Jane Richards Roth

This case involved Playboy Entertainment Group challenging the constitutionality of Section 505 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which required cable operators to fully scramble or limit to safe-harbor hours (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.) any channels primarily dedicated to sexually explicit adult programming in order to prevent signal bleed into non-subscribers' homes. Playboy sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the provision violated the First Amendment by restricting protected speech. After a trial, the three-judge district court held that Section 505 was unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it was not the least restrictive means of achieving the government's interest in shielding children from indecent material, as a less burdensome alternative existed in Section 504's requirement that operators provide blocking devices upon request. The court did not reach Playboy's additional claims that the provision was unconstitutionally vague or violated equal protection. The decision focused on findings that the scrambling mandate imposed significant burdens on adult channels and that voluntary lockbox distribution under Section 504 had proven inadequate in practice.

free speechbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a constitutional challenge by adult cable programming providers to section 505 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which mandated that cable operators fully scramble or block channels primarily dedicated to sexually explicit content to prevent signal bleed into non-subscribers' homes, or else limit such programming to late-night hours between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. The three-judge district court considered claims that the provision violated the First Amendment as a content-based speech restriction and the Equal Protection Clause by targeting only exclusively adult networks. The court upheld the law's constitutionality, finding that it served a compelling government interest in shielding children from unintended exposure to sexually oriented material. It further reasoned that the measure was narrowly tailored through its focus on dedicated channels and alternative compliance options, was not unconstitutionally vague, and did not discriminate in a manner requiring heightened equal protection scrutiny beyond the First Amendment analysis.

free speech

The case involved a citizen suit by environmental groups against Texaco for alleged violations of its Clean Water Act permit regulating discharges from an oil refinery in Delaware. The court determined that the plaintiffs had standing and that it had jurisdiction over most but not all of the claimed violations. Based on evidence from the trial, including discharge monitoring reports, the court imposed a penalty of $1,680,000 on Texaco and issued a permanent injunction requiring compliance with the permit's terms.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

Courtland C. Pitts filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging his 1983 Delaware state court convictions on ten counts of felony theft and five counts of misdemeanor theft, for which he received a 25-year sentence. He raised thirteen claims, including denial of his right to self-representation, improper joinder of charges, ineffective assistance of counsel, and various trial errors such as shackling and publicity. The court adopted the magistrate's recommendation to dismiss the petition, finding that most claims lacked merit or were procedurally barred, and specifically concluding that Pitts' request to proceed pro se was untimely and not clearly asserted, thus not violating his constitutional rights.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, an inmate at Delaware Correctional Center's Maximum Security Unit brought a Section 1983 action against prison officials, claiming that the legal resources and assistance available to MSU inmates failed to meet constitutional requirements under Bounds v. Smith for adequate law libraries or help from legally trained persons. The district court conducted a three-day bench trial, heard testimony from the plaintiff, other inmates, library staff, and corrections officials, and reviewed documentary evidence on the prison's facilities and materials. The court made detailed findings of fact about the MSU population, the books and forms provided in the library, access procedures, and the role of the Inmate Legal Services Administrator. These findings addressed whether the defendants had satisfied their obligations during the period of the plaintiff's confinement in MSU from 1987 to 1991.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

In this patent infringement case, Applied Biosystems, Inc. sued two Scottish corporations, Cruachem Ltd. and Cruachem Holdings Ltd., alleging that their DNA synthesis products infringed two U.S. patents; the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court granted the motion after discovery, holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendants under both the Delaware long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. The companies had almost no direct contacts with Delaware, and their corporate relationships with a related U.S. subsidiary—including shared officers, intercompany sales, and resource sharing—did not establish an agency sufficient to attribute the subsidiary's contacts or satisfy minimum contacts requirements. The court noted that the forum state's interest was minimal given the plaintiff's non-resident status and that jurisdiction might exist in other states but not Delaware.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved Bush Industries suing O'Sullivan Industries for infringing several design patents on ready-to-assemble furniture pieces in traditional styles, including entertainment centers, TV carts, desks, hutches, and printer stands. O'Sullivan counterclaimed for declaratory judgments of non-infringement and invalidity for obviousness. The court granted O'Sullivan's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the accused products did not infringe because of multiple distinguishing design features and that the patents were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because the combinations of known traditional styling elements on RTA furniture were obvious in light of prior art setup furniture designs, with secondary considerations like commercial success and copying insufficient to show non-obviousness.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In this patent infringement case, Rohm and Haas sued Brotech for willfully infringing four patents related to ion exchange resins. After Brotech and its affiliate Purolite filed a separate action in Pennsylvania alleging antitrust, RICO, and fraud claims based on alleged misconduct in obtaining the patents, Rohm and Haas moved for an injunction requiring those claims to be brought as counterclaims in the Delaware action instead. The court granted a permanent injunction, ordering Brotech to dismiss the Pennsylvania claims and barring further participation except as a witness, on the ground that the claims arose from the same transaction or occurrence as the infringement suit and therefore constituted compulsory counterclaims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a). The court declined to extend the injunction to Purolite because it was not a party to the present action.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case arose after a 1989 flood led the Town of Elsmere to condemn basement apartments in Elsmere Park's complex and later enact Ordinance No. 247, which barred their residential use by amending zoning rules on nonconforming uses in floodplains. Elsmere Park sued, claiming a regulatory taking without compensation and a violation of substantive due process from the town's delay in processing its repair permit. The court held that the town's arbitrary delay in acting on the permit application violated substantive due process rights under clearly established law, but the ordinance itself did not effect a taking because it advanced public health and safety without denying all economically viable use of the property. Genuine issues of fact remained on damages from the delay period, while officials were denied qualified immunity.

propertycivil rightsbusiness & regulatory

Shell Oil Company sued the Internal Revenue Service and Department of the Treasury under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain documents containing the agency's definition of 'tar sands' used in connection with the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 and related tax regulations. The government withheld the documents under the deliberative process privilege, but Shell moved for partial summary judgment after an IRS official read a draft definition aloud at a public meeting attended by government and industry representatives. The court granted the motion, holding that the government waived the privilege with respect to the definition that was read. The core reasoning was that an authorized, voluntary disclosure of the information to non-federal third parties at the meeting eliminated the government's ability to claim the exemption under FOIA.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case is a declaratory judgment action by United Sweetener and Holland Sweetener against Nutrasweet seeking to invalidate two patents on sweetening compositions, including claims that the '189 patent was obtained through inequitable conduct such as misrepresentations about prior art and test results. After previously addressing jurisdiction and other counts, the court considered Nutrasweet's motion to stay proceedings on Counts I and II pending completion of PTO reexamination of the '189 patent and any appeals. The court granted a stay of all proceedings, including discovery, limited to the period until the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ruled on the pending appeal from the reexamination. The reasoning centered on the potential for the reexamination to resolve or narrow the patentability issues, thereby avoiding unnecessary litigation and conserving judicial resources while the PTO process, required to proceed with special dispatch, ran its course.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case arose from an employment dispute in which three permanent part-time police officers in Fenwick Island, Delaware, alleged that town officials terminated their employment by declaring their absences a 'voluntary quit' without providing notice or a hearing, in violation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with related state tort claims. The plaintiffs had missed scheduled shifts due to illness or approved leave but were not contacted beforehand, and they requested but did not receive hearings before the town council. The court granted summary judgment to the Town of Fenwick Island on the federal claims but denied it as to the individual defendants Negley and Clower, finding potential liability for those officials, and granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to add a retaliation claim.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case concerned whether the United States Postal Service had statutory authority under 39 U.S.C. § 407(a) to set and change rates for On-Demand Express Mail International Service without submitting them for review by the Postal Rate Commission under §§ 3621 and 3622. The court granted the Postal Service's motion to dismiss Count 1 and denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, holding that the Postal Service could establish international mail rates independently. The core reasoning was that deference is owed to the consistent interpretations of the Postal Service and the Commission that the Commission lacks jurisdiction over international rates, since this reading is not contradicted by clear legislative intent in the Postal Reorganization Act and reflects the Act's distinction between domestic and international mail services handled through international agreements.

federal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a declaratory judgment action by United Sweetener and Holland Sweetener against Nutrasweet regarding two patents on aspartame (the '131 and '189 patents), in which the plaintiffs sought declarations of invalidity, unenforceability due to inequitable conduct, and non-infringement after importing and preparing to sell aspartame-based products in the U.S. Nutrasweet moved to dismiss several counts, while both parties cross-moved for summary judgment on the infringement claims. The court denied the motion to dismiss Counts I and II concerning the '189 patent, finding an actual controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act despite Nutrasweet's promise not to sue until after reexamination. On Count III, the court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on claim 2 of the '131 patent due to non-infringement but denied it on claim 8 due to disputed facts; it also granted dismissal of Count IV regarding patent term extensions.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission seeking to enforce a subpoena against American Express Centurion Bank for information related to an age discrimination charge filed by a former employee under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The bank refused to comply, arguing that the employee had signed a release waiving all claims, including those under the ADEA, which invalidated the charge and deprived the EEOC of jurisdiction to investigate. The court held that the employer may not refuse to respond to the subpoena on this basis, as the validity of the waiver is a defense that can be raised in a later adversarial proceeding but does not prevent the EEOC from conducting its initial investigation. The reasoning emphasized the EEOC's broad investigatory powers under the ADEA to determine whether reasonable cause exists before pursuing further action.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved shareholders of Kinder-Care, Inc. (later renamed The Enstar Group, Inc.) who sued the company, its executives, and affiliated entities over statements announcing a corporate reorganization plan in May and June 1989, followed by an abandonment of that plan in September 1989. The complaint asserted federal claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for securities fraud, including conspiracy and aiding and abetting, plus Delaware state claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6), finding that the plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with particularity, did not allege facts showing scienter or justifiable reliance, and did not state a viable claim for negligent misrepresentation based on omissions rather than false statements. Dismissal was without prejudice, and plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their complaint.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In United States v. Crocker, the defendant was indicted on four counts of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and four counts of failure to file tax returns under 26 U.S.C. § 7203 for the years 1984 through 1987. After a jury trial resulting in guilty verdicts on all counts, the court considered Crocker's motion for judgment of acquittal, which argued insufficient evidence, that the tax system is voluntary, and that the Paperwork Reduction Act barred prosecution due to missing OMB control numbers on IRS form instructions. The court denied the motion, holding that the government presented sufficient evidence of willful non-filing, false W-4 claims, and evasion through misleading conduct and asset concealment. It further ruled that 1040 instruction booklets are not "information collection requests" under the PRA requiring OMB numbers, as they do not solicit new information beyond the forms themselves.

criminal lawtaxes

The case involves plaintiff Ramon Ospina's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Delaware law against state police officers, prison officials, and departments, arising from his 1987 arrest for drug possession and subsequent detention at Gander Hill prison. Ospina alleged excessive force during handcuffing that caused a serious wrist injury and denial of adequate medical treatment for over two months, leading to permanent damage. The court converted the motion to dismiss into one evaluated under Rule 12(b) standards after excluding affidavits due to lack of discovery, accepted the complaint's facts as true, and analyzed the defendants' capacities. It dismissed all federal and state claims against defendants sued in their official capacities on Eleventh Amendment grounds and related immunity principles, while allowing claims against Trooper Durnan in his individual capacity to proceed at this early stage.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case involved Read Corporation and its affiliate suing Portec, Inc. for willful infringement of two patents (a utility patent and a design patent) covering a screening device for separating fine earth materials from coarser ones. A jury found that Portec willfully infringed both patents and awarded Read $1,324,782 in lost profits as compensatory damages. Portec moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, challenging the sufficiency of evidence on infringement, patent validity, willfulness, damages, and several evidentiary and jury-instruction rulings by the court. The court denied the motions in full, concluding that the jury verdict was supported by substantial evidence under the applicable standards and that the challenged trial rulings were not erroneous.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involves consolidated diversity suits stemming from a 1987 dormitory fire at Wesley College that killed student Christopher Sterner and injured Joseph Morgan. The Sterner family sued the college and two students, McGee and Rumsey, alleging that the students' use of smoke bombs started the fire and claiming both negligence and recklessness, while Morgan sued the college for negligence; the claims sought compensatory damages as well as punitive and hedonic damages. The court granted Wesley College partial summary judgment barring punitive damages against it, denied the same relief to McGee and Rumsey, and ruled that hedonic damages could not be recovered as a distinct category but only to the extent they form part of pain-and-suffering damages under Delaware's survival statutes. The core reasoning was that no evidence supported a finding of recklessness by the college sufficient for punitives, while the students' conduct raised a triable issue of recklessness, and Delaware statutes do not authorize standalone hedonic recovery in survival or wrongful-death actions.

torts & liability