The case involved an employee of General Dynamics who was discharged in 1972 for refusing to join or pay dues to a union as required by a new collective bargaining agreement, citing his religious beliefs as a Seventh Day Adventist that prohibited membership in or contributions to labor organizations. The plaintiff sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging religious discrimination, after the Ninth Circuit had previously ruled that a reasonable accommodation could be made by directing equivalent payments to charity and remanded the case. On remand, the district court addressed the defendants' challenge to the constitutionality of the religious accommodation requirement in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). The court held this provision unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, after reviewing the legislative history of Title VII, applicable constitutional standards from cases like Lemon v. Kurtzman, and the absence of controlling precedent from higher courts.
The case involves the San Diego Unified Port District challenging a condition imposed by the California Department of Transportation in a noise variance for Lindbergh Field airport. The condition required extending an existing curfew on commercial jet operations to ban most takeoffs and landings between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. The Port District sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the condition was unconstitutional, and the court addressed motions for a preliminary injunction and summary judgment after the FAA declined to issue a written determination on the curfew's effects. The court granted the preliminary injunction, finding serious constitutional questions and that the balance of hardships favored the Port District and intervenor airlines, while denying the Department's summary judgment motion due to the lack of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The decision focused on whether the state-imposed curfew condition could be enforced without conflicting with federal aviation authority.
This case was a class action lawsuit brought by applicants denied General Relief benefits in San Diego County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that the county's informal administrative review process for denials violated their Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights, and requesting the full evidentiary hearing protections established in Goldberg v. Kelly. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that denied applicants have no constitutional right to an evidentiary hearing before denial of aid. The core reasoning was that an applicant's interest in General Relief does not constitute a protected property right or claim of entitlement under the Due Process Clause, distinguishing it from the interests of existing recipients facing termination, and that the county's existing informal review procedures, while not constitutionally required, provide sufficient recourse along with options to reapply or seek judicial review.
The case involved plaintiff Judith Exner suing the FBI under the Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act after the agency failed to timely respond to her 1975 request for records about herself; following court orders and appeals, the FBI released most of the 92 identified documents over time, though some were properly withheld under exemptions. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment on the remaining documents and dismissed the case. On plaintiff's subsequent motion, the court awarded attorney fees and costs, finding that she had substantially prevailed in the litigation because her lawsuit prompted the release of the majority of the records. The award was limited to 125 hours of attorney time at $75 per hour plus reasonable costs, excluding time spent on an unsuccessful opposition to summary judgment.
This case involved a bankruptcy trustee's petition for review of a referee's order finding that a creditor held a valid purchase money security interest in the inventory of a bankrupt retail clothing business, including after-acquired items, allowing the lien to attach to proceeds from a public auction sale of the inventory. The court affirmed the referee's decision under California Commercial Code § 9102(4), which prohibits nonpossessory security interests in retail inventory except for purchase money security interests. The core reasoning was that the purchase money exception extends to after-acquired property based on the UCC's liberal construction rules, its rejection of historical prejudice against floating liens, pre-Code California law recognizing similar arrangements via chattel mortgages and conditional sales, and the policy of facilitating commercial transactions through recorded notice to creditors.
This case involved three ambulance drivers who sued their employer, Bay Cities Ambulance Service, under the Fair Labor Standards Act for unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation based on their 120- to 132-hour weekly on-duty schedules. The court held that the plaintiffs were engaged in interstate commerce because a portion of their ambulance calls involved interstate highways and other cross-border activity, making the FLSA applicable and precluding any exemption. It further ruled that compensation was due for all on-duty time, including sleep and meal periods, because those times were subject to frequent interruption by emergency calls and served the employer's benefit. The court declined to award liquidated damages, finding the employer's noncompliance reasonable and in good faith given the uncertain state of the law at the time, and entered judgments for specific amounts of back wages, costs, and attorney fees for each plaintiff.