George Hughes Revercomb

This case involved post-verdict motions by five defendants convicted after a lengthy trial on charges stemming from the R Street Organization drug trafficking conspiracy in Washington, D.C., including violations of RICO, drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, continuing criminal enterprise under 21 U.S.C. § 848, money laundering, and related offenses. The defendants sought dismissal, new trials, or judgments of acquittal primarily on grounds of alleged juror misconduct, such as exposure to extraneous newspaper articles, site visits to the crime area, and improper discussions or influences during the trial. The court examined affidavits from jurors and alternates, along with trial records and hearing testimony, and denied the motions, finding the claims of contamination unsupported by credible evidence, lacking proof of prejudice to the verdicts, and often based on unreliable or inconsistent statements. The reasoning emphasized that isolated instances of potential exposure did not taint the unanimous convictions on the core drug-related counts, and procedural safeguards during trial had adequately addressed any issues.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a challenge by building trades unions to a Department of Labor Wage Appeals Board decision finding that union "job targeting programs," which use union dues to subsidize contractors on targeted projects, violate regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part 3 implementing the Davis-Bacon Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary of Labor, upholding the Board's ruling that such programs are not permissible uses of "membership dues" under the regulations. Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration under Rule 60(b), claiming errors of fact regarding whether the programs necessarily involved federal projects and errors of law in the court's reliance on the Supreme Court's Beck decision. The court corrected minor factual statements in its prior opinion to remove references to government projects but held the corrections immaterial to the outcome, rejected any misapplication of Beck, and denied the motion, confirming that the Secretary's narrow interpretation of the regulation was reasonable.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved unions and contractor associations challenging a Department of Labor Wage Appeals Board decision that job targeting programs (JTPs), which subsidize wages on public construction projects using deductions from union members' pay, violate the Davis-Bacon Act and related regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part 3. The district court denied a motion to intervene, granted a motion to strike, and entered summary judgment for the Secretary of Labor. The court found the material facts undisputed and held that the JTP subsidies constitute unauthorized payroll deductions not covered by regulatory exceptions, including those for regular union dues as limited by relevant precedent. The core reasoning centered on the Davis-Bacon requirement that laborers receive prevailing wages without subsequent deductions or rebates, supported by the statute's purpose of protecting local wage standards.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerns a trespass claim brought by KayFirst Corporation against WMATA (and related claims against Chicago Title Insurance) over a subterranean step footing of a retaining wall, built between 1905 and 1907, that extends approximately seven feet into KayFirst's Parcel 4 from WMATA's adjacent Parcel 14. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on WMATA's liability for trespass under Count I and Chicago Title's liability for breach of a title insurance contract under Count III. Finding no material facts in dispute, the court analyzed the property deeds, the history of the parcels, and legal doctrines including easements and adverse possession, concluding that the footing is an encroachment not protected by any easement and denying WMATA's motion for summary judgment while addressing the scope of the insurance claim.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure

This employment discrimination case involves claims by a black registered nurse against the Peace Corps for racial discrimination in training, performance evaluations, and denial of a contract extension, as well as retaliation for complaining about discrimination, spanning events from 1987 to 1990. The defendant moved to dismiss or for summary judgment and to strike demands for compensatory damages and a jury trial. The court analyzed the timeliness of claims under a continuing violation theory, the elements of a prima facie case despite the position ultimately going to another black applicant, and the retroactive application of 1991 Civil Rights Act provisions. It identified genuine issues of material fact on the plaintiff's awareness of deadlines and the discriminatory intent behind narrative comments in evaluations, deferring full resolution pending further facts.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case is an employment discrimination lawsuit in which plaintiff Marie R. Jackson alleged that defendant American Chemical Society violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII by rejecting her application for an administrative assistant position in favor of a non-minority candidate, along with a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court denied summary judgment on the Title VII claim after finding that Jackson had established a prima facie case and raised triable issues of fact on whether the employer's proffered reasons were pretextual, based on evidence of prior assurances of promotion and circumstantial indications of discrimination. The court granted summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, holding that it was subsumed by the Title VII allegations because the complained-of conduct and injury arose entirely from the asserted acts of discrimination. The ruling permits the discrimination claims to proceed while dismissing the tort count.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

The case involved an NLRB field examiner who sued the agency under the Privacy Act of 1974 after a supervisor retrieved data from the CHIPS case-tracking system about cases assigned to him and used it in a grievance arbitration over his promotion. Plaintiffs argued that CHIPS constituted a system of records subject to the Act's requirements, which the agency had not followed. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the CHIPS data—limited to case filing dates, closure dates, and similar procedural details—was not a 'record' under the statute because it did not contain personal information about the employee such as education, medical history, or performance evaluations. The court reasoned that information usable for evaluation only when combined with other data does not trigger Privacy Act protections, distinguishing it from cases involving actual personnel evaluations.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involves a trade association of tour guides challenging the National Park Service's enforcement of a regulation prohibiting the solicitation of business on national park grounds without a permit, after the guides had operated for years near the Ellipse without permits. The plaintiffs claimed violations of the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech, Fifth Amendment due process, equitable estoppel based on prior representations by the Park Service, and improper award of an exclusive contract to another company. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Applying the Central Hudson test for commercial speech regulations, the court found that the rule directly advanced substantial government interests in preserving park aesthetics, preventing harassment of visitors, and maintaining the non-commercial character of the parks, and was no more extensive than necessary. The court also rejected the due process, estoppel, and contract claims as unsupported by the facts or law.

free speechbusiness & regulatoryenvironmentfederal power

This case involves a nonresident alien challenging an IRS jeopardy assessment of over $72 million in taxes, interest, and penalties for the 1985-1987 tax years under 26 U.S.C. § 7429. The court first addressed venue, ruling it proper in the District of Columbia based on constitutional due process requirements and IRS policy guidelines directing such actions there. On the merits, the court determined the assessment was unreasonable because the IRS failed to show the plaintiff posed a risk of placing assets beyond reach, as evidenced by his past settlements with creditors, and noted plausible challenges to the underlying tax liability. Consequently, the court denied the government's motion to dismiss and ordered the abatement of the jeopardy assessment.

taxesprocedurefederal power

The case arose after Robert Bell was seriously injured in a car crash in Washington, D.C., when the stolen vehicle in which he was a passenger left the road and hit a tree; the car had been taken from a lot operated by Colonial Parking, where an attendant had left the keys in the ignition and delayed reporting the theft to police for about twelve hours. Bell and his mother sued Colonial for negligence in failing to secure the vehicle and promptly notify authorities. The court granted Colonial’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. It held that, under District of Columbia common law, a defendant owes no duty to protect against unforeseeable intervening criminal acts by third parties unless the risk is so foreseeable that a heightened showing establishes a duty to guard against it, which was not met on these facts.

torts & liabilitycriminal law

This case involves a taxpayer's challenge to an IRS jeopardy assessment of over $72 million in taxes, interest, and penalties for the 1985-1987 tax years under 26 U.S.C. § 6861. The plaintiff filed for expedited judicial review pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7429(b), seeking to determine the reasonableness and appropriateness of the assessment, and moved for discovery after receiving only limited information from the IRS. The court addressed the IRS's emergency motion for reconsideration of an order granting expedited discovery, ruling that limited discovery would be permitted because the IRS had not furnished adequate information in its required letter or subsequent documents, but that the prior order was overly broad given the summary nature of § 7429 proceedings. The decision relies on precedent holding that discovery is not barred if necessary for the taxpayer to participate meaningfully, while emphasizing the need for court control over its scope.

taxesprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Companies and Harold Honickman challenging the Federal Trade Commission's denial of Honickman's application to acquire assets from Seven-Up Brooklyn Bottling Company under a prior Consent Order. The plaintiffs argued that the denial was arbitrary and capricious, violated due process rights, and contravened antitrust laws. The court determined that the issues were primarily legal rather than factual and, after reviewing the administrative record, granted summary judgment to the FTC, upholding the denial of the acquisition application.

business & regulatory

This case involved a Miller Act claim by material supplier Marmet Corporation against prime contractor Becon Services Corporation and its surety for unpaid amounts on materials furnished for a federal construction project. Becon had issued joint checks to subcontractor Olympus Glass and Marmet matching Marmet’s invoices, but Marmet returned portions of the funds to Olympus pursuant to a retainage agreement between those two parties; Olympus later defaulted on repaying the retainage. The court granted summary judgment to Marmet, holding that the joint checks contained no express waiver of Miller Act rights, did not clearly designate full payment, and that the Act’s remedial purpose entitled Marmet to recover the retained sums from Becon, which was best positioned to protect itself or pursue Olympus.

business & regulatory

The case involves a white university administrator who sued the District of Columbia for racial discrimination after the University of the District of Columbia failed to grant him permanent status in his position and later demoted him in 1987. He brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Fifth and Thirteenth Amendments, and the D.C. Human Rights Act. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss in part, dismissing the DCHRA claim because it is unavailable to District government employees, the Fifth Amendment due process claim for lack of a protected property interest, and the Thirteenth Amendment claim. It denied dismissal of the § 1981 claim, finding that the plaintiff adequately pled a prima facie case of disparate treatment and that a continuing violation theory allowed incidents outside the three-year statute of limitations to be considered alongside the timely 1987 demotion. The ruling rested on application of pleading standards, statutes of limitations, and precedents regarding employment rights and race discrimination claims.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

In this case, Southland Corporation, the owner of the 7-Eleven franchise system, sued franchisees McClure and Edith Godette for breach of their 1985 Franchise Agreement, alleging fraud and embezzlement through underreporting of sales at their Washington, D.C. store, and sought a preliminary injunction for immediate possession of the premises along with other relief. The court denied Southland’s renewed motion for a preliminary injunction. It reasoned that the dispute involved claims falling squarely within the Franchise Agreement’s broad arbitration clause, which covers contract, tort, federal trademark, and state law issues and mandates binding arbitration under American Arbitration Association rules, except in limited circumstances not applicable here. The court further held that Southland could not selectively enforce portions of the agreement while avoiding its arbitration obligations and granted the Godettes’ request to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a commercial real estate developer, Franklin Asaph Ltd. Partnership, that had received construction loans from the National Bank of Washington and claimed the bank had agreed to an additional $650,000 loan increase before the bank was declared insolvent and placed into FDIC receivership in August 1990. The developer sued the FDIC for various forms of relief, including damages and specific performance, alleging the receiver was obligated to honor the loan increase. The court dismissed the entire complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), holding that the claims were barred by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), the related provision in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A), and the D’Oench, Duhme doctrine. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff’s allegations described only an unwritten and unexecuted agreement for additional financing, which failed to meet the statutory and common-law requirements for enforceability against the FDIC as receiver.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved a lawsuit under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) brought by the Foundation on Economic Trends against the Secretaries of Energy, Agriculture, and the Interior. The plaintiffs challenged dozens of federal agency programs and actions related to the greenhouse effect, seeking a declaration that the agencies had unlawfully failed to evaluate those actions' environmental impacts in required NEPA documentation. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to demonstrate a palpable and particularized injury traceable to the challenged actions or redressable by the relief sought. The court also denied the plaintiffs' motion to file a second amended complaint as futile in light of the standing ruling. Standing analysis under both constitutional requirements and the APA's zone-of-interests test formed the core of the decision.

environmentprocedurefederal power

In United States v. Crosby, defendant Ronald Bruce Crosby, charged as part of the R Street Organization narcotics conspiracy, moved to dismiss RICO substantive and conspiracy counts as well as related predicate acts on grounds that the RICO statute is unconstitutionally vague, the indictment failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity, the charges were insufficient, and certain acts violated double jeopardy due to prior plea agreements. The district court denied the motion to dismiss in full, holding that circuit precedent confirms RICO's constitutionality, the long-running narcotics conspiracy sufficiently alleged the required continuity and relationship for a pattern, the indictment tracked statutory language, and double jeopardy does not bar RICO prosecution based on prior predicate offenses. The court granted severance of Crosby's trial to permit his interlocutory appeal on the double jeopardy issue while denying a stay of proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a physician's lawsuit against a hospital concerning the termination of his medical staff membership and privileges, including civil rights and antitrust claims arising from a peer review process. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the district court addressed pending motions, including the plaintiff's request to unseal the judicial record. The court granted the motion to unseal the entire record, denied the defendants' motion for a stay of discovery and related sanctions request, and established a schedule for further proceedings on all claims. The core reasoning applied the Hubbard factors for public access to judicial records, finding that statutes protecting peer review materials do not bar disclosure of court records, that public interest in healthcare quality outweighed confidentiality concerns, and that no third-party patient interests were asserted to prevent unsealing.

civil rightshealthcareprocedure

In Kenney v. Roland Parson Contracting Corp., a bricklayer sued his former employer, a masonry subcontractor on Washington Metrorail projects, alleging that the firm violated ERISA fiduciary duties by failing to pay required Davis-Bacon Act fringe benefits either directly or through contributions to a pension plan, despite oral promises and distribution of a plan brochure; the plaintiff sought class certification, damages, and other relief after the Department of Labor had already investigated and begun recovering back wages. The court granted the motion to amend the complaint but denied class certification and summary judgment, then dismissed the entire action for failure to state a federal claim. It reasoned that no ERISA-covered plan existed because the defendants made no contributions to a trust or plan and assumed no written enforceable commitment, so oral representations alone could not create ERISA liability or a private right of action; remedies instead lay under the Davis-Bacon Act via the Department of Labor or in state court.

labor & employmentfederal power