Plaintiff Ricardo Cardenas, a Milwaukee police officer, sought a hardship waiver from the city's residency requirement under Milwaukee City Charter § 5-02 to live near his two deaf sons who board at the Wisconsin School for the Deaf outside city limits. The Fire and Police Commission denied the waiver after a June 2000 hearing, following prior court remands for further proceedings on Cardenas's state-law certiorari claim. The court reviewed the administrative record and found that the Commission had not adequately justified its denial, that Cardenas lacked an adequate legal remedy, and that the balance of hardships strongly favored granting the exception to permit him to reside with his sons. Accordingly, the court reversed and voided the July 6, 2000 decision, enjoined enforcement of the residency requirement against Cardenas, and ordered the defendants to grant the waiver within 30 days.
The case involved RE/MAX suing former franchisee Patricia Cook for continuing to use its trademarks and logos after terminating her franchise agreement, alleging a violation of the Lanham Act, while Cook counterclaimed that the termination breached the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law. The court granted RE/MAX's motion for summary judgment on both the main claim and the counterclaim. It found that RE/MAX had properly terminated the franchise by providing notice of default for Cook's failure to sign a valid renewal agreement and allowing more than sixty days to cure by executing either the 1999 or 2000 agreement. Because the termination was lawful, Cook's post-termination use of the marks constituted trademark infringement under federal law.
In this case, plaintiff Stanley Person sued attorney Jeffrey Schuster and his law firm under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) for sending a collection letter on behalf of a condominium association that sought an unspecified amount of attorney fees in addition to a stated balance of $987.71, without any prior court determination authorizing those fees. Person brought the action as a class action, alleging violations of FDCPA provisions requiring clear disclosure of the debt amount, prohibiting deceptive practices, and banning unfair or unconscionable collection methods. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the allegations were sufficient because a reasonable unsophisticated consumer could view the letter as indicating an indeterminate debt that the defendants had not shown they were entitled to collect at the time it was sent.
This case involves a claim by Elmer C. Meyers against his former employer, Lakeland Supply, Inc., alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) after his termination. Because the defendant failed to respond to the complaint, Meyers sought a default judgment and requested a jury trial to determine damages under the ADEA's provisions for jury trials on factual issues. The court denied the motion for a jury trial on damages, reasoning that the ADEA does not specifically grant a right to a jury in the context of default judgments, unlike certain other statutes, and that Seventh Circuit precedent does not provide such a right, with the plaintiff failing to show that a jury would be the best method for assessing damages. Instead, the court scheduled a hearing where it would determine the damages based on presented evidence.
This case arises from plaintiff John Murray's allegations of tortious conduct, including breach of contract, misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and breach of fiduciary duty, by The Loewen Group and related parties in connection with the 1995 sale and later attempted resale of Murray's Wisconsin funeral home businesses. The court addressed motions by The Chubb Corporation and Chubb Insurance Company of Canada to dismiss or for summary judgment on Murray's claims against them as insurers. The court granted Chubb Corporation summary judgment on the ground that it was not an insurer under the relevant policy. The court granted Chubb Insurance's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, applying an "insured v. insured" exclusion in the policy that barred coverage for claims brought by Murray in his capacity as a former officer or director of a Loewen subsidiary against Loewen.
In Castrejon v. Apfel, the plaintiff sought judicial review of the Social Security Administration's denial of her application for supplemental security income benefits, claiming disability from asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, vision problems, headaches, and Morton's neuroma. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation in full, reversing the Commissioner's decision and remanding the case for further administrative proceedings. The court agreed that the plaintiff's waiver of counsel at the hearing was defective, that the administrative law judge failed to sufficiently articulate reasons for her residual functional capacity findings and credibility assessments, and that the ALJ should have applied SSR 00-3p regarding the evaluation of obesity. The decision emphasized that these legal and procedural shortcomings in the administrative process required remand under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
