This case involved three plaintiffs who sued their former employer and its successors under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, claiming they were unlawfully excluded from a 2001 discretionary employee investment program due to their age and that one plaintiff was denied severance in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims. The discrimination claims were dismissed as time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations and because exclusion from the voluntary investment opportunity did not constitute an adverse employment action. The retaliation claim was rejected because the employer applied a uniform policy requiring a general release of claims in exchange for severance benefits to all eligible employees.
The case concerned Kenneth Schneider's jury convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) for traveling in foreign commerce with intent to engage in sex with a minor and under the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421, for transporting a person in foreign commerce for criminal sexual conduct, arising from his 2001 travel to Russia with a 15-year-old boy with whom he had a prior sexual relationship. Schneider moved for judgment of acquittal, dismissal of the indictment, arrest of judgment, or a new trial, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the constitutionality of the statutes under the Commerce Clause, and the vagueness of jury instructions. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, finding the evidence sufficient to support the convictions under the charged statutes, upholding Congress's authority to enact the provisions even for non-commercial activity abroad, and rejecting claims that the relevant terms or instructions were unconstitutionally vague.
In United States v. Martinez, defendant Harold Martinez moved to suppress items including bolt cutters, gloves, screwdrivers, and a baseball bat seized from the trunk of his car after his arrest, claiming his consent to the search was involuntary because officers allegedly beat him and failed to advise him he could refuse. The court found Martinez's account of the beating not credible, noting that multiple officers and medical personnel observed no injuries, he made no complaints during processing, and his responses during the search were calm. Considering the totality of the circumstances—the calm, non-coercive manner of the request in English and Spanish, Martinez's affirmative responses of "no problem," visible but undrawn weapons, and lack of any apparent duress—the court held the consent was freely and voluntarily given. The motion to suppress was therefore denied, and the seized items were deemed admissible under the Fourth Amendment.
This case involved car dealerships owned by Donald Mente that had long-standing floor plan financing agreements with GMAC under Wholesale Security Agreements requiring repayment for sold vehicles 'faithfully and promptly,' a term the court found ambiguous. After disputes over credit lines and an audit while the dealerships' controller was on vacation, GMAC declared the dealerships out of trust, seized assets and titles, and imposed restrictive sales policies, leading the dealerships and Mente to sue for breach of contract. A jury awarded the plaintiffs $4 million, and GMAC moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) or a new trial under Rule 59, arguing issues including insufficient evidence, erroneous evidentiary rulings, and improper jury instructions. The court denied both motions, holding that the evidence supported the verdict, that any evidentiary or instructional errors were harmless or not prejudicial, and that the plaintiffs' course-of-dealing interpretation of the contract was permissible.
In United States v. Stearn, defendants Edward Stearn, Joseph Doebley, and Michael Doebley moved to suppress evidence seized from multiple houses, a garage/gym, and vehicles during searches conducted on October 5 and 6, 2005, pursuant to warrants. The court granted the motion in part, suppressing evidence from four warrants issued on October 5 because the supporting affidavit did not contain sufficient facts within its four corners to establish probable cause. The court also suppressed evidence from two additional warrants issued on October 6 because those warrants relied on information obtained from the earlier, invalid searches. The core reasoning was that the affidavit relied on uncorroborated statements from a confidential informant without any indicia of reliability and that the limited surveillance observations failed to provide a substantial basis for concluding that contraband would be found at the specified locations.
The Parkers, college-educated business owners with prior home financing experience, sued a mortgage broker and several lending institutions over two pairs of mortgages they obtained in 2005 on properties in Pennsylvania, alleging violations of the Truth-in-Lending Act, RESPA, and state laws based on claims of inadequate disclosures, predatory terms such as adjustable rates and prepayment penalties, and improper loan practices. After a bench trial, at the close of the plaintiffs' case the court granted the defendants' motions for judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c). The court found that the Parkers' testimony was not credible or sufficient to overcome the documentary evidence showing timely early disclosures, including TILA statements with rate and payment schedules, and that the borrowers had requested no-document loans and were aware of the loan structures at settlement. The court also rejected rescission claims due to the Parkers' inability to tender the loan proceeds and found no violations of RESPA servicing requirements.
