In this bankruptcy appeal, Aetna Life Insurance sought relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on property held by an irrevocable trust in which debtor Reuben Leimer held a beneficial interest, after the trust defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of trust. The bankruptcy court had denied relief, ruling that the trust assets and Leimer's interest constituted property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541 and were thus protected by the stay. On appeal, the district court reversed, holding that neither the trust assets nor the beneficial interest were estate property. The core reasoning was that 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) excludes a debtor's interest in a spendthrift trust from the estate when the trust's anti-alienation provisions are enforceable under applicable state law, here Nebraska law recognizing such trusts, as reflected in the trust's explicit spendthrift clause.
In Groth v. Sandoz, Inc., the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the drug Fiorinal after using it daily for nine years to treat migraines and later developing end-stage renal failure that required dialysis, asserting claims for negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that all claims were barred by Nebraska's ten-year statute of repose for product liability actions under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-224(2). The court reasoned that the claims fell within the statutory definition of product liability actions regardless of the legal theory pleaded, that the repose period extinguished any cause of action once ten years had passed from the product's first sale or use, and that the fraud allegations did not create equitable estoppel because they were unsupported and essentially restated the other product liability claims; the court also rejected constitutional challenges to the statute based on Nebraska Supreme Court precedent upholding a similar repose provision.
This case involved consolidated actions by the government to seize and condemn drug products distributed by Midwest Pharmaceuticals as misbranded imitation drugs under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 352(i)(2)), along with a request for injunctive relief against the company and its officers. The district court adopted the magistrate's findings and granted the government's motion for summary judgment on the claimant's counterclaims while denying the claimant's partial summary judgment motion and the defendants' motions to dismiss. The court reasoned that the doctrine of contributory liability, drawn from trademark and copyright precedents, applies to FDCA violations, allowing liability for distributors who induce or knowingly supply products that will be passed off as controlled substances. It further held that the counterclaims for sanctions, abuse of process, and negligence were legally insufficient or barred by the discretionary function exception in the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The case involved a former assistant controller at Union Pacific Railroad who was terminated due to a merger and sought six years of salary and benefits under New York Dock conditions imposed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, as well as claiming breach of an implied employment contract. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claim because disputes under the New York Dock conditions must be resolved through mandatory arbitration. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claim as a pendent matter. The reasoning centered on the language of the New York Dock conditions and precedents interpreting "may be referred" as requiring arbitration.
This case involved consolidated tax refund suits brought by members of the Hilt family and their family-owned corporations (including Trucks, Inc.) against the United States, seeking recovery of 1975 and 1976 income taxes paid after IRS audits disallowed portions of compensation paid to family members as unreasonable or excessive under Section 162(a)(1). The IRS had recharacterized some payments as dividends, increasing tax liability, while also reallocating income in one Subchapter S corporation. The court found jurisdiction proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) and determined, after examining all facts and circumstances including comparable compensation data, that judgment should be entered for the plaintiffs in five cases involving the reasonable compensation issue, leading to dismissal of the remaining cases.
This case involved a pro se plaintiff suing an IRS agent and a cooperative manager for allegedly violating her due process and civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 by serving and complying with an IRS summons for business records without prior notice to her. The court treated the defendants' motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment and granted them, dismissing the complaint. The core reasoning was that the cooperative was not a third-party recordkeeper under 26 U.S.C. § 7609 because its records were limited to its own business transactions (excluding it from the definition of consumer reporting agency) and it was not engaged in accounting, so the plaintiff had no right to notice or intervention and the defendants' actions did not support any constitutional or statutory claims.
