consumer contracts, and determined that the clause was not substantively unconscionable even if procedurally so. The court further found the plaintiff's claims fell within the broad scope of the arbitration provision covering disputes related to the service agreement. It declined to order class-wide arbitration absent explicit provision in the clause.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In 1998, John Corcoran sued Officer Paul Fletcher individually and the City of Montebello under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Fletcher violated his Fourth Amendment rights by detaining him without reasonable suspicion and arresting him without probable cause, and that the City maintained an unconstitutional policy or custom and failed to train its officers. After a two-week jury trial in which Corcoran prevailed on all claims and was awarded punitive damages, the court addressed the deferred issues of Fletcher's qualified immunity defense and Corcoran's request for declaratory relief that the City's policy was unconstitutional. The court explained that qualified immunity questions had been reserved until after trial because factual disputes existed, and it then turned to the policy issue. The jury had found, based on testimony from multiple Montebello officers, that the City maintained a policy of accepting custody of persons under citizen's arrests without requiring or determining probable cause; the court held that this policy was unconstitutional because the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for arrests and that duty cannot be delegated to private citizens.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

In Guerrero v. Gates, plaintiff brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and RICO against defendant Bernard Parks, then Los Angeles Police Chief, arising from events tied to a prior conviction and resulting injuries. Defendant moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing the § 1983 claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey and the statute of limitations, and that the RICO claims lacked cognizable injury to business or property. The court held that Heck does not bar § 1983 claims for plaintiffs no longer in custody, determined that federal accrual rules and Heck's exception applied to the limitations period, and concluded that pecuniary losses stemming from personal injuries can confer RICO standing. It therefore denied the motion to dismiss in full.

civil rightsprocedurecriminal law

In Carter v. Variflex, Inc., Variflex brought counterclaims alleging that Carter, E-Z Up, Lynch, and KDK violated federal antitrust law under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, as well as California antitrust and unfair competition statutes, by conspiring to allocate customers and monopolize the instant canopy market through cross-licensing patents, threatening enforcement of patents, filing patent infringement suits, and pressuring Variflex's customers. The court granted summary judgment to the Counterclaim Defendants on all four counterclaims. It reasoned that Variflex failed to produce evidence establishing a relevant market or the defendants' market power, that patent licensing agreements did not constitute a per se violation or unreasonable restraint under the rule of reason, and that the state-law claims failed for the same reasons because they track federal antitrust standards.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns a patent dispute in which Harmonic Design and Hunter Douglas sought judicial interpretation of the term 'electronic circuit' appearing in multiple claims of three patents related to motorized window coverings. The court conducted a Markman claim construction analysis to determine whether the term should be treated as means-plus-function language under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. It held that the term does not invoke that provision because the word 'circuit' connotes sufficiently definite structure to a person of ordinary skill in the art. The decision rested on the absence of 'means for' language, the ordinary meaning supported by dictionary definitions, the claims' references to electrical connections, and relevant Federal Circuit precedent.

propertyprocedure

This case involves securities fraud claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp. and its CEO, their distributor Stanson Marketing and its president, and auditor Coopers & Lybrand, based on allegations of a "ship and return" scheme that overstated 1995 revenues by millions and led to misleading statements to analysts and investors before insider stock sales. The court denied summary judgment to the Chantal and Stanson defendants because evidence raised genuine issues of material fact on whether returns occurred at a scale that made financials fraudulent, whether statements to analysts were misleading, and whether the defendants acted with scienter. It granted summary judgment to Coopers & Lybrand because undisputed facts showed no triable issue regarding the auditor's scienter or direct involvement in any false public statements. The decisions turned on application of summary judgment standards to evidence of warehouse storage of goods, stock sales timing, and the auditor's verification procedures under GAAP.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case arose from plaintiff Fowler's allegations that he was over-detained for two days in Los Angeles County Jail after his acquittal on criminal charges, in violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Defendants, including Sheriff Sherman Block and several deputy defendants, moved for qualified immunity, arguing there was no clearly established law prohibiting the administrative processing period following acquittal. The court denied the motion for reconsideration of its prior denial of qualified immunity to Block in his individual capacity as a policymaker, finding a factual question on the reasonableness of his actions, and also denied qualified immunity to the deputy defendants on the constitutional claims while addressing related conspiracy allegations.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case involves a habeas corpus petition filed by Mohammed Haider, a state prisoner convicted of selling cocaine, challenging his conviction on grounds that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights and due process by upholding the surveillance post privilege. The privilege prevented his counsel from questioning arresting officers about the exact location of their rooftop surveillance site during a drug transaction observation, though general details and observations were allowed. The magistrate judge recommended denying the petition after analyzing the privilege as analogous to the qualified informant privilege, requiring a balance of interests, and finding no violation because Haider's identity was not at issue and he failed to demonstrate a specific need for the exact location to support exoneration. The district court adopted the recommendation in full and entered judgment denying the petition.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved Philip Young challenging the City of Simi Valley's zoning ordinances restricting locations for nude dancing facilities on First Amendment grounds. After a jury trial ended in a mistrial, the court granted Young's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b). The court held that Young had standing due to the real and substantial chilling effect on his protected expression. It reasoned that although the ordinances were content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations aimed at secondary effects, they left open only an unreasonable number of alternative sites for adult entertainment and were therefore unconstitutional on their face and as applied.

free speechcivil rights

This case involved Hunter Douglas and its fabrication company suing Harmonic Design, Springs Industries, and Springs Window Fashions Division over patents for electronic window shades. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' negligent and fraudulent procurement of invalid patents, along with false statements about exclusive rights, caused them to delay entering the market and lose sales, asserting state law claims including unfair competition, injurious falsehood, negligence, and interference with prospective economic advantage. The court had previously dismissed the declaratory relief claim for patent invalidity due to lack of reasonable apprehension of infringement suit. The court granted the motion to dismiss the state claims with prejudice, holding that federal patent law preempts these claims under both field and conflict preemption principles because the claims would require proving patent invalidity without meeting the federal requirements for challenging patents.

business & regulatoryfederal powertorts & liability

In Di Giorgio v. Lee, residential tenants who had lost an unlawful detainer action and faced a writ of possession filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition while still in possession of the premises. The bankruptcy court issued a permanent injunction barring enforcement of California Code of Civil Procedure § 715.050, which directs sheriffs to execute such writs without delay despite a bankruptcy filing. The district court affirmed, ruling that the tenants' possessory interest constituted property of the bankruptcy estate that triggered the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (2), and (3). Because the state statute conflicted with the federal stay's prohibitions on continuing judicial proceedings, enforcing pre-petition judgments, and exercising control over estate property, it was preempted and could not be applied.

federal powerpropertyprocedure

The case arose from the termination of plaintiff Alicia Pena, a Mexican-born employee at defendant Downey Savings and Loan, after she was accused of violating company policies on personal loans from customers; Pena alleged breach of an implied employment contract, age and national origin discrimination under California law, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and defamation. The defendant removed the action from state court to federal court, contending that the state-law contract claim was preempted by federal regulations under the Home Owners' Loan Act governing employment contracts at savings associations. The court examined its removal jurisdiction sua sponte under the well-pleaded complaint rule, finding that any federal preemption defense did not appear on the face of the complaint and did not qualify for complete preemption that would create federal-question jurisdiction. It therefore held that the case must be remanded to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

labor & employmentcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure