Richard A. Schell

The case involved parents of a child with dyslexia, ADHD, and a speech impairment who appealed a Texas Education Agency hearing officer's ruling that Northwest Independent School District had provided their child a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The parents had requested a due process hearing after multiple ARDC meetings, alleging inadequate services and seeking reimbursement for private school placement. The district court reviewed the administrative record and the parties' cross-motions for judgment, finding no procedural violations that denied FAPE, that the IEPs were reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit, and that the district had not withheld required information. The court therefore denied the parents' motion, granted the district's motion, upheld the hearing officer's decision, and denied the district's request for attorneys' fees.

civil rights

The case involved a former probation officer who sued her employer, the Fannin County Community Supervision and Corrections Department, and several individuals in state court, alleging retaliation under the Texas Whistleblowers Act as well as violations of the First Amendment and federal civil rights statutes after she reported alleged state law violations within the department. Defendants removed the action to federal court, prompting the plaintiff to move for remand on the ground that one defendant had not properly joined in or consented to the removal within the statutory 30-day period. The court granted the motion to remand, ruling that the rule of unanimity required all served defendants to demonstrate consent on the record before the deadline and that removal statutes are strictly construed with doubts resolved in favor of remand to state court. The court denied the plaintiff's request for attorney fees and a motion for additional briefing as moot.

procedurecivil rights

This case is an employment discrimination suit under the FMLA and ADA in which plaintiff Michael Norton alleged that defendant Assisted Living Concepts fired him after he took medical leave for cancer treatment. The court ruled on numerous pending motions, including multiple discovery disputes, motions to compel, a motion for summary judgment on a counterclaim, and a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. It denied as moot or without merit several motions to compel responses and objections, found that Norton had waived objections by providing answers, and held that his responses to certain RFPs complied with Rule 34. The court further addressed the sufficiency of administrative prerequisites and determined that cancer qualifies as a disability under the ADA because it substantially limits normal cell growth.

labor & employmentprocedurecivil rights

This case involves a dispute between medical services provider Encompass Office Solutions and health insurers UnitedHealth Group and its subsidiaries over reimbursement for equipment and nursing services provided during in-office surgical procedures for United's insured patients. Encompass, which received assignments of benefits from patients, alleged that United initially reimbursed claims but later stopped payments, demanded refunds based on claims of misrepresentation regarding facility status, and underpaid outstanding claims, leading to causes of action including declaratory judgment, breach of contract, ERISA violations, and various state-law claims. The court ruled on the defendants' motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), denying the motion in part and granting it in part. The decision addressed issues such as Encompass's standing to sue based on patient assignments, the sufficiency of pleadings for fraud-based claims under Rule 9(b), and the viability of ERISA and state-law causes of action.

business & regulatoryhealthcareprocedure

This case involves a long-running class action lawsuit filed in 1993 by Medicaid-eligible Texas youth alleging that state officials failed to adequately provide Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) services as required by federal Medicaid law. The parties entered a 1996 consent decree outlining improvements to the state's Texas Health Steps program, followed by a 2007 corrective action order addressing specific deficiencies including dental services. The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) to modify the corrective action order by eliminating requirements for a dental corrective action plan and a second dental assessment, arguing that program objectives had been met, and also sought to strike certain expert testimony. The court denied both motions, finding that the defendants had not demonstrated attainment of the decree's objectives or a durable remedy sufficient to justify relief from the ongoing requirements.

healthcarecivil rightsfederal power

This case involved the United States suing Renda Marine, Inc. to enforce two claims totaling over $14 million arising from a dredging contract with the Army Corps of Engineers under the Contract Disputes Act. The claims stemmed from a prior Court of Federal Claims decision that had addressed Renda's requests for additional compensation and determined the government was owed money for overpayments and other issues. Renda moved to dismiss one count for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the claims required separate administrative proceedings, and sought summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, while the United States moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court denied Renda's motions and granted the United States' motion, holding that the prior CFC litigation had already resolved the disputes in compliance with the CDA and that no additional contracting officer decision was needed for the overpayment claim.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

This case is a bankruptcy appeal in which Red River Resources, Energytec, and Comanche challenged the bankruptcy court's ruling that Energytec's interests in oil and gas leases on the Jennie Belcher and Garbade properties in Titus County, Texas, had terminated. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's December 2009 decision after conducting de novo review. Under Texas law, the leases automatically terminated due to cessation of production after the primary terms expired, and the court found that the force majeure clauses in the leases did not excuse the cessations caused by regulatory severance orders or loss of a purchaser, that the temporary cessation of production doctrine did not apply, and that no lessor repudiation had occurred.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee seeking to enforce a judgment lien by foreclosing on a sand pit property owned by the defendant to satisfy a $686,689.75 award plus interest from an adversary proceeding. The defendant claims the approximately 95-acre Grayson County property qualifies as his rural homestead under Texas law and is therefore exempt from execution. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the homestead exemption issue. The court denied both motions, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the defendant's use, occupancy, and intent to claim the property as homestead, including conflicting evidence about prior designations and ownership of other properties. The matter will proceed to a bench trial to resolve whether the property is exempt.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned a dispute over life insurance benefits under an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan following the death of James Hugh Elmore. Plaintiffs, the decedent's children, sued in state court seeking a declaration that the decedent was not married to defendant Jackie Doss-Elmore at the time of his death and that they were therefore entitled to the proceeds; MetLife had already paid the benefits to Doss-Elmore after determining she was the decedent's common-law spouse under Texas law. Defendants removed the case to federal court, arguing the claims were preempted by ERISA. The court granted summary judgment to both defendants, concluding that MetLife's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record, including documents listing the couple as married and affidavits from acquaintances, and that plaintiffs failed to show an abuse of discretion.

family lawprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In this bankruptcy appeal, Legacy Capital Investments, LLC challenged a bankruptcy court's order that reconsidered and modified the confirmed Chapter 11 reorganization plan for itself and related debtors. The bankruptcy court had initially confirmed a plan providing for a cramdown interest rate of prime plus 2% over four years to secured creditor RMR Investments, Inc., but on reconsideration granted RMR relief by requiring the contractual default rate of 15% and limiting deferred payments to three years, citing the debtor's solvency. The district court affirmed, reviewing the bankruptcy court's conclusions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error, and determining that the reconsideration was proper under the circumstances of the cramdown provisions in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2). The core reasoning focused on the applicability of the pre-petition default interest rate when the debtor was solvent and the appropriate length of the payment deferral period.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved a lawsuit by Drummond American LLC against its former sales agents Jack Brierton and Leo Sharp, along with competitor Share Corporation, for breach of non-compete covenants in independent sales agent agreements, as well as related claims of trade secret misappropriation and tortious interference. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the non-compete provisions were enforceable under Texas law and that Brierton and Sharp had breached them. The core reasoning was that the covenants were ancillary to otherwise enforceable agreements, reasonable in time and geographic scope, and supported by uncontroverted evidence that the agents sold competing products to their former Drummond customers within two years of leaving. Defenses based on alleged oral contract modifications and constructive discharge were rejected for lack of proper pleading or sufficient evidence.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a motion to reconsider a prior order granting summary judgment to defendants Joe and Cathey Weaver in a negligent entrustment claim brought by plaintiff Chris Wright. The claim alleged that the Weavers were liable for entrusting a vehicle to their son Judson, whose prior driving incidents and record supposedly made him reckless or incompetent. The court denied the motion, finding that the incidents were too isolated, remote, or lacking in fault determinations to establish a pattern of recklessness, with no evidence of driving under the influence and a renewed driver's license indicating competency. The core reasoning relied on Texas precedents requiring a clear showing that the entrustor should have anticipated harm based on the driver's history.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves a patent infringement suit in which Raytheon Company accused Indigo Systems Corporation and FLIR Systems, Inc. of infringing multiple claims across four patents related to infrared detectors, indium antimonide photodetectors, and focal plane array readouts. The court issued a claim construction order resolving disputes over the meaning of various terms in the asserted claims. Relying on the claim language, the patent specifications, and the prosecution histories as intrinsic evidence, the court applied the framework from Phillips v. AWH Corp. to assign ordinary and customary meanings to a person of ordinary skill in the art, while declining to import limitations from preferred embodiments or impose numerical bounds unless supported by the intrinsic record. The constructions addressed terms such as “spacer layer,” “about 1/4X,” and functional claim elements under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case was an employment discrimination suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act in which the plaintiff alleged that her bank employer failed to promote her, denied reasonable accommodations for her lupus and related conditions, and discharged her in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment in full. The court found no genuine issue of material fact on the failure-to-promote or accommodation claims, and on retaliation held that evidence of temporal proximity between the EEOC filing and termination was insufficient by itself to establish causation given the plaintiff's prior disciplinary record and extended absence.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In this case, a residential real estate developer sued an electric cooperative alleging that the cooperative's requirement for the developer to pay over $700,000 for electrical infrastructure in a new subdivision phase, along with conveying title to that infrastructure, violated federal antitrust laws and the developer's constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause. The developer claimed the agreement was signed under duress and constituted a contract of adhesion, and that the cooperative acted under color of state law as a monopolist. The court granted the cooperative's motion to dismiss, finding that the cooperative was not a state actor for purposes of the civil rights claim and that the developer failed to allege anticompetitive conduct or an antitrust injury sufficient to support the Sherman Act claims, as the cooperative's monopoly position resulted from state-granted exclusive service territory. The remaining state law claims were dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.

business & regulatorycivil rightsproperty

This case involved Raytheon suing Indigo Systems and related defendants for trade secret misappropriation, tortious interference, unfair competition, and fraudulent concealment arising from former Raytheon employees founding Indigo and allegedly using Raytheon's confidential infrared imaging technology. Raytheon abandoned its unfair competition and tortious interference claims during briefing. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims and denied Raytheon's cross-motion, holding that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The core reasoning was that discovery evidence showed Raytheon had long been on notice of the underlying facts through Indigo's business activities and hiring, so the fraudulent concealment doctrine did not toll the limitations period long enough to make the suit timely.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a mother suing MySpace on behalf of her minor daughter, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and strict product liability after the daughter was lured and sexually assaulted by a predator who contacted her via the website; the plaintiff claimed MySpace failed to implement adequate safety measures and acted as an information content provider by generating profile elements like zodiac signs and prompts. MySpace removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss, arguing immunity under the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the claims were barred by CDA § 230(c)(1) because MySpace was an interactive computer service provider and not an information content provider, as users were not required to provide additional profile information and the site's prompts did not constitute creation or development of content under precedents like Roommates.com. The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments as either foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent or factually distinguishable from cases where platforms mandated specific user inputs.

free speechtorts & liability

This case involves claims by parents and students against two elementary school principals in Plano Independent School District, alleging that the principals engaged in viewpoint discrimination by preventing students from distributing items with religious messages, such as candy cane pens referencing the religious origin of the candy cane or pencils stating 'Jesus is the Reason for the Season,' as well as tickets to a religious event and similar materials during non-instructional times. The defendants moved to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity, arguing that elementary students lack constitutional protections for such speech or that no clearly established law prohibited their actions. The court conducted a de novo review and adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation, denying the motion to dismiss as to both principals. The reasoning was that the complaint alleged facts showing potential violations of clearly established rights to free speech and free exercise of religion, and that the principals' conduct as described was not objectively reasonable under existing precedent.

free speechreligious libertycivil rights

In Anderson v. Cain, plaintiffs brought claims arising from alleged fraud by defendants Eugene and Rita Cain and others in Texas state court; after the Cains filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the case was removed to federal district court under the bankruptcy removal statute. The district court initially granted plaintiffs' motion to remand the claims against the Cains to state court, citing state-law issues and concerns over forum shopping. On the intervenor Chapter 7 Trustee's motion for reconsideration, the court granted the motion and referred the entire lawsuit to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The court reasoned that new developments—including withdrawal of a motion to dismiss the bankruptcy petition, additional parties intervening in the related adversary proceeding, and counterclaims in that proceeding that mirrored the claims here—made the bankruptcy court the most efficient single forum for resolving the disputes.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves a motion by plaintiff Raytheon to exclude the rebuttal expert report and testimony of Art Simmons, offered by defendants in a trade secret misappropriation dispute concerning infrared imaging technology. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, ruling that Simmons is qualified to testify based on his relevant experience in infrared imaging fabrication despite limited direct work with the specific InSb technology at issue. However, the court excluded Simmons' opinions that certain trade secrets (16-18 and 23) were in the public domain, as they lacked supporting evidence from the documentation he cited. The remaining challenges to Simmons' methodology and conclusions were deemed issues of evidentiary weight for the jury rather than grounds for exclusion under Daubert standards for reliability and relevance.

procedurebusiness & regulatory