This case involved debtors who sought to set aside a foreclosure sale of their residence under 11 U.S.C. § 548, alleging it was a fraudulent transfer because they received less than reasonably equivalent value and were insolvent at the time. The bankruptcy court found the sale price inadequate but denied relief due to lack of evidence on insolvency and instead ordered the bank to return its excess proceeds from the sale. On appeal, the district court reversed that judgment, holding that the bankruptcy court had erred by rendering a decision without an adequate evidentiary basis on the insolvency and equivalent-value issues and by failing to conduct the hearing contemplated in a prior order. The court remanded the matter for a new hearing allowing the parties to present evidence, including on the contents of the Chapter 13 schedules.
The case involved claims by White Industries and Carthage Airways, on behalf of themselves and a class of Cessna zone dealers, seeking treble damages from Cessna Aircraft Co. and Cessna Finance Corp. for alleged violations of the Robinson-Patman Act's prohibition on price discrimination and Section 1 of the Sherman Act during the distribution of general aviation aircraft between 1968 and 1974. After a bench trial on the liability phase of the individual claims, the court addressed the defendants' motions for involuntary dismissal of those claims and for decertification of the class. The opinion first defined key terms in the aircraft distribution chain, including fixed base operators, contracted dealers, zone dealers, and end consumers, then examined evidence regarding resale prices, sales territories, diverted sales, and competitive impacts. The court concluded that plaintiffs had not sufficiently proven the elements of their claims, including injury from discriminatory practices or diverted sales to end users, leading to rulings on the pending motions.
This case arose after the failure of Penn Square Bank, when six Missouri credit unions that had deposited over $100,000 each sought FDIC insurance coverage up to $100,000 per individual member rather than a single $100,000 limit per credit union. The FDIC determined that the credit unions qualified only for the corporate limit under its regulations and paid accordingly, prompting the credit unions to sue. On the FDIC's motion for summary judgment, the court held that Missouri-chartered credit unions are corporations subject to 12 C.F.R. § 330.5, which caps coverage at $100,000 per corporation, and that their relationship with members did not qualify for multiple coverage under any other regulatory provision. The court further found that the mere notation of "credit union" on the bank's records did not provide the required notification of a fiduciary or agency relationship entitling the plaintiffs to broader coverage. Because the material facts were undisputed and the issues presented questions of regulatory interpretation and law, summary judgment was granted to the defendant.
This case involved an appeal from a bankruptcy court's determination that certain post-divorce obligations were nondischargeable support payments. The debtor was required by the divorce decree to pay for his children's dental and orthodontic care and to share proceeds from a promissory note with his former spouse. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling that these amounts totaling $3,650 constituted nondischargeable support under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), rather than a dischargeable property settlement. The court reasoned that the intent behind the obligations at the time of the decree was to provide for the children's needs, evidenced by the low child support awards and the context within the decree.
This case concerned entitlement to a $4,442.50 surplus remaining after a trustee's sale under a first deed of trust on real property, where the first lienholder was paid in full and junior lienholders and the mortgagors both claimed the remainder. The court entered judgment for the Farmers Home Administration, holder of the second deed of trust, directing payment of the surplus to it (after costs) to the extent of its unpaid debt, with any excess to the Wishons. The decision rested on Missouri precedent holding that a junior encumbrance assigns the mortgagor's equity of redemption, giving junior lienholders priority over the mortgagor for surplus proceeds following foreclosure of a senior lien. The court distinguished contrary lines of authority as inapplicable to disputes between mortgagors and junior creditors.
The case centers on challenges by JBK, Inc. and related plaintiffs to a 1977 Kansas City ordinance regulating massage parlors and masseuses, asserting facial and as-applied violations of federal and state due process, equal protection, privacy rights, and unlawful delegation of power, along with Missouri antitrust claims. A prior state court action involving substantially the same parties and issues ended in a 1980 judgment declaring the ordinance constitutional and valid, with no appeal taken. On defendants' motion for summary judgment in this later federal case, the court addressed whether claim and issue preclusion from the state judgment barred relitigation. The court determined that the prior final judgment on the merits resolved the constitutional validity of the ordinance provisions at issue, precluding further federal adjudication of those claims.