The case involved the Federal Trade Commission and the State of Georgia seeking to enjoin Phoebe Putney Health System and related entities from acquiring Palmyra Park Hospital through the Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County, on the grounds that the transaction would eliminate competition and create a monopoly in inpatient hospital services in the Albany, Georgia area. Plaintiffs claimed the deal was structured to circumvent antitrust enforcement by having the public Authority nominally acquire the hospital before leasing and transferring operational control to Phoebe Putney. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that the challenged conduct qualified for state action immunity because it was authorized by the Georgia Hospital Authorities Law and directed by a political subdivision of the state.
This case involved state-law claims for wrongful death and pain and suffering brought by the mother of a woman fatally struck by a stray bullet during a street fight outside a Georgia bar, along with claims on behalf of the decedent's minor children, against a professional football player and his bodyguard. The plaintiffs filed the suit in federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction based on the parties' citizenship in different states. The court granted the defendants' motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction after an evidentiary hearing, determining that the minor plaintiffs, their representative, and at least one defendant were all domiciled in Georgia at the time of filing. As a result, complete diversity was absent and the case was dismissed without prejudice.
The case involved a defendant arrested in 2009 on drug charges involving 8.3 grams of crack cocaine, who pled guilty in October 2010 to violating 21 U.S.C. § 841 and faced sentencing in 2011. The court addressed the defendant's motion seeking a declaratory judgment that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 applied to reduce the applicable mandatory minimum penalties, rather than the pre-FSA law that imposed a five-year minimum for five grams or more of crack. The court granted the motion, holding that the FSA's penalty provisions govern because the defendant's plea and sentencing occurred after the Act's August 3, 2010 effective date. The core reasoning centered on congressional intent to restore fairness to cocaine sentencing by narrowing the crack-powder disparity, the absence of explicit retroactivity language being overcome by the timing of conviction and sentencing, and avoidance of the federal savings statute's default rule preserving prior penalties.
This case is a putative class action brought by plaintiffs against Life of South Insurance alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and negligence for failing to refund unearned credit insurance premiums after borrowers prepaid their car loans. The district court had previously denied the defendant's motion to compel arbitration, and that denial is now on interlocutory appeal to the Eleventh Circuit; proceedings in the district court were stayed pending the appeal. Plaintiffs then moved for a protective order requiring the defendant to preserve certain data and documents related to putative class members during the stay, while the defendant moved to stay consideration of that motion. The court granted the defendant's motion and stayed the plaintiffs' preservation request, holding that the pending appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction to issue such an order under precedents like Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co. and Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, and that the Federal Rules already impose a duty to preserve evidence.
The case involved a defendant charged in a superseding indictment with aggravated sexual abuse of a child, abusive sexual contact, and traveling in foreign commerce to engage in illicit sexual conduct, all alleged to have occurred in Japan while the U.S. citizen defendant accompanied his wife, a member of the U.S. Air Force. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA), which provided the basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction in two counts, was unconstitutional both facially and as applied, and raising related Sixth Amendment challenges. The court denied the motion to dismiss. It held that MEJA was a valid exercise of congressional authority under Article I, Section 8, and that extraterritorial jurisdiction was permissible under international law principles including the nationality principle (due to the defendant's U.S. citizenship) and the protective principle (to safeguard U.S. interests), while also finding the third count proper under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c).
In this case, defendants moved for attorneys' fees after the district court granted their motions to dismiss and entered judgment in their favor on March 31, 2009. The court denied the motion because it was filed on April 15, 2009, one day after the 14-day deadline imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B) and the corresponding local rule. The court held that it retained jurisdiction over the collateral fee request despite the pending appeal, but found that neither the three-day extension in Rule 6(d) nor a Rule 6(b) excusable-neglect extension applied to the filing deadline.