This case involved a Delaware dentist and member of the U.S. Army Standby Reserve who was erroneously ordered to active duty in 1961 under a joint resolution that authorized calls only for the Ready Reserve. The plaintiff sublet his dental practice and reported for duty before being released in 1962, then sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging negligence by the government in issuing the order. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, holding that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not waive sovereign immunity for injuries to servicemen arising out of or in the course of activity incident to military service, as established in Feres v. United States. The decision rested on the conclusion that the erroneous activation and resulting damages were directly tied to the plaintiff's military status and service obligations, distinguishing it from cases involving off-duty or unrelated negligence.
This case involved a declaratory judgment action by the ancillary administrator of an injured party's estate against an insurer to determine coverage under an automobile liability policy issued for a 1955 Chevrolet truck. The insured had converted the truck into a tractor and attached an uninsured trailer, which was involved in an accident injuring William C. Bunting; the insurer denied coverage and refused to defend a subsequent damages suit that resulted in an $18,000 judgment. The court held that the policy provided no coverage for the accident. It reasoned that even assuming the converted truck qualified as a newly acquired replacement vehicle, the standard trailer exclusion clause and related policy definitions unambiguously excluded coverage when the insured vehicle towed an uninsured trailer, as confirmed by precedent interpreting similar provisions under Virginia law.
The case originated as a Miller Act claim by a material supplier against a federal contractor and its surety for unpaid rental and repair costs on a leased crane. After discovery, the defendant moved to amend its answer to add a counterclaim alleging fraud in connection with the crane, more than three years after the complaint was filed. The court granted the motion to amend but limited the counterclaim to the nature of recoupment, holding that a compulsory counterclaim arising from the same transaction is not barred by the statute of limitations when the main action remains timely.
In Perkins v. Rich, a pro se plaintiff sued a police inspector and a municipal court judge for $50,000 each under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983) and state law after the inspector reported an alleged obscene late-night phone call, leading to the plaintiff's arrest, mental examination, and temporary commitment to a state hospital; the case against the inspector was later marked "retired." The court treated the defendants' motions to dismiss as summary judgment motions and addressed the claims separately. It held that the action against the deceased inspector abated because any malicious prosecution claim was excluded from Delaware's survival statute and no federal civil rights claim existed since the inspector acted as a private citizen rather than under color of law. The claim against the judge was dismissed on grounds of judicial immunity, which the court found applies equally to civil rights actions when the judge acted within his jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.
This case under the Federal Tort Claims Act involved plaintiffs seeking damages for the wrongful death of their decedent and the loss of an airplane in a 1958 crash in Delaware. The court addressed the defendant's objections to several of the plaintiffs' interrogatories, first holding that the defendant's failure to strictly follow Rule 33 by noticing a hearing did not waive those objections. On the merits, the court overruled objections to interrogatories seeking details on the defendant's contentions regarding contributory negligence and other defenses, finding that the questions properly targeted the factual basis for those defenses rather than improper legal conclusions. The court also required disclosure of the names of expert witnesses the defendant intended to call, distinguishing them from ordinary fact witnesses whose identities might not need to be revealed at that stage.
This case concerns a Miller Act claim by a construction project superintendent seeking unpaid weekly salary plus a $15,000 bonus from the surety on a federal building contract. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, but the surety's answer denied the claim and asserted an affirmative defense that any bonus agreement had been rescinded by mutual agreement. The court denied the motion, holding that the pleadings created a genuine issue of material fact that could not be resolved by affidavits on summary judgment.