Charles Robert Richey

In this case, plaintiff JoAnn Carpenter sued her employer, the Federal National Mortgage Association, alleging sex discrimination under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act after a male colleague with the same title received additional supervisory responsibilities and influence during a reorganization of the General Counsel's office. The defendant moved to dismiss the discrimination claim, arguing that it amounted to a failure-to-promote claim that could not succeed because no promotion to a higher title occurred and that the Act does not cover allocation of responsibilities among employees of equal rank. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that the complaint adequately alleged disparate treatment in the terms and conditions of employment on the basis of sex, which is prohibited by the Act, and that such claims are not limited to formal promotions or changes in pay or title.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involves a plaintiff's motion to reconsider the court's grant of partial summary judgment to the defendant on her Title VII sexual harassment claim. The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff was improperly attempting to reargue previously decided facts and introduce a new legal theory not raised earlier, without any change in law or new evidence. The court reasoned that the alleged rape was not timely charged with the EEOC, the continuing violation doctrine did not apply due to lack of connection to timely incidents, and there was insufficient evidence of a hostile work environment or quid pro quo harassment based on sex within the limitations period.

civil rightslabor & employment

In this case, a former document preparation specialist sued his employer law firm alleging employment discrimination under Title VII along with claims for national origin discrimination and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant moved to dismiss the Title VII claims as time-barred by the 90-day statute of limitations after the right-to-sue letter and to dismiss the national origin and emotional distress claims for failure to state a claim. The court denied dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, ruling that the plaintiff's latest complaint would be treated as a timely amended complaint in the prior action to avoid penalizing clerical errors by counsel and the clerk. The court granted dismissal of the national origin discrimination and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a Dutch multiemployer pension fund for health care workers seeking a refund of approximately $8.5 million in U.S. income taxes withheld on dividends from U.S. investments for 1993, claiming exemption as a labor organization under I.R.C. § 501(c)(5). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted the government's, ruling that the Fund did not qualify for the tax exemption. The court reasoned that the statutory language and legislative history of § 501(c)(5) do not encompass pension funds like the plaintiff's, which is jointly controlled by employers and unions and primarily manages retirement benefits rather than engaging in traditional labor organization activities such as collective bargaining or representing employee interests in labor disputes.

taxeslabor & employment

In Harvey v. District of Columbia, an emergency medical technician sued the District of Columbia and its Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging sexual harassment based on incidents including a 1992 rape by a supervisor and various co-worker actions in 1994. The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims against the D.C. EMS as a separate entity and her claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, while granting the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the hostile work environment sexual harassment claim. The decision rested on the plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies by filing an EEOC charge within the required 300-day period for earlier incidents and the absence of employer liability for unreported co-worker harassment, as supervisors neither knew nor should have known of the conduct, precluding application of the continuing violations doctrine. Additionally, the court addressed discovery disputes by denying the exclusion of certain witness testimony but allowing the defendants to depose the plaintiff's expert witness before trial.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In Cones v. Shalala, a federal employee sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services under Title VII, alleging racial discrimination in multiple non-selections for promotions and other career opportunities between 1989 and 1993, as well as retaliation for filing an EEO complaint. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant. Claims based on events before December 15, 1992 were dismissed because the plaintiff failed to timely contact an EEO counselor as required by regulations. For the remaining claims, the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, could not show that the agency's legitimate reasons for its actions were pretextual, and could not demonstrate causation, including because the position at issue was filled by lateral transfer rather than merit promotion.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

In this case, forty-eight current and former employees filed a class action against Bell Atlantic Corporation (BAC) and several individual defendants, alleging race discrimination and retaliation in employment under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, along with a common-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the Title VII and emotional distress claims against the individual defendants with prejudice, dismissed the emotional distress claim against BAC with prejudice, and dismissed the § 1981 claims against the individuals and all personal jurisdiction challenges without prejudice. It denied without prejudice the motions to dismiss the Title VII and § 1981 claims against BAC. The core reasoning was that the plaintiffs failed to allege they were employed by BAC rather than its subsidiaries, the individual defendants could not be held personally liable under Title VII, the emotional distress claims were either subsumed by the statutory claims or insufficiently pled, and personal jurisdiction over the defendants was not established on the existing record. The court permitted sixty days of limited discovery on the issues of BAC's employer status, personal jurisdiction over BAC, and personal jurisdiction over the individuals, after which the plaintiffs must either dismiss or file an amended complaint.

civil rightslabor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

In Ridley v. District of Columbia, an African American correctional officer sued the District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII, claiming a hostile work environment from repeated use of a racial epithet by African American co-workers and retaliation for an EEOC complaint when his request for eight hours of leave was only partially pre-approved. The court denied the motion to dismiss as moot after the plaintiff amended the complaint to name the proper defendant but granted summary judgment to the District on all claims. It reasoned that the plaintiff failed to notify the employer of the alleged harassment so it could investigate or remedy it, that isolated uses of the epithet did not create a sufficiently severe or pervasive hostile environment under Title VII, that there was no evidence of a policy of deliberate indifference for the § 1983 claim, and that the partial leave approval did not constitute unlawful retaliation.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case concerns a dispute between the Burka family trust, which owns one lot, and defendants Aetna Life Insurance Company and American University over rights to two contiguous lots in Washington, D.C. The plaintiffs challenged the validity of a 1979 Declaration of Easement and Agreement that allocated gross floor area between the lots for zoning purposes and granted the owners of the adjacent lot non-exclusive parking easements for at least 236 vehicles on the Burkas' lot, along with related foreclosure proceedings after a default on financing for a building on the other lot. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint and granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, entering final judgment for the defendants and permanently enjoining the plaintiffs from interfering with the easement rights or enforcing contrary parking rules. The decision rested on the pleadings, the undisputed record, and applicable law, which upheld the Declaration and Deed of Trust as binding on the parties and their successors.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case was a class action and derivative suit brought by a limited partner in SCA Tax Exempt Fund Limited Partnership against the general partners, alleging breach of the partnership agreement and fiduciary duties arising from a 1995 bond refunding and financing transaction that raised additional proceeds without distributing them to BAC holders; an amended complaint added a federal securities claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 regarding misrepresentations in a consent solicitation. The parties reached a settlement that modified the terms of a related restructuring of the partnership into an LLC and provided for certain disclosures. The court approved the Second Amended Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise and Settlement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), after reviewing the agreement, pleadings, and record. It also awarded class and derivative counsel attorneys' fees of $132,631.25 and expense reimbursement of $38,780.17, to be paid by the partnership, and entered final judgment dismissing the action while retaining jurisdiction over settlement administration.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved two pro se plaintiffs who submitted Freedom of Information Act requests to the IRS seeking records from their Individual Master Files and related agency manuals. After partial responses, including some documents provided after delays and a demand for copying fees from one plaintiff, the plaintiffs sued for immediate access to all requested materials plus costs and attorneys' fees. The court granted the IRS's motion for summary judgment, holding that the agency had fulfilled its FOIA obligations by releasing responsive documents where they existed, correctly requiring advance payment for copies, and properly denying a fee waiver because the requests did not demonstrate a public interest, while also ruling that pro se litigants cannot recover attorneys' fees and in forma pauperis status bars recovery of costs.

proceduretaxes

The case involved the Cherokee Nation challenging the U.S. Department of the Interior's 1996 decision to recognize the Delaware Tribe of Indians as a separate tribal entity eligible for direct federal relations and funding, reversing a 1979 policy of dealing with the Delaware only through the Cherokee Nation. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case. It reasoned that the Delaware Tribe is a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) because the claims directly affect its interests, but it cannot be joined due to its sovereign immunity as a federally recognized Indian tribe. Furthermore, the Delaware Tribe is indispensable under Rule 19(b), as its absence would prejudice it and there are no adequate alternatives, requiring dismissal of the action.

federal powerprocedure

This case involved the Animal Legal Defense Fund and individual plaintiffs challenging U.S. Department of Agriculture regulations and actions under the Animal Welfare Act concerning standards for the psychological well-being and social grouping of nonhuman primates exhibited by regulated entities, as well as the agency's failure to enforce the statute. The court first determined that the plaintiffs had constitutional and statutory standing to bring their claims. It then granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on four counts, holding that the agency's primate enrichment regulation violated the APA by failing to include required minimum standards, that the failure to issue standards for psychological well-being and social grouping was arbitrary, capricious, or unlawfully withheld, and that an on-site plan regulation improperly bypassed notice-and-comment procedures. The court dismissed the fifth count alleging wholesale non-enforcement as a non-justiciable claim committed to agency discretion and struck the plaintiffs' extra-record exhibits.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a Title VII sex discrimination claim brought by a female former Director of University Libraries at Howard University against the university after her employment contract was not renewed in 1995. The plaintiff alleged that she was terminated and replaced by a male subordinate due to gender bias, pointing to complaints about her management style, a restructuring plan, and an alleged sports analogy by her supervisor. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact because the university articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the decision—primarily severe workplace disruption caused by the plaintiff's exclusion of supervisors from decision-making and unauthorized revisions to forms—and the plaintiff failed to show these reasons were pretextual under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. The court found the evidence of discord with subordinates sufficient to support the employment action without evidence of sex discrimination.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved a student suing Strayer College and its employees, alleging they obstructed his efforts to form a student government by blocking advertisements and notices and misdirecting students, and later adding claims that the defendants conspired to interfere with his receipt of financial aid. The court allowed the plaintiff's amendment to the complaint but granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the entire action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and declared other motions moot. It reasoned that diversity jurisdiction was absent because the plaintiff and all defendants resided in the District of Columbia, and federal question jurisdiction was lacking because the allegations did not present a substantial claim under federal law such as the First Amendment.

procedurefree speechcivil rights

This case involved a pro se plaintiff's FOIA request to the FBI seeking records on alleged wiretaps and surveillance involving the U.S. Supreme Court, conversations of Justices, J. Edgar Hoover's files, and related matters, some of which had been referenced in a book. The FBI released many pages but withheld or redacted others under multiple FOIA exemptions including (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(D), and (b)(7)(E). After the plaintiff narrowed his claims and the FBI submitted Vaughn indices and supporting declarations detailing the bases for nondisclosure, the court granted the FBI's motion for summary judgment. It held that the agency had carried its burden to show the exemptions were properly applied, that there were no genuine issues of material fact, and that the plaintiff had not contested certain withholdings. The case was dismissed.

procedurefederal power

This case arose from a 1993 boating accident in Abu Dhabi in which plaintiff Tara Jungquist, then a teenager, suffered permanent brain injuries allegedly caused by reckless operation of motorboats by Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan after drinking; the plaintiffs claimed that Sheikh Sultan and his agents later entered into an oral contract to pay all medical expenses in exchange for the family's silence and non-involvement of the U.S. Embassy, but stopped payments once the extent of the injuries became clear. The defendants moved to dismiss on grounds of foreign sovereign immunity, lack of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens. The court granted the motion in part, dismissing all claims against the United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi, the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince’s Court, and Sheikh Khalifa (sued only in his official capacity) on the basis of immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. It denied the motion as to the claims against Sheikh Sultan, Al-Malki, Albaba, and Samea in their individual capacities, holding that the FSIA does not shield those defendants from suit in their personal capacities and that the complaint adequately alleged contacts with the District of Columbia sufficient for jurisdiction.

proceduretorts & liabilityfederal power

In this case, a prisoner serving a long sentence at a D.C. facility sued prison officials and a private nonprofit inmate program under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that officials retaliated against him for filing a prior lawsuit by denying his application to join the "Take It From Me, Inc." program, which involves inmates counseling youth about crime. The court characterized the claim as a First Amendment retaliation action but dismissed the case against the private program because it was not acting under color of state law. The court granted summary judgment to the individual defendants, finding that the program's active inmate members—not the warden—made the selection decision and that the plaintiff had no constitutional right to participate in such a program. The court also denied the plaintiff's motions regarding defense counsel representation and discovery. The ruling rested on the absence of evidence linking the denial to retaliation and established precedents that inmates lack protected interests in educational or vocational prison programs.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The plaintiff, a federal prisoner, sued the Bureau of Prisons and one of its employees alleging errors in his custody classification records that affected his sentence reduction eligibility, and seeking amendments under the Privacy Act, production of specific documents under FOIA, and relief for alleged constitutional violations involving access to courts, mail, and counsel. The court dismissed the claims against the employee in his individual capacity for lack of personal jurisdiction under the D.C. long-arm statute, as no conduct or injury was alleged in the District of Columbia. It dismissed the constitutional claims and granted summary judgment to the defendants on the Privacy Act claims based on the record showing corrections to the files. The court denied summary judgment on the FOIA claim due to an inconsistency in the record regarding the existence of three requested pages and ordered further briefing on that narrow issue.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case concerns a 1992 FOIA request by Nation Magazine to the U.S. Customs Service seeking records about offers from presidential candidate H. Ross Perot to assist in drug interdiction efforts, including in headquarters and field offices. On remand from the D.C. Circuit, the district court denied in part Customs' renewed motion for summary judgment, ruling that the agency's search of non-investigatory files was inadequate and directing an additional search with more detailed justification. The court granted in part the motion regarding Customs' Glomar response, allowing the agency neither to confirm nor deny the existence of certain investigatory files that would indicate whether Perot or his associates were subjects, witnesses, or informants, after balancing privacy interests under FOIA Exemption 7(C) against public interests in disclosure.

federal powerprocedurecriminal law