This case involved non-competent Pottawatomie Indian heirs seeking a refund of federal estate taxes paid on the estate of Grace Riordan, which consisted of inherited allotted lands and related trust funds held in trust by the United States under the General Allotment Act of 1887. The court held that the inherited restricted property was exempt from federal estate tax, just as original allotments would be, and that the refund claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. The core reasoning was that the ongoing trust status and federal guardianship over non-competent Indians prevented taxation of the transfer at death, distinguishing the case from precedents involving unrestricted or competent Indians and rejecting arguments that only the original allottee's property qualified for exemption. The court further noted that the excise nature of the estate tax did not override the statutory protections for restricted Indian lands.
The case involved a plaintiff suing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for damages based on alleged slanderous statements made by its General Counsel during prior court proceedings, with jurisdiction asserted under the FDIC's statutory 'sue and be sued' authority in 12 U.S.C. § 1819. The FDIC moved to dismiss, arguing that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) made it a federal agency and the exclusive vehicle for such tort claims against the United States, precluding direct suits against the corporation even for claims excluded by FTCA exceptions like 28 U.S.C. § 2680. The court first determined that the FDIC qualifies as a federal agency under the FTCA due to presidential and congressional oversight and its governmental purpose in banking stability. It then held that the FTCA withdrew authority to sue federal agencies directly in tort, channeling all such claims against the United States instead, so the 'sue and be sued' clause could not support jurisdiction or recovery. The motion to dismiss was therefore granted.
This case involved landowners near Altus Air Force Base who sued the United States under the Fifth Amendment and the Tucker Act, seeking compensation for the alleged taking of two easements: an aviation easement from overflights and a flowage easement from altered surface drainage. The court entered judgment for the defendant. It found that aircraft followed established patterns that did not cross the property except for rare, non-recurring deviations that did not amount to a taking, and that any flooding resulted from unprecedented rainfall rather than intentional government action; in fact, base construction had reduced the drainage area flowing onto the land and included diversion measures that lessened potential flooding.
In Barry v. United States, taxpayers who owned a farm in Colorado sued for a refund after the IRS disallowed their deduction of a casualty loss on their 1954 income tax return for topsoil blown away by a windstorm. The court determined that the storm was sudden, unexpected, and unusual, making the loss deductible under Section 165 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, and classified the farm as property used in a trade or business under Section 1231 for purposes of treating the loss as ordinary. The court calculated the allowable deduction by multiplying the adjusted cost basis by the percentage decline in fair market value before and after the storm, awarding the plaintiffs a refund of $1,205.08 plus interest.
In Berry v. Wiseman, the plaintiffs sought to deduct the cost of installing an elevator in their home as a medical expense on their 1954 federal income tax return after a doctor recommended it to treat Edwina Berry's coronary condition. The IRS denied the deduction, leading the plaintiffs to sue for a refund. The court found that the installation was advised by a physician, improved the patient's health, was the most practical option, and did not increase the home's value. It ruled that the expense qualified as a deductible medical expense under Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, entitling the plaintiffs to a refund with interest.
The case involved a Michigan plaintiff who purchased a used oil-well drilling rig from Oklahoma defendants, including the seller Star Drilling Company and brokers Chapman and Harman, and sought rescission of the contract, return of payments, cancellation of promissory notes, and damages based on allegations of fraud, false representations, breach of warranty, and breach of fiduciary duty. The defendants counterclaimed for payment on the notes and other expenses. The court found that the plaintiff's broker Chapman and the seller's broker Harman had secretly colluded to divide commissions and profits without the principals' knowledge, which violated public policy and the brokers' duties, entitling the plaintiff to recover the secret profit of $5,000 minus offsets for repairs. Accordingly, the court canceled the $2,000 note held by Chapman and Harman, entered a $2,100 money judgment against Chapman, and awarded Star Drilling Company judgment on its separate $8,000 note plus interest and fees.
