Walter Herbert Rice

The case is a bankruptcy appeal arising from an adversary proceeding in which Dayton Title Agency and National City Bank sought to recover over $4.8 million from White Family Companies and Nelson Wenrick, claiming the funds were fraudulent conveyances under Ohio’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and, for NCB, unjust enrichment. The transfers stemmed from short-term bridge loans made through DTA’s trust account to a real estate investor whose repayment checks were dishonored, followed by a large deposit that DTA and NCB alleged was fraudulent. The district court affirmed in part and reversed in part the bankruptcy court’s judgment, holding that certain defenses and evidentiary rulings were properly decided while rejecting others on the merits of the fraudulent-transfer and trust-account claims under state law. The core reasoning applied Ohio precedents on fraudulent transfers, the status of IOLTA/trust accounts, and procedural doctrines such as waiver and estoppel to determine whether the lenders could retain the repayments.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs Susan Clements-Jeffrey and Carlton Smith suing the City of Springfield, two police officers, Absolute Software, and its employee after a stolen school laptop equipped with tracking software led to the interception of the plaintiffs' explicit electronic communications, which were then shared with law enforcement. Plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Stored Communications Act, and state-law invasion of privacy. The court sustained the Springfield defendants' motion for partial summary judgment while overruling the Absolute defendants' motion for summary judgment, primarily on grounds that the police officers were entitled to qualified immunity and that Absolute's actions did not transform it into a state actor for purposes of the federal claims.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a fair housing organization suing an apartment management company, alleging that its Craigslist rental advertisements violated the federal Fair Housing Act and Ohio law by discouraging families with children and indicating a preference based on sex. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on liability. It held that none of the ads were facially discriminatory, as an ordinary reader would not interpret them as expressing an illegal preference or making statements that discourage protected classes when the advertisements are considered in their entirety rather than based solely on headlines or isolated phrases.

civil rightsprocedure

This case involves plaintiff Mandy Burghy, an accounting assistant at the Dayton Racquet Club, who was terminated after a credit check revealed adverse information that allegedly disqualified her from her position. Burghy sued her employer and its parent company under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) for failing to provide proper disclosures and notices before obtaining her credit report and taking adverse action, along with related state-law claims. The court sustained in part and overruled in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact on certain FCRA timing and notice requirements that precluded full dismissal while granting judgment on the conceded negligence claim and other non-viable counts. The core reasoning centered on statutory interpretations of FCRA provisions defining adverse actions, permissible purposes for reports, and the prerequisites for employer compliance, along with undisputed facts about the sequence of meetings and letters.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involves a former employee who sued his employer under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) for allegedly refusing to promote him, denying raises and bonuses, and terminating him due to his service in the Ohio National Guard and deployment to Iraq. The court addressed the defendant's motion for summary judgment by first outlining the procedural standards from cases like Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate genuine issues of material fact on essential elements of the claims. It then analyzed evidence including a vice president's statement that the plaintiff would have received the promotion but for his long deployment, distinguishing this from other precedents, while noting limited evidence on the raises, bonuses, and termination claims. The court ultimately sustained the motion in part and overruled it in part.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case concerns a patent infringement dispute between competitors in the metal beverage can industry, where plaintiffs Crown Packaging Technology, Inc. and Crown Cork & Seal, Inc. alleged that defendant Ball Metal Beverage Container Corp. infringed claim 14 of U.S. Patent No. 6,935,826 and claims 50, 52, and 61 of U.S. Patent No. 6,848,875, both relating to can end geometry and seaming methods that reduce metal usage. The defendant denied infringement and counterclaimed for declaratory judgments of non-infringement, invalidity, and unenforceability. On cross-motions for summary judgment regarding infringement and invalidity, the court sustained the defendant's motion in part and the plaintiffs' cross-motion in part, while overruling other portions as moot, and ultimately entered judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs. The core reasoning centered on findings that the asserted claims were anticipated by prior art, specifically Japanese patent application JP '323, and rendered obvious under standards from KSR International, with constructions of claim terms like 'first and second circumferentially extending walls' and 'annular reinforcing bead' leading to these conclusions.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case arose from Overlook Mutual Homes' no-pet rule and the Spencers' request for a waiver to keep their dog as a service animal for their daughter's anxiety and neurological conditions, after Overlook received noise complaints and the Spencers provided limited documentation from a psychologist. Overlook sued for declarations that it was entitled to the child's full medical records to assess disability status, that its record requests did not violate fair housing laws, and that the dog did not qualify as a reasonable accommodation. The Spencers counterclaimed alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act. The court overruled Overlook's motion for summary judgment, concluding that genuine issues of material fact remained concerning whether the Spencers had provided sufficient information, whether Overlook had engaged in the required interactive process, and whether the requested accommodation was necessary under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) and related regulations.

civil rightspropertyprocedure

This case is a putative class action securities fraud lawsuit against former Huffy Corporation executives, alleging violations of §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 based on statements about the company's due diligence and the financial impact of its acquisition of Gen-X, as well as Huffy's overall financial results and prospects during the class period from April 2002 to August 2004. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that it failed to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), Rule 12(b)(6), and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. The court sustained the motion in part and overruled it in part, holding that certain allegations of material misstatements and scienter were pleaded with sufficient particularity to survive dismissal while others were not.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved defendant Roger Dale Trent, who was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) for traveling in interstate commerce between November 2 and 25, 2007, and knowingly failing to register or update his registration as a sex offender as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Trent moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority in enacting both § 2250(a) and the underlying registration requirement in 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a), that SORNA did not apply because Ohio had not implemented it, that he lacked proper notice in violation of due process, and that Congress improperly delegated retroactivity decisions to the Attorney General. The court overruled the motion in full. It reasoned that the statute validly regulates the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce by conditioning criminal liability on interstate travel by a person required to register, that the registration duty applied regardless of state implementation, that the statute provided adequate notice, and that the Attorney General's guidelines were properly issued and applied retroactively.

criminal lawfederal power

The case involves a lawful resident alien whose citizenship application was approved in 2002 but reopened by the Citizenship and Immigration Services in 2005, with no decision or status update provided by the time the suit was filed in 2006. The plaintiff sought a court order compelling the District Director to rule on the application, asserting jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, federal question statute, Declaratory Judgment Act, and Administrative Procedure Act. The court determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) supplies the exclusive mechanism for district courts to address delays in citizenship decisions after the required examination period, and the plaintiff neither invoked nor amended to rely on that provision. Other asserted bases for jurisdiction were unavailable due to the comprehensive statutory scheme established by Congress. The court therefore dismissed the action without prejudice.

immigrationprocedure

This case involved a constitutional challenge by publishers, distributors, and retailers to Ohio Revised Code §§ 2907.01(E), 2907.31(D)(1), and 2907.31(D)(2), as amended, which regulate the dissemination of material harmful to juveniles, particularly through internet communications. Plaintiffs argued the provisions were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and violated the Commerce Clause. The court granted summary judgment in part to each side, permanently enjoining enforcement of § 2907.31(D)(1) as applied to the internet while upholding the other provisions against the constitutional claims. The core reasoning centered on the internet's technical inability to verify recipients' ages or locations, which rendered certain applications of the statute overly broad in restricting protected adult speech, while the definitional and other provisions were found not to violate constitutional standards on their face.

free speechcriminal law

The case involved a Freedom of Information Act request filed in 1995 by Dayton Newspapers Inc. and reporter Russell Carollo with the Department of Veterans Affairs seeking access to data fields in the VA's Tort Claims Information System. The court reconsidered its prior January 2003 opinion but declined to alter it, entering judgment in favor of the VA and against the plaintiffs. The core reasoning was that newly discovered evidence showing the Office of General Counsel's access to additional data fields occurred well after the temporal scope of the 1995 request and therefore did not require amending the earlier determination limiting disclosure to 33 fields maintained by the OGC.

federal powerproceduretorts & liability

The case involved plaintiffs who filed suit against National Alliance Insurance Company over an insurance claim for vehicle damage from an accident and then sought to recover the costs of effecting service after the defendant failed to respond to a request for waiver of service. The court sustained the plaintiffs' motion and ordered the defendant to pay $995.04 in costs and attorney fees. The core reasoning was that the plaintiffs had properly attempted to serve an authorized representative via waiver request under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d), the defendant did not comply or demonstrate good cause for its failure, and the rule requires imposing the resulting service costs on the non-compliant party.

procedure

The case was a class action by a South Carolina resident against National City Mortgage Co. alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act for mischaracterizing broker fees as prepaid finance charges, which understated the APR and amount financed on loans secured by South Carolina property. The defendant moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer venue from the Southern District of Ohio to the District of South Carolina. The court granted the motion, finding that the case could have been brought in South Carolina because the loans were negotiated there, all putative class members were South Carolina residents with property there, and transfer served the convenience of parties and witnesses while advancing the interest of justice.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This ERISA case involved plaintiff John Sweeney, trustee of Miami Valley Worldwide, Inc.'s profit-sharing plan, suing former employee and plan beneficiary Dan Allen to recover an alleged overpayment of $17,715.60 from a 2004 distribution made after Allen's termination. Allen filed a counterclaim seeking a set-off for taxes, penalties, and other losses allegedly caused by the distribution, which he claimed was demanded as part of settling a separate state-court lawsuit. The court sustained Allen's motion to amend the counterclaim, sustained in part and overruled in part the motion to dismiss the counterclaim (finding some claims preempted by ERISA but allowing others to proceed as amended under ERISA), overruled without prejudice the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and sustained the motion to stay summary judgment briefing. The core reasoning was that omitted counterclaims require court leave under Rule 13(f) rather than automatic amendment under Rule 15(a), ERISA preempts certain state-law claims but permits properly pleaded ERISA counterclaims, and summary judgment is premature before any discovery under Rule 56(f) when the non-movant files a supporting affidavit.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Stepp v. NCR Corp., a former employee sued his employer for age discrimination under federal and state law after his position was eliminated and he was terminated, alleging the actions stemmed from age-based animus. The employer moved to dismiss and compel arbitration, citing a 1996 mandatory arbitration policy (ACT) that it claimed the employee accepted by continuing employment. The court overruled the motion, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employee ever received notice of the arbitration offer and concluding that the agreement lacked mutuality of obligation and thus consideration. The decision applied standards from the Federal Arbitration Act while treating the motion like one for summary judgment.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Parsley v. Hamilton Beach/Proctor Silex, Inc., plaintiffs Gregory and Karen Parsley sued the manufacturer of a coffee maker after a fire damaged their property, claiming strict product liability, negligence, and breach of warranty based on an alleged defect in the appliance. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on those three counts, holding that the plaintiffs could not establish the existence of a defect or breach of duty even assuming the admissibility of their expert testimony, as the experts failed to opine on defective design or other required elements. The court dismissed the fourth count against unidentified defendants for lack of prosecution and denied the motions to exclude the experts as moot. Judgment was entered for the defendant.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case arose from an African-American employee's claims that her employer, Good Samaritan Hospital, reduced and capped her salary, altered her job duties as a dispatcher and Control Officer, and denied pay increases in 1999 while raising pay ranges for Security Officers, allegedly due to race. Plaintiff Doris Neely sued under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and related state laws for racial discrimination, harassment, retaliation, breach of contract, and public policy violations. The court had previously granted summary judgment on all but part of the federal discrimination claim concerning the pay cap and now overrules the defendant's motion to reconsider that partial denial. The core reasoning is that the plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons for the pay decisions lacked factual basis or were pretextual, permitting a jury to infer unlawful discrimination without additional direct evidence.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case is a products liability action in which plaintiffs Nancy and Dean Benton sued Ford Motor Company, alleging that a design defect in a 1998 Ford Explorer caused it to roll over on an interstate highway, resulting in serious injuries to Nancy Benton. The court addressed Ford's motion to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert witness, Andrew Lawyer, an electrical engineer who planned to opine on the vehicle's stability index, rollover propensity, and feasible safer designs. Applying the standards from Daubert and Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, the court overruled the motion, finding that Lawyer was qualified as an expert and that his methodology was reliable, with challenges to his conclusions and testing going to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Angela Spencer seeking $104,424.62 in benefits under a mortgage life insurance policy issued by Minnesota Life on her late husband James, who died in an automobile accident shortly after the policy's issuance. The insurer denied the claim, asserting that it was induced to issue the policy by Mr. Spencer's willful and fraudulent misrepresentations on the application, where he falsely answered "no" to whether he had consulted a physician in the past three years despite his ongoing treatment for bipolar disorder. Applying Ohio Revised Code § 3911.06, the court found that the false answer was material, that but for the answer the policy would not have been issued, and that the insurer lacked knowledge of the falsity; it further held that a presumption of willful falsity and fraudulent intent arose from the material falsehood, with no evidence presented of an honest mistake by the applicant. The court therefore entered judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.

business & regulatoryhealthcare