In this declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff insurance company sought a ruling that it had no duty to defend or indemnify its insured, Gibbons, in a lawsuit brought by Lesselyoung for injuries sustained when a bullet fired from a rifle resting on the insured vehicle ricocheted and struck Lesselyoung. The court, applying North Dakota law, held that the injury did not arise out of the "use" of the automobile as contemplated by the policy's insuring clause. The reasoning focused on the policy language requiring the injury to arise from the ownership, maintenance, or use of the vehicle in its inherent nature as an automobile, rather than its incidental use as a gun rest.
This case involved a petition by an IRS Special Agent to enforce two summonses served on respondent Orser, a CPA, seeking production of workpapers, records, and documents related to amended tax returns prepared for taxpayers Kenneth and Lois Peterson for the years 1960-1963. The court denied enforcement of the summonses. The undisputed facts showed that Orser had been retained by the Petersons' attorney, Vogel, to assist in representing the clients, that the underlying records remained the property of the Petersons, and that the taxpayers had expressly asserted their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination regarding disclosure of those materials. Because the documents were in the lawful possession of their owners rather than a third party, and Orser had no lawful means to obtain them against the owners' consent, an enforcement order would have been improper and unenforceable.
In this case, plaintiff White, an employee of Noble Drilling Company, was injured on the job and received workers' compensation benefits under North Dakota law before suing McKenzie Electric Cooperative and others in tort for his injuries. McKenzie then filed a third-party complaint against Noble seeking indemnity or contribution, alleging Noble's negligence in violating safety rules or that its own negligence was merely passive compared to Noble's active negligence. The court granted Noble's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint. The decision rested on the North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Act, which the court interpreted as providing an exclusive remedy that bars all other claims against a complying employer like Noble, including those for indemnity or contribution by third parties, since there is no common liability or contractual relationship allowing such recovery.
This case concerned a claim for refund of 1956 federal income taxes paid by shareholders of a corporation that sold substantially all its assets. Under Section 337(a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, no gain or loss is recognized to the corporation if it adopts a plan of complete liquidation and distributes its assets within 12 months. The sale occurred on February 14, 1956, but the formal shareholder resolution adopting a liquidation plan was not passed until November 23, 1956. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove a plan of complete liquidation had been adopted by the corporation before the sale, as pre-sale discussions among officers and shareholders reflected only conditional intentions dependent on the sale occurring, and the burden of proof rested on the plaintiffs. Judgment was entered for the defendant.
This case was a federal lawsuit by a union against an employer under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act to compel arbitration of four grievances alleging that the company violated their collective bargaining agreement by contracting out maintenance and operating work at a North Dakota refinery. The court ruled that the employer did not have to arbitrate the grievances and dismissed the suit. The core reasoning was that the agreement's arbitration provision in Article II, Section 8, expressly excluded proposals to modify or amend the contract and any matters arising from them, and the grievances amounted to attempts to alter the company's subcontracting practices, which the parties had deliberately left outside the arbitration process; the court applied Supreme Court precedent limiting judicial inquiry to whether the contract on its face covered the claims. The court found the exclusion clause plain and controlling, without reaching the merits of the underlying disputes.
This diversity jurisdiction case arose from a December 1958 collision on a North Dakota highway after defendant corporation's employee towed a disabled vehicle belonging to co-defendant Weisz using an improperly attached chain that caused the towed car to veer across the centerline into oncoming traffic, injuring plaintiff Gillis. After Weisz settled with Gillis, the court tried the remaining claims of negligence against the corporation, which had denied liability and asserted contributory negligence. The court found the corporation negligent for failing to ensure the towed vehicle tracked properly behind the tow truck, given the offset attachment points, power steering without power, cold weather, and known traffic conditions on the highway, and rejected contributory negligence. It awarded damages to both Gillis and Weisz, including the reasonable value of military-provided medical services under the modern rule allowing such recovery, and entered judgment accordingly.