This case involves two employees at an auto dealership, an autopainter and a bodyman, who were paid on a piece-rate or flat-rate basis for repair jobs and alleged they were required to wait unpaid at the shop for 10-15 hours per week between assignments. They sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act and New Mexico Minimum Wage Act for unpaid waiting time, with one plaintiff also bringing claims under the New Mexico Human Rights Act for retaliation and under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for discrimination based on Mexican ancestry. The court denied summary judgment on the wage claims, reasoning that FLSA requires compensation for required waiting time at least at minimum wage and that the exemptions cited by defendants applied only to overtime, not basic wages. It granted summary judgment on the retaliation claim against the individual supervisor but denied it against the employer, and denied summary judgment on the § 1981 claim, finding that the statute covers discrimination based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics.
The case involved a medical student with Scoptic Sensitivity Syndrome, a reading disability, who requested testing accommodations from the University of New Mexico and the National Board of Medical Examiners for the United States Medical Licensing Examination Step 1; after his requests were denied or not fully addressed, he failed the exam twice, was placed on academic leave, and sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and state breach of contract claims. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss. It held that the UNM defendants were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from the § 1983 claims, that the complaint failed to plausibly allege a disability under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act because it did not identify a substantially limiting impairment of a major life activity, and that with no federal claims remaining the court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law contract claims.
In Pacheco v. Hopmeier, a high school student sued school officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming he was removed from class without consent or suspicion of any crime or rule violation, then handcuffed, searched, and transported to a police station in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on any negligence claim but denied it as to the constitutional claims, while granting plaintiff's cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims. The core reasoning was that the principal ordered the seizure knowing there was neither probable cause, reasonable suspicion, nor consent, thereby setting in motion an unlawful arrest and search.
The case involved David Augustson challenging the ATF's revocation of his federal firearms license for August Arms due to repeated violations of record-keeping requirements under the Gun Control Act, such as improper Form 4473 completions and bound book entries. The court granted summary judgment to the Attorney General, upholding the revocation, after finding that the violations were willful. The reasoning was that Augustson, as the licensee, was responsible for compliance including his employee's actions, that multiple inspections showed repeat violations despite warnings, and that even a single willful violation justifies revocation under the law.
This case concerned a motion to remand a lawsuit originally filed in state court by State Farm against Dunn-Edwards and other defendants for liability arising from fire damage to its insured. The defendants removed the action to federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction, but only one defendant participated in the removal notice, with the other later filing a consent to magistrate jurisdiction rather than explicit consent to removal. The court granted the motion to remand, holding that the unanimity rule derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1446 requires all properly served defendants to provide timely written consent to removal through a filing with the court. The opinion emphasized that private communications between counsel or subsequent actions do not satisfy the requirement of unambiguous, court-noticed consent within the thirty-day removal period, consistent with the presumption against removal jurisdiction and strict enforcement of procedural rules.
In Sanders v. DJO, LLC, the plaintiff sued multiple defendants in New Mexico state court alleging products liability and negligence claims after a pain pump implanted during shoulder surgery allegedly caused severe injuries. The defendants removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds, arguing that the non-diverse defendant Lovelace Health Systems had been fraudulently joined. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand, finding that defendants had not met their heavy burden to show fraudulent joinder because there was a reasonable possibility the plaintiff could prevail on a negligence claim against Lovelace for failing to properly investigate the pain pump. The court applied a standard more deferential than a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, allowing consideration of evidence beyond the pleadings and noting that ultimate dismissal of the claim in state court would not necessarily establish fraudulent joinder.