District Court, W.D. Texas — appointed by Lyndon B. Johnson
Interfirst Bank Abilene v. Federal Deposit Insurance
District Court, W.D. Texas · 1984-08-24 · cited 5×
This case involves a dispute between InterFirst Bank Abilene and the FDIC, as receiver for the insolvent Ranchlander National Bank, over InterFirst's setoff of Ranchlander's correspondent account against four loan participations it had purchased from Ranchlander. The participations involved loans tainted by fraud and gross negligence by Ranchlander's officers. The court denied the FDIC's motion for partial summary judgment and entered judgment for InterFirst, declaring the setoff valid, finding no liability to the FDIC, and ordering the FDIC to pay InterFirst its shares of proceeds collected on two of the loans. The reasoning was that the fraud made InterFirst's claims provable in the receivership, allowing the setoff; the FDIC held the collected proceeds as agent rather than as receivership assets; and federal law on ratable distribution among creditors barred recovery of interest or attorney's fees.
business & regulatoryfederal power
Country Junction, Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co. (In Re Country Junction, Inc.)
District Court, W.D. Texas · 1984-06-25 · cited 22×
This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court order in a Chapter 11 proceeding where Country Junction, Inc. and Country Legend, Inc. sought to recover $415,291 in preferential payments made to Levi Strauss & Co. under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code shortly before their December 1981 filings. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment after reviewing Levi's challenges to jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1471, the striking of its jury demand, the use of consolidated financial data without substantive consolidation, and multiple factual findings on issues such as insolvency, alter ego status, creditor claims, and the validity of notes and guaranties. Applying the clearly erroneous standard to factual determinations and plenary review to legal conclusions, the court found sufficient evidence supporting the bankruptcy court's decision and concluded that certain arguments were moot, resulting in affirmance of the preference recovery award.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Austin Elcon Corp. v. Avco Corp.
District Court, W.D. Texas · 1984-05-29 · cited 6×
This Miller Act case involved a subcontractor's suit against a prime contractor and its sureties for allegedly unpaid costs related to extra work and delays on a federal construction project at Air Force bases, along with the prime contractor's counterclaim for expenses to complete and correct the subcontractor's deficient work. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for the defendant prime contractor, awarding it a net recovery of $109,106 after offsetting amounts owed. The core reasoning was that the subcontract's purchase orders expressly required written change orders and claims for price adjustments within 20 days, incorporated the prime contract specifications, and barred recovery for oral understandings or late-noticed changes; the subcontractor failed to follow these procedures, while the prime contractor proved its counterclaim for correction costs under federal law.
business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure
Wilkenfield v. Powell
District Court, W.D. Texas · 1983-12-19 · cited 3×
Plaintiff Jayson Wilkenfield, a former doctoral student in clinical psychology at the University of Texas at Austin, sued the university's Board of Regents and a faculty member under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his removal from the program violated his constitutional right to due process. The court found that the psychology department's area committee had authority under university regulations to impose and enforce academic requirements, that Wilkenfield received advance notice of deficiencies and multiple opportunities to remediate them, and that the decision underwent several layers of internal review including by an executive committee, an independent faculty panel, the graduate dean, and the university president. The court concluded that these procedures far exceeded the minimal protections required by the Fourteenth Amendment, that no evidence supported claims of bad faith or arbitrariness, and that the university acted within its delegated authority. Judgment was entered for the defendants.
civil rightsprocedure
Thomas v. Schweiker
District Court, W.D. Texas · 1983-10-04 · cited 2×
Thomas v. Schweiker involved a challenge to the denial of disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, where claimant Norvella Thomas argued that inadequate notice of her right to representation and an unfair administrative hearing prejudiced her case. The court denied the Secretary's motion for summary judgment and granted Thomas's motion for remand, finding that the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge failed to meet the standards of a full and fair hearing. The core reasoning centered on deficient notice that omitted information about free legal services, equivocal statements from Thomas that did not constitute a valid waiver of counsel, the ALJ's failure to allow rebuttal of key medical evidence or develop the record regarding hospital records and supporting physician opinions, and the resulting prejudice from lack of representation. The decision emphasized the claimant's right to be informed of free counsel options and the ALJ's duty to probe for relevant information in an unrepresented claimant's proceeding.
procedurefederal powerhealthcare
Brown v. United Transportation Union
District Court, W.D. Texas · 1983-09-12 · cited 1×
Eleanor Van Cleave Brown, a former employee of the Texas Legislative Board (a subsidiary of the United Transportation Union), sued the Board and UTU alleging violations of the Landrum-Griffin Act after being fired in retaliation for reporting her supervisor's suspected misappropriation of funds; she also asserted state claims for breach of contract and fraud. The court held there was no diversity jurisdiction because Brown, the Board, and the UTU were all Texas citizens. Although federal question jurisdiction existed, Brown did not qualify as a union "member" under the Act, as she had never applied for membership, paid dues, or satisfied the union's constitutional requirements such as signing an oath, so her federal claim failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the remaining state claims and granted the motion to dismiss.
labor & employment